250 Mass. