Opinion by
Aрpellant argues that there was insufficient evidence of aggravated assault and related charges because the Commonwealth did not prove the intent to commit the assault, but rather that intent was vitiated by appellant’s showing of self-defense.
The appellant was tried on January 22, and 23, 1974, before Judge Charles Lord, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, sitting without a jury. The following facts were credited by him after hearing the case. At about 6:00 p.m. on June 21, 1973, appellant went to the home of his common law wife’s son to pick up some personal belongings. A fight ensued bеtween appellant and the son, who was aided by his cousin. Later in the evening at about 10:30, Ms. Zamickich, appellant’s common law wife, who had remained at her son’s home, called appellant at his residence to warn him that her son, the son’s cousin, a niece of Ms. Zamickich, and a boyfriend of the niece were about to drive to appellant’s residence. She requested that appellant call the pоlice; he would not, *303 but told her to do so. Ms. Zamicldch called the police who subsequently responded to the report of the incipient fight.
Alerted by the phone call, the appellant dressed, armed himself with a kitchen knife, and left the premises to await the arrival of the carlоad of hostile youths. A flare, some stones, and a piece of a bicycle were thrown at the house. Appellant left the porch tо confront the youths, one of whom kicked the appellant. He then struck Donald Farmer, the niece’s boyfriend, who pushed appellant tо the ground. As appellant jumped from the ground with the knife in hand, he slashed at and cut Farmer, who sustained an injury that required a week’s hospitalization. Thе police arrived and apprehended the appellant who was brandishing the knife while chasing Farmer.
The court found appellant guilty оf aggravated assault. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied on March 13, 1974. Appellant was sentenced to one year’s рrobation with sentence suspended on the related charges. This appeal follows the denial of appellant’s motions.
As in every appeal from a criminal conviction that challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be read in the light most favоrable to the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising therefrom.
Commonwealth v. Johnston,
*304
Under the new Crimes Code
2
aggravated assault is defined as a crime which requires specific intent.
3
Further, §505 of the Code provides that a showing of self-defense vitiates intention necessary for criminal responsibility: “(a) The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other рerson on the present occasion. . . . [and] (b) (2) [t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor
believes
that such force is nеcessary to protect himself against death [or] serious bodily injury. . . .” (Emphasis added). Although the statute provides that the actor must “believe” that the usе of force is necessary, §501 defines “believe” as “reasonably believe.”
4
Similarly, the law in this Commonwealth prior to the new Crimes Code was that while an actor may erroneously believe that he is in danger,, he may avail himself of the defense as long as his belief is reasonable.
Commonwealth v. Sutton,
*305
Not only must thе belief be reasonable, but the actor must also “have been free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the [injury].”
Commonwealth v. Johnston,
supra, at 489;
Commonwealth v. Minoff,
In the instаnt case, the appellant knew that the police had been notified, so that any possible danger to his house would be abated immediately. Nonetheless, he left the security of his home to confront the youths. The force exerted against the youths by the appellant, therefоre, was not “immediately necessary” to protect himself. Nor was his belief that force was necessary reasonable because hе knew that the police were coming. There was already animosity between the appellant and the youths. Therefore, by coming ontо the porch when the action was not reasonably necessary, appellant was “continuing the difficulty” that resulted in the assault of Farmer. Further, the force exercised on the appellant did not justify the use of deadly force. (Wielding a knife certainly amounts to the use *306 of deadly fоrce.) Appellant chose to engage in fisticuffs, but then drew his knife after he had been knocked down. The facts are similar to those in Commonwealth v. Sacco, supra: “Thеre the defendant had. inflicted a serious knife wound after the victim had struck him with his fist. ... [T]he Court concluded that the [claim of self-]defense was unavailable under those circumstances. . . .” Commonwealth v. Presogna, supra at 433.
Because appellant did not prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable belief that his use of a knife was necessary to protect himself against serious bodily injury, and because even if the appellant retained the privilege of self-defense after the altercation began, his use of force was excessive, the lowеr court committed no error in rejecting appellant’s claim of self-defense.
Judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Notes
Commonwealth v. Rose,
Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P. L. 1482, No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S. §101 et seq.
§2702 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: “. . . . (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon.”
See Toll, Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, §505, citing Joint State Government Commission: “The intent оf this section is to codify existing case law pertaining to ‘self-defense’ and to cover in a single rule the law governing the use of defensive force against both attack and in crime prevention.”