Commonwealth v. Joshmar Mendez

Jul 1, 2026

2577CR00326

The defendant, Joshmar Mendez (“Mendez“), moves to suppress the warrantless seizure of contraband by members of the Beverly Police Department (“BPD“) on June 11, 2025, following the stop of a minivan driven by him. After hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, Mendez‘s motion to suppress is DENIED.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On May 27, 2026, the court heard testimony from BPD Detective Thomas Nolan (“Nolan“), Detective Sergeant Justin Shairs (“Shairs“), Detective William Barror (“Barror“), and Officer Jason Lantych (“Lantych“), and it received nine exhibits in evidence. Mendez did not testify. The court makes the following factual findings based on the credible evidence produced at the hearing and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. In making these findings, the court finds the testimony of Nolan, Shares, Barror, and Lantych truthful and accurate on the relevant and material points set forth below.

On June 10, 2025, the BPD received a complaint from an individual regarding a person known to the caller and police to be a drug user loitering behind Flair‘s Cleaners on Longmeadow Road in Beverly. Nolan and other officers had dealt with the alleged loiterer, Ian Rivers (“Rivers“), for more than twenty years. During this time, Rivers admitted to Nolan to being an opiate addict. BPD had responded to incidents when Rivers overdosed on narcotics and on occasions when Rivers was present when other individuals had overdosed. Nolan, an experienced narcotics investigator, had dealt with Rivers in his capacity as a BPD officer dozens of times over the years. In the past, Nolan has seen Rivers engage in conduct consistent with participating in a drug transaction. While sellers of narcotics to Rivers have been arrested and convicted for drug offenses, Rivers himself has not been arrested by Nolan for drug possession.

The Longmeadow Road area is a small neighborhood. The street itself, however, is off a major thoroughfare (Cabot Street/Route lA) and a short distance from Route 128, making it an ideal location to conduct illicit drug sales as it offers avenues to avoid apprehension by law enforcement.

After receiving the complaint on June 10, 2025, Nolan and Shairs, also an experienced narcotics detective, went to Longmeadow Road. They were dressed in plain clothes and drove separate unmarked vehicles. Shairs observed Rivers loitering behind Flair‘s Cleaners talking on his cellphone. Rivers proceeded to walk down Longmeadow Road, but Shairs lost sight of him. Shairs next saw a grey minivan with Illinois license plates and an Uber sign on the windshield pull into the neighborhood. Approximately one minute after observing the minivan pulling onto Longmeadow Road, Shairs saw the minivan leaving the area. Shairs noted that the driver of the minivan was a male, and the front seat passenger was a female. He was unable to see into the rear passenger compartment of the minivan because its windows were heavily tinted. Shairs and Nolan drove about the neighborhood in search of Rivers but were unable to locate him.

The next day, at approximately 4:45PM, Nolan and Shairs returned to the Longmeadow Road area in search of Rivers. Nolan and Shairs knew from their experience that a frequent user of opiates such as Rivers needed to obtain a daily dose or they could get physically ill. Upon arriving in the Longmeadow Road area, Nolan observed Rivers leaving the North Beverly Variety Store with a “Twisted Tea” alcoholic beverage and walking about the area while talking and texting on his cellphone. As he communicated over the phone, Rivers appeared to be animated, gesturing with his hands. Detectives observed Rivers walking on Access Road, a dead end, and then proceeding to the downtown area. They followed him to several locations. He eventually walked down Rantoul Street toward the waterfront area of the city, where he entered the parking lot of Port Marine on Water Street and remained static for a period.

At one point after going in and out of buildings, Rivers waved to Shairs, who was known to Rivers as a police officer. Recognizing that surveillance had been burned, detectives enlisted the assistance of Barror, who responded to the area in a different unmarked vehicle. The detectives communicated with each other over open cellphone lines placed on speaker. They would also use, on occasion, shortwave radios. After a short time, detectives observed a grey minivan with Illinois license plates and an Uber sign on the windshield pull into the Port Marine parking lot. It had a male driver and female passenger. It was similar, if not identical, in appearance with the minivan observed in the Longmeadow Road neighborhood at the same time as Rivers the day before. Rivers entered the rear compartment of the minivan via the side sliding door. The minivan drove approximately thirty feet, whereupon Rivers alighted from the vehicle. Approximately twenty to thirty seconds had elapsed between Rivers entering the minivan and his leaving the minivan. Rivers walked from the area while the minivan exited the parking lot and doubled back in the direction it initially came. Although detectives could not see into the minivan after Rivers had entered the vehicle due to the tinted windows, they nevertheless believed, based on the totality of their observations and their collective experience, that a so-called “meaningless ride” had occurred. In other words, detectives concluded that Rivers entered the minivan for the sole purpose of purchasing narcotics from the vehicle‘s occupants rather than traveling to a destination.

