82 Va. 789 | Va. | 1887
(after stating the case), delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question for determination here is the constitutionality of the act of March 4, 1886. Is it inconsistent with section 10, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States, which forbids “a State to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts?”
It is contended for the defendant in error that this act of March 4, 1886, is equally repugnant to the said section of the Federal Constitution as the acts of February 7, 1884, and March 15, 1884, which were pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 572, void for repugnancy to said section.' But we think the contention is wholly untenable and not supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to.
The statutes pronounced unconstitutional in Royall’s case compelled the treasurer to refuse under any circumstances to receive State coupons in payment of license taxes, and required the same to be paid in money, and nothing else; and in that case the court said: “ If a State officer, acting in obedience to a statute of the State, which is in conflict with the Constitution of
But let us analyze and critically consider what the Supreme Court of the United States meant by the language: “If a State officer refuses to issue a license to a person who has tendered the amount required by the lato.” By its terms, this sentence means, necessarily, either that the amount so tendered was tendered in money, or else, in the light of the context, was tendered in money, or in genuine tax-receivable coupons, and the amount so tendered was refused and the license denied by an officer acting in obedience to an unconstitutional statute, then the person so tendering the amount so refused, need not take legal steps to compel the issuance of the license, before doing business. But not so, if any of these elements are.wanting. That is, if the officer, not acting in obedience to a /State statute, shall wilfully refuse to receive the amount so tendered and to issue such license; or if the amount be not tendered in money or in genuine tax-receivable coupons, but only in papers purporting to be such coupons, as to the genuineness of which the officer entertains reasonable doubts, impressed upon him by the plain terms employed by the legislature in the preamble and in the body of the acts referred to; and the officer makes such refusal in obedience to a constitutional statute of the State, then
It is true the court in that case did, in effect, say that one who tenders coupons in payment of such taxes may, if they are refused, prosecute his business without a license, and cannot be punished for so doing. But it would be altogether unjustifiable to impute to that court an intention to say, that one who tenders coupons, though they be coupons that are spurious, or, at least, of doubtful genuineness, if they are refused to be taken as payment until they shall have been verified in accordance with the law of the State, need not take legal steps to compel the issuance of such license before doing business-The alteration of the conditions upon which the remark of the court in that case, was based, makes all the difference in the world, and a difference upon which as the pivotal point, the decision of the question arising here must turn. The question of spurious bonds and coupons is one of too grave import to this Commonwealth, to be lightly brushed aside, and should not be treated with judicial incredulity. No fact— certainly none connected with the history of the Virginia State debt—is better established than that there are spurious bonds of the State out, some of which have been presented and claimed as valid, and their invalidity incontestably established. It is idle to attempt to “ whistle down the wind ” the existence of such spurious bonds, and the absolute necessity of protec
In the preamble to the act of January 14, 1882, the fact of the existence of such spurious bonds is set forth, and also the fact of the passage of the act as a necessary means of protection to both the State and her creditors. Then, aside from all other evidences of the same facts, the legislature of the State, having thus found the facts, this court will hold the ascertainment one not to be questioned.
In view of these facts, and in view of the great importance of the subject to the State, we repeat that the Supreme Court of the United States did not say, and could not have intended to say, in Royall v. Virginia, that which, as applicable to the case under consideration, would be tantamount to saying that a person desiring to conduct the business of a sample merchant in this State may, upon the bare tender of papers purporting to be tax-receivable coupons, cut from bonds of this State, without more, and though the papers thus tendered may be spurious, or the officer to whom they are tendered may honestly doubt their genuineness, take the law in his own hands and proceed to do business without first taking the legal steps necessary to compel the issuance of the license required by law.
It is important to remember in this connection that while the bonds of the State are signed by the State treasurer, the signature to the coupons attached is engraved, and may readily be counterfeited to an unlimited extent. This view of the subject is forcibly put by Lacy, J., in Cornwall v. Commonwealth, ante, p. 644.
If, then, the treasurer in this case acted in obedience to a State statute which is not unconstitutional, it follows that the applicant, whose tender was refused, cannot proceed to do busi
From the standpoint of the Supreme Court of the United States in Roy all’s case, the demonstration of the unconstitutionality of the statutes there passed upon, was an easy matter. Those statutes compelled the State officer to refuse coupons in payment of license taxes under any circumstances, and to receive nothing but money. That court had repeatedly held that such license assessments were taxes for revenue. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. Both that court and this court had held that by the terms of the act of March 30, 1871, the coupons of Virginia were made receivable for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the State, and that by the surrender of their old bonds and the acceptance of two-thirds of their amount in new bonds, with coupons annexed, whereon was expressed such tax-receivability, constituted between the creditors and the State, a contract that was irrepealable without the consent of both parties. Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672.
In the case last named, the federal court held that “the right of the coupon holder is to have his coupon received for taxes, when offered,” and that, “any act of the State which forbids the receipt of these coupons for taxes,” is a violation of the contract, and void as against the coupon-holder.”
How, all this plainly holds good as respects the act of March 4th, 1886, which is virtually the same in terms and object as the act then and there passed upon.
But the above quotation from the opinion of the chief justice has been made not merely to show that the material features of that act were discussed and declared unexceptionable, but also to call emphatic attention to two important points made there in reference to the statute then before the court. The first is,
If that be true of the act of January 14th, 1882, it is equally true of the act of March 4th, 1886. The condition, then, upon which the court in ítoyall’s case, held, that “if a State officer acting in obedience to a statute of the State, which is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, refuses to issue a license to a person who has duly tendered the amount required by law, the person tendering need not take legal steps to compel the issuance of the license before doing business,” and “may prosecute his business without a license and cannot be punished for so doing,” does not exist in the case here before the court, and that decision has no bearing on, and cannot govern it. The act of March 4th, 1886, does not forbid, the treasurer to receive genuine coupons in payment of license-taxes. It only provides that he shall resort to a certain mode to determine their genuineness and receivability, which mode requires no unreasonable delay, and pending which the applicant can at once obtain his license by the payment in advance in money,
The law of Virginia requires the obtainment of a license before any person can sell within her limits goods, wares, and merchandise by sample, card, description or other representation. These are articles which the State has an undoubted right to tax, either directly or indirectly, by imposing a license assessment on the business of selling them. The mode for the obtainment of such license is plainly prescribed by her laws. The conditions upon which it is granted are reasonable and just, and demanded by the policy of the State. Any one selling
Therefore, the judgment of the hustings court sustaining the demurrer of the defendant to the replication of the Commonwealth to the defendant’s plea to the indictment against him, is erroneous, and must be reversed; and the case must be remanded to the said hustings court to be there further proceeded with in conformity with the law and the views herein expressed.
Judgment reversed.