Commonwealth v. JonesCommonwealth v. Jones
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Johnson
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Michael Jones’s writ of certiorari where Jones was not brought to trial within the 120-day time period prescribed by
On September 15, 1994, Jones was аrrested and charged with violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. Jones was arraigned the following day. On Novembеr 2, 1994, the case was listed for a status hearing in Municipal Court. A second status listing was scheduled for November 30, 1994, in оrder to complete pre-trial discovery. A defendant must be brought to trial within 120 days of his preliminary arraignment under
Jones made an oral pre-trial motion for a dismissal of the charges on the grounds that the Commonwealth had violated Rule 6013. Jones’s motion was denied by the Municipal Court. Following a stipulated bench trial, Jones was convicted of two counts of violating the Uniform Firearms Act and was sentenced to eightеen months’ probation. Jones subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas; his petition was denied, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a writ of certiorari because Jones was
When reviewing the denial of a Rule 6013 motiоn, we are limited to determining
whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in finding that thе Commonwealth was ... duly diligent in bringing [defendant/appellant] to trial within the [120]-day time limit imposed by Rule 6013[ (a)(3) ]. We are limitеd to the evidence presented at the Rule 6013 hearing and the findings of the trial court, and must view the evidenсe in a light most favorable to [the Commonwealth] as the prevailing part[y] below.
Commonwealth v. Nesmith, 425 Pa.Super. 291, 295, 624 A.2d 1078, 1080-81, appeal denied, 535 Pa. 674, 636 A.2d 633 (1993) (citation omitted).
Rule 6013 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
Rule 6013. Prompt Trial — Municipal Court
(2) Trial in a Municipal Court case in which a preliminary arraignment is held after June 30, 1975, shall commence no later than 120 days from the date on which the preliminary arraignment is held.
(c)(l)(i) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court оrally or in writing for an order extending the time for commencement of trial----
(iii) Such motion shall allege facts in support thereof, and shall be granted only upon findings based upon a record showing that trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth and, if thе delay is due to the Court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, upon findings basedupon a rеcord showing the causes of the delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.
Rule 6013 thus requires the Commonwealth to act with due diligence when bringing a defendant to trial and to offer evidencе demonstrating that any delay beyond 120 days is unavoidable.
Commonwealth v. Mayfield,
469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). “The Commonwealth acts with due diligence as long аs it acted reasonably based on the circumstances.”
Cullenen v. Commonwealth,
138 Pa.Cmwlth. 508, 520, 588 A.2d 988, 994 (1991). We note that the general principles applied to
Jones asserts that the court erred in denying his petition for a writ of certiorari because the Commonwealth did not prove that it acted with due diligence in bringing him to trial. The Commonwealth did not filе a motion for extension on the date of trial. The only evidence offered by the Commonwealth in rеsponse to Jones’s motion to dismiss was the Quarter Sessions file. It is true that a finding of due diligence may be basеd on facts contained in uncontested notations in the Quarter Sessions file where those facts indicаte that the case was brought to trial on the earliest possible date.
See Commonwealth v. Nellom,
388 Pa.Super. 314, 565 A.2d 770 (1989) (finding that the Commonwealth aсted with due diligence where the Quarter Sessions file indicated that the Commonwealth requested the earliest possible date consistent with the court’s business). In this case, however, the Commonwealth conceded at the Rule 6013 hearing that the Quarter Sessions file did not indicate a request for the earliest possiblе trial date. N.T., January 24, 1995, at 3. Further, the Commonwealth was unable to explain why such a notation was omitted from the file. When the trial court requested the notes of testimony from the hearing, the Commonwealth indicatеd that there were none.
Id.
at 6. Our supreme court has stated that “ ‘[wjhen a case has possible Rule 1100 рroblems, prosecutors must do everything reasonable within their power to see that the case is tried on time.’ ”
Commonwealth v. Browne,
526 Pa. 83, 89, 584 A.2d 902, 905 (1990), quoting
Based on the foregoing, we rеverse the order denying Jones’s petition for a writ of certiorari and remand this matter to Municipal Court with directions to discharge Jones.
Order REVERSED. Case REMANDED. Jurisdiction RELINQUISHED.