Nolan communicated the observations at the Port Marine parking lot to Shairs, who had parked his vehicle on Front Street. Shairs observed Rivers “hotfooting” it while coming off Water Street and passing by Front Street. About one minute elapsed between Shairs learning about the “meaningless ride” and Shairs observing Rivers. Shairs followed Rivers a short distance in his vehicle. He caught up with Rivers on Cabot Street approximately 100 yards before Stone Street and a short distance away from the Port Marine parking lot. Shairs activated his emergency lights and siren and stopped Rivers. He exited his car and told Rivers that police knew what transpired and instructed Rivers to turn over the drugs. Rivers responded that he “got rid of it” after hearing the police siren. A pat search of Rivers yielded negative results. The interaction with Rivers took approximately one minute.¹ Shairs released Rivers and reentered his vehicle, whereupon he told Nolan what occurred.

Meanwhile, Barror and Nolan followed the minivan. They communicated via shortwave radio. Barror activated the emergency lights and siren on his vehicle and stopped the minivan on Water Street. Nolan assisted Barror with the stop. Barror approached the driver‘s side of the minivan while Nolan went to the passenger side. Mendez was the operator of the minivan. A female occupied the front passenger seat and a dog occupied the rear of the van. A conversation ensued. Mendez asked the detectives why he was being stopped. Mendez told Barror and Nolan that he was an Uber driver and had just dropped off a passenger. Nolan told Mendez police were familiar with Mendez‘s passenger and asked why an Uber driver would pick someone up for a thirty-foot ride. Mendez appeared stunned by the question and did not respond.

The traffic on Water Street in Beverly at rush hour is heavy. Nolan asked Mendez to step from the minivan and proceed to the front of the minivan. Before having Mendez exit the vehicle, Nolan learned from Shairs that Rivers acknowledged buying some “stuff” but that he “got rid of it.”² Barror did not communicate with Shairs at that time, but he believed Nolan did. As Mendez exited the minivan, Nolan observed a large bulge of money sticking out of Mendez‘s pants pocket. Once at the front of the minivan, Nolan noticed an “abnormal bulge” in Mendez‘s upper buttocks area. Nolan then patfrisked the object and felt hard, knotted twists which he recognized to be packaged narcotics. Nolan removed the object from Mendez‘s waistline and observed a clear plastic sandwich bag containing smaller packets of a brown powered substance which Nolan recognized to be fentanyl. Mendez was arrested.

Police determined the female passenger in the minivan had a suspended driver‘s license and therefore could not operate the minivan. The vehicle itself was blocking a lane of travel on Water Street during rush hour and created a traffic hazard. A decision was made to tow the vehicle. Prior to towing, police conducted an inventory of the minivan and found, among other things, approximately $500 in cash. At the station during the booking process, Lantych performed a pat frisk of Mendez and discovered crack cocaine in the area of Mendez‘s left calf.

RULINGS OF LAW

1. Police had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to stop Mendez after observing him operate the minivan in a manner consistent with conducting a drug transaction inside the vehicle with a self-admitted opioid user. See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 363-364 (2017) (“Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer, based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer‘s experience, has reasonable grounds to suspect ‘a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.‘“). The finding takes into account the totality of the facts summarized above, including, but not limited to: (1) police observed Rivers, a known longtime opiate user, the day before behind Flair‘s Cleaners in the Longmeadow Road area in response to a civilian‘s complaint, (2) at that time, police also observed a grey minivan with Illinois license plates and an Uber sign in the windshield entering the confined neighborhood and leaving shortly thereafter, (3) the operator of the minivan was male and the front-seat passenger was female, (4) officers lost sight of Rivers that day but were unable to see inside the minivan due to window tinting, (5) the next day, police observed Rivers in the same neighborhood area using a cellphone while gesticulating in an animated fashion and then walking from one location to another before detecting an undercover officer, (6) Mendez arrived in a grey minivan bearing Illinois tags and an Uber sign, accompanied by a female passenger, (7) officers could reasonably infer it was the same minivan detectives saw the day before in the Longmeadow Road area after losing sight of Rivers, and (8) Rivers entered the minivan, which drove a distance of approximately thirty feet before Rivers exited the vehicle and “hotfooted” from the area, the overall sequence of events being consistent with a narcotics transaction having taken place between Rivers and the individuals inside the minivan. Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 345-347 (2010) (viewed through the eyes of experienced drug investigators, seemingly innocent activities can give rise to reasonable suspicion drug deal is afoot); Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 746 (2021) (“Police also may rely on their training and experience as a basis for reasonable suspicion.“). In short, many mickles make a muckle. That an innocent explanation for Mendez‘s actions might exist “does not remove [those actions] from consideration in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 373 (2007).

2. The order directing Mendez to exit the minivan was lawful. An exit order during a motor vehicle stop is justified where “(1) police are warranted in the belief that the safety of the officers or others is threatened; (2) police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; or (3) police are conducting a search of the vehicle on other grounds.” Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2020). Here, as noted above, police had reason to suspect that criminal activity involving Mendez and Rivers was afoot in the form of a recently completed drug transaction and consequently they were justified in ordering Mendez to exit the minivan.

3. Police lawfully patfrisked Mendez and seized suspected fentanyl from his person.³ After (1) Mendez provided an implausible explanation for giving Rivers a ride of such short duration, (2) Rivers informed police that he “got rid” of the drugs, (3) Nolan saw a large bulge of money in Mendez‘s pants pocket upon his exiting the minivan, and (4) Nolan noticed an “abnormal bulge” at Mendez‘s waistline, police had probable cause to believe that Mendez engaged in a drug transaction with Rivers. See Commonwealth v. Maria, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 494 (2020) (“Probable cause exists when police know of ‘enough facts and circumstances to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing a crime.‘“). Consequently, the patfrisk of Mendez and discovery of suspected fentanyl above his buttocks area were lawful incident to arrest. G.L. c. 276, § 1. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 743 (1991) (long established purpose of search incident to arrest is to prevent individual from destroying or concealing evidence of crime for which police have probable cause to arrest, or to prevent individual from acquiring a weapon to resist arrest or facilitate escape). That Rivers managed to dispose of the drugs before police stopped him does not undermine the existence of probable cause where Rivers admitted to Shairs he “got rid” of the narcotics moments before being stopped. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 21 (1999) (police had probable cause to arrest defendant for drug possession where they had observed defendant in place known for drug activity, had observed him in presence of female companion engage in what appeared to be drug transaction, and female companion had acknowledged to police following lawful stop that she had drugs in her pocket). Moreover, a search incident to arrest “may precede formal arrest as long as probable cause exists for the arrest and the arrest and the search are ‘roughly contemporaneous.‘” Commonwealth v. Vick, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 627-628 (2021) (citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Darosa, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 635, 641 (2019) (search incident to arrest can precede formal arrest if search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous).

4. Police lawfully towed the minivan. First, Mendez was under arrest and the female passenger had a suspended driver‘s license. Therefore, no one on scene was available to take possession of the minivan on behalf of Mendez. See Commonwealth v. Olivera, 474 Mass. 10, 15 (2016) (police had no obligation to locate or telephone registered owner to determine their wishes or to wait with car until licensed driver was located). Second, BPD‘s written tow policy authorized towing the vehicle from Water Street. See Exhibit 2, Section IV, et seq. Third, the van blocked a lane of travel at rush hour and presented a traffic hazard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ubilez, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 814, 818 (2016) (officers could not leave vehicle unattended on shoulder of busy main road) (citation omitted). Finally, towing of the vehicle also was lawful to protect the vehicle and its contents from theft and/or vandalism of property, see Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 430 Mass. 769, 775 (2000), and to ensure there were no potentially dangerous items in the car that might pose a risk to the public. See United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1149 (2007).

5. The inventory of the minivan on Water Street was lawful. Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires that inventory searches of automobiles be conducted pursuant to standard police procedures, and that those procedures be in writing. Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 553 (1995). “Unlike other types of searches, an inventory search is administrative, and the decision to conduct an inventory search must not be for investigatory purposes; the decision must be objectively reasonable, and the search must be conducted according to standard written procedures.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 219 (2019) (citation omitted). The BPD has a written inventory policy regarding standardized motor vehicle inventories, and Nolan‘s inventory of the vehicle at the scene was both authorized, and in fact mandated, by BPD‘s written inventory policy. See Exhibit 6, Section IV. Procedure 1.2.4(F) (officer directing vehicle to be towed “shall inspect and inventory the vehicle and its contents ... “). The money discovered near the center console and in a wallet was lawfully inventoried.

6. Lantych‘s discovery of crack cocaine near Mendez‘s left calf during the booking procedure was lawful as part of the booking inventory set forth in the BPD‘s Detainee Processing Policy (Exhibit 9). The search of Mendez and discovery of the cocaine was also permissible incident to arrest. See Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 806 (2012) (search incident to arrest of person and items found on him may take place not only contemporaneously with arrest but also at later point at police station); Grasso, Suppression Matters § 12-3[b][3] (2022 Ed.) (“Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.“)

ORDER

For the aforementioned reasons, the defendant‘s motion to suppress (Paper No. 6) is DENIED.

/s/William F. Bloomer

Justice of the Superior Court

DATE: July 1, 2026

Notes

All times quoted herein are estimates.

Nolan noted that a $40 or $50 bag of an opiate, presumably heroin or fentanyl, was approximately half the size of a dime and could easily be disposed of, either by swallowing or simply throwing the bag away.

While police reasonably suspected Mendez of having conducted a drug transaction with Rivers, they did not have reason to believe he was armed and dangerous. See . In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has determined that involvement in drug distribution, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a patfrisk of a suspect for weapons. . See (“[w]hile drug involvement certainly may be a relevant factor in assessment of threats to police safety, we are reluctant to adopt a blanket rule that all persons suspected of drug activity are to be presumed armed and dangerous for constitutional purposes“). This court is not at liberty to disregard the SJC‘s determination. Here, aside from the inherent dangers associated with drug distribution (including that many drug traffickers arm themselves with weapons for protection), officers made no observations that led them to believe Mendez was armed and dangerous - such as furtive movements or items appearing to be weapons in plain view.