In this case, we are called upon to determine whether an attempted murder conviction merges, for purposes of sentencing, with an aggravated assault conviction (via attempt, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2)). We hold that these particular crimes do not merge. Therefore, we affirm judgment of sentence.
The facts and procedural history of this case may be summarized as follows. On August 22, 1990, appellant, with the aid of an accomplice, stole a BMW. Using the stolen BMW, the appellant and his accomplice drove to a Domino’s Pizza shop where they attempted a robbery. A locked door, however, thwarted their robbery attempt. Before leaving the scene, though, appellant fired a shot that put a nick in the heavy glass door blocking the entrance to the pizza shop.
Later that evening, Officer Jerry Jack, driving a marked squad car, spotted the stolen BMW backing into a driveway marked with “no trespassing” signs. Shortly thereafter the stolen BMW entered the public roadway and proceeded at a high rate of speed. Officer Jack pursued the stolen BMW. After observing numerous moving violations, Officer Jack activated his overhead emergency lights. During the chase that ensued, Officer Jack saw the appellant rise up through the sunroof of the stolen BMW three times. While appellant elevated himself through the sunroof, the officer got a good view of appellant, watched appellant point what the officer determined was a gun, and observed several flashes. In concert with one of those flashes, the officer felt and heard an *348 impact on the front of his squad car. Later inspection revealed a hole in the front of Officer Jack’s car one inch below the point where the projectile would have penetrated the windshield and struck Officer Jack. Expert analysis determined that a lead object made the hole in Officer Jack’s car.
Appellant was arrested on August 23, 1990, and charged with multiple criminal offenses pursuant to this conduct of August 22,1990. Subsequent to the arrest, appellant’s mother voluntarily consented to a warrantless search of appellant’s bedroom in the family home. During that search, police officers seized evidence.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion on December 21, 1990, to suppress the evidence seized by the police without a warrant. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant filed a supplemental pre-trial motion on March 1, 1991, which he later withdrew.
On September 3, 1991, appellant filed two pro se motions. First, appellant moved for and was granted new court-appointed counsel. Second, appellant moved for and was denied nominal bail pursuant to Rule 1100 of Pennsylvania’s Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The case then proceeded to a jury trial where the jury found appellant guilty of all but one of the crimes charged. Appellant filed post-verdict motions for arrest of judgment and a new trial. These motions were timely filed and covered all of appellant’s issues raised herein with the exception of issue V. The court denied appellant’s post-verdict motions.
At sentencing, the court sentenced appellant for six offenses to an aggregate of seventeen to thirty-six years. 1 Appellant subsequently filed this timely appeal.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
*349 I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] MOTION FOR RELEASE UPON NOMINAL BAIL BECAUSE OF INCARCERATION FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) DAYS.
II. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S BEDROOM PURSUANT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WITHOUT DEFENDANT’S CONSENT.
III. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT IN THAT THE COMMONWEALTH DID NOT PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [APPELLANT] POSSESSED THE REQUISITE SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL OR INFLICT SERIOUS BODILY INJURY UPON OFFICER JERRY JACK.
IV. WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THAT IT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [APPELLANT] INTENDED TO KILL OR INFLICT SERIOUS BODILY INJURY UPON OFFICER JERRY JACK.
V. WHETHER THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON [APPELLANT] IS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT MERGES
*350 WITH THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the opinion of the trial court, we hold that appellant’s first four questions raised on appeal are without merit. The trial court opinion fully discusses and correctly disposes of appellant’s first four issues. Therefore, with regard to those issues, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion. 2
*351 The trial court reasoned that appellant waived all other issues which he did not address in his post-verdict motions brief. Trial Court Opinion at 3. We disagree. The issue of legality of sentencing is not waived by failure to raise the issue at trial or in post-verdict motions. 3 Hence, we address the contentions presented in appellant’s fifth issue.
Appellant’s fifth argument presents two subissues. First, appellant argues that his aggravated assault conviction merges with his attempted murder conviction for purposes of sentencing. We disagree.
In the companion cases of
Commonwealth v. Leon
Williams
4
and
Commonwealth v.
Weakland,
5
our Supreme Court refined the doctrine of merger by instituting a modified two-step analysis. This refinement narrowed the scope of the merger doctrine such that, for sentencing purposes, merger only occurs when the
“same facts
support convictions of
lesser included offenses.” Commonwealth v. Weakland,
A lesser included offense is:
[o]ne composed of some, but not all, of the elements of the greater crime, and which does not have any element not included in the greater offense____ When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a “lesser included offense.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 812 (5th Ed.1979) (emphasis added).
Accord Commonwealth v. Fuller,
Because the shot fired by appellant, striking the front of Officer Jerry Jack’s squad car, is the one act that simultaneously forms the basis for both aggravated assault and attempted murder, only the first step of the
Weak-land/Williams
test is at issue here. Thus, if aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of attempted murder, the crimes will merge.
Commonwealth v. Anderson,
The rubric of aggravated assault includes several distinct crimes. These crimes include both inchoate and completed offenses.
See Commonwealth v. Anderson, supra
The statutory definition of aggravated assault, relevant in the instant case, is as follows:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(2) attempts to cause ... serious bodily injury to a police officer ... in the performance of duty
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2). Thus, aggravated assault (via attempt, pursuant to § 2702(a)(2)) has three basic elements: (1) an attempt to cause, or the actual causation of, serious bodily injury; (2) to a police officer; and (3) in the performance of his or her duty.
