239 Pa. 533 | Pa. | 1913
Opinion by
The murder was committed December 19, 1910. The indictment charged appellant with the commission of the crime. She was tried March 1, 1911, and was found guilty of murder of the second degree. A motion for a new trial was argued March 31, 1911, and was held under advisement until June 2, 1911, when it was overruled. On October 4, 1911, appellant was sentenced to undergo an imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement for a period of not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty years in the Eastern Penitentiary. The Act of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, relating to indeterminate sentences, was passed after the commission of the crime, and subsequently to the trial and conviction, but before the sentence, was imposed. It is, therefore, urged that the sentence was imposed under the Act of 1911, and that this act as applied to the crime for which appellant was convicted is an ex post facto law and, therefore, unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the Act of 1911, as it may be applied to crimes committed after its approval, is not questioned by either party. A reargument was ordered in this case for the purpose of having the constitutionality of the Act of 1911, which .necessarily involved the constitutionality of the Act of May 10, 1909, P. L. 495, raised and discussed. But upon this question we are confronted with the' rather unusual positions of both parties, each insisting upon the constitutionality of the Act of 1911. The Commonwealth..argues that the act was in force and that' appellant was . properly sentenced under it, while appellant, urges the,, validity of the act as the ground upon which is based the contention that as to her crime it is an, ex post facto law. In this state of the record there'
(1) That the title is defective; (2) that the act creates a new crime without notice in the title; (3) that the act is special legislation; (4) that the act transfers judicial discretion to a non-judicial board; (5) that it assumes to restrict the pardoning power of the governor and the board of pardons; (6) that the sixth section.of the act is in conflict with Article III, Section 6, of the Constitution. We do not feel warranted in discussing at length these several objections to the Acts of 1909 and 1911, which in one form and another, and in several cases, have been raised in different courts. In the present case these objections have not been urged because both parties choose to stand upon the constitutionality of these acts, at least this is their position as to the Act of 1911. We agree with counsel that the Act of 1911 is a valid exercise of legislative power, and that nothing contained therein is in contravention of any provision of the Constitution. The same may be said of the Act of 1909, which has been very fully considered by the Superior Court in an opinion recently handed down by President Judge Rice in the case of Com. ex rel. Bates v. McKenty, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 332. In the supplemental paper book of appellant this opinion is printed in full, and since the questions there considered are incidentally involved in the present case, it becomes necessary for this court to approve or disapprove of what was there decided and the reasons given for the conclusions reached. We fully concur in the views expressed by the Superior Court speaking through its president judge in. that case. The questions involved
This view is in accord with the trend of decisions interpreting indeterminate sentence laws in many other jurisdictions in which it was held that a sentence for an indefinite term must be deemed a sentence for the maximum term prescribed by law as a punishment for the offense committed. This view was first expressed in our own State by President Judge Sulzberger in Com. ex rel. Bates v. McKenty, hereinbefore referred to as having been considered by the Superior Court. In that case the learned court below in passing upon the question we are now considering, said: “Assuming, as we do, for the purpose of interpreting the statute, that it is constitutional, it necessarily follows that the maximum sen
A statute which mitigates the penalty is not objectionable on the ground of being an ex post facto law, although passed after the crime was committed: Com. v. Wyman, 66 Mass. 237; Com. v. Gardner, 77 Mass. 438; Dolan v. Thomas, 94 Mass. 421. So, too, statutes which relate to procedure or penal administration, or prison discipline, are not to be considered ex post facto, even
In the present case the maximum punishment for murder of the second degree under the Act of 1893 was an imprisonment of twenty years, and nothing contained in the Act of 1911 increased or aggravated the crime. The provisions of this act were intended to benefit convicted persons and to mitigate the severity of their punishment as prescribed by law. This act represents the humanitarian view of those most competent to speak on the question of the proper treatment of criminals. It is believed to be wholesome legislation and we can see no reason why courts should be astute in sustaining technical objections intended to strike it down.
We find no merit in any of the assignments of error and they are all dismissed.
Judgment affirmed, and record remitted in order that the sentence may be executed.