215 Pa. Super. 537 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1969
Opinion by
Defendant Frederick Jordan was charged with assault and battery on complaint of his common law wife and at trial, with his counsel present, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. The defendant asked for a jury trial and then changed his mind and advised the trial court he wished to proceed nonjury. The case proceeded nonjury and the court found defendant guilty of the charges and deferred sentence pending motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment which were subsequently denied. Defendant was placed on two years probation and this appeal followed. The question before us is the posture of defendant’s decision to have his case tried nonjury which compels us to consider the circumstances in which his decision to proceed nonjury was made. In effect, defendant claims he was coerced in waiving his right to a jury trial because the trial judge allegedly was obviously dissatis
After having accepted the waiver of a jury trial, the court proceeded to hear the evidence and, as already stated, found the defendant guilty of assault and battery on his common law wife. He then gave the defendant seven days in which to file his motions for a new trial or in arrest of judgment. The discussion between the court and the defendant relative to this matter is enlightening on the issue now before us and is as follows: “The Court: ... do you understand what I have just said to you about the seven days within which you have a right to file these motions? Do you understand that? The Dependant: Seven days— Ti-xe Court: Do you understand that? The Dependant: Wait a minute. I’m so mixed up, I’m trying to get it together. You say I have a right to file— The Court: You have a right to have seven days within which you will file either a motion in arrest of Judgment or for a new trial. Do you understand that? The Dependant: Yes. I’m kind of mixed up again. That depends on what the sentence is, or— The Court: No. before I sentence. Before I can pass sentence. You have been convicted by the Court, sitting
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the question of the propriety of the Judge’s remarks, as it is evident that the accused was not intimidated by them. The defendant continued to demand a jury trial, as he had a right to do, and the judge did not incarcerate him for requesting a jury trial. Instead, he ordered that a jury be selected forthwith so that the accused’s trial could commence immediately. At this point, the judge’s threat ceased to have any effect and had the accused not changed his mind, the trial would have proceeded before a jury. Even after the trial, the accused, as can be seen from a reading of the quoted excerpt, affirmed that it was not his desire to have a jury trial. If defendant was influenced by the judge’s attitude and the attitude of his counsel when he changed his mind and decided to go nonjury because he felt that they were all “mad” at him for wanting a jury trial, such influence in our opinion does not constitute coercion vitiating his waiver of a right to jury trial he knew he could insist upon and which was immediately made available to him by the court.
Judgment affirmed.