See In Re Barry W.,
Attempted murder, on the other hand, requires an intent to kill another human being.
See
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501. Therefore, attempted murder does not necessarily involve a police officer in the performance of a duty, as aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(2) does. Hence, by definition, aggravated assault (via attempt, pursuant to § 2702(a)(2)) cannot be a lesser included offense of attempted murder. Because no lesser included/greater offense relationship exists between attempted murder and the form of aggravated assault involved in this case, the crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes under
Weakland/Williams, supra. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, supra
*355
Second, appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the sentencing court was manifestly excessive and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant has satisfied the technical and minimal requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,
In deciding if a substantial question exists, “we may not look beyond the statement of questions presented and the concise prefatory 2119(f) statement.”
Commonwealth v. Scullin,
Appellant’s sentences are in compliance with the specific provisions of the Sentencing Code. See Pa.Code §§ 303.1-303.9. Furthermore, appellant fails to raise a colorable claim why the particular sentencing scheme imposed by the sentencing court constitutes an abuse of discretion. Therefore, appellant does not raise a substantial question that his sentence was inappropriately fashioned. Accordingly, we deny allowance of appeal.
*356 Allowance of appeal as to discretionary aspects of sentencing denied. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
. The court sentenced appellant as follows:
(1) for theft of a BMW automobile, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921, sentence three to six years;
(2) for conspiracy to commit theft of BMW, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3921, sentence one to two years;
Sentences (1) & (2) to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to all other sentences.
*349 (3) for attempted murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502, sentence four to ten years;
(4) for aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2), sentence nine to twenty years;
(5) for recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, crime merged with aggravated assault for sentencing purposes;
(6) for attempt to commit robbery of pizza shop, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3701, sentence five to ten years;
(7) for recklessly endangering another person when firing shot at pizza shop door, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, sentence one to two years;
(8) for conspiracy to commit robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3701, no sentence imposed;
Sentences (6) & (7) to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to all other sentences.
Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 25-27.
. The trial court opinion provides the following reasoning for its disposition regarding appellant’s issues I through IV.
Issue I: Under Rule 1100 of Pennsylvania’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is entitled to immediate release on nominal bail after a period of pre-trial incarceration in excess of one hundred and eighty days. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(e). In calculating the one hundred and eighty days, however, certain time is excluded. Each of the following is excludable from the one hundred and eighty day calculation: (1) delay between complaint filing and arrest, (2) delay due to unavailability of defendant or defendant’s counsel or any continuance granted upon request of defendant or defendant's counsel, and (3) time for which defendant waives Rule 1100. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c). After subtracting the time associated with the listed exceptions, the trial was timely held. Therefore, appellant was not entitled to nominal bail.
Issue II: A warrantless search made pursuant to the voluntary consent of a party with "common authority” over the premises searched, is valid unless the defendant made an effort to exclude other family members from the area searched.
Commonwealth v. Gibbons,
Issue III: The Pennsylvania courts have held that the necessary intent for attempted murder may be inferred from a defendant's conduct of taking aim and firing a shot that narrowly misses the vital organs of another human being.
See, e.g., Commonwealth
v.
Cross,
Issue IV: The weight of the evidence is for the fact finder to determine.
Commonwealth
v.
Thomas,
.
Commonwealth v. Anderson,
.
.
. The statutory definition of aggravated assault provides:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life;
(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to a police officer, firefighter, county adult probation or parole officer, county juvenile probation or parole officer or an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation Parole in the performance of duty or to an employee of an agency, company or other entity engaged in public transportation, while in the performance of duty;
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a police officer, firefighter or county adult probation or parole officer, county juvenile probation or parole officer or an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in the performance of duty;
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(5) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a teaching staff member, school board member, other employee or student of any elementary or secondary publicly-funded educational institution, any elementary or secondary private school licensed by the Department of Education or any elementary or secondary parochial school while acting in the scope of his or her employment or because of his or her employment relationship to the school.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702 (emphasis added).
. Both In Re Barry W. and the instant case involve aggravated assaults on a police officer. In Re Barry W. and the instant case involve two different statutory forms of aggravated assault. In In Re Barry W. the completed form of § 2702(a)(3) was at issue, while the attempt form of § 2702(a)(2) is at issue in the instant case. A review of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702 reveals that under the facts of In Re Barry W. and the instant case, only one material difference exists between the elements of these two statutory forms of aggravated assault: the severity of the harm attempted or inflicted upon a police officer. Under § 2702(a)(3), the perpetrator must attempt to cause, or inflict, "bodily injury" upon an on-duty police officer. Under § 2702(a)(2), on the other hand, the perpetrator must attempt to cause, or inflict, "serious bodily injury" upon an on-duty police officer. Because these two subsections evince a legislative concern with the protection of police officers, and the only material difference between their elements is the severity of the bodily injury attempted or inflicted, the holding of In re Barry W. applies herein.
. We are not presented with the issue left unanswered in
Commonwealth v. Anderson:
whether the specific intent required to establish attempted murder and that required to establish aggravated assault (via attempt, pursuant to § 2702(a)(1)) are mutually exclusive, precluding the legal sentencing for both crimes on the basis of the same facts.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, supra,
at 224-25, n. 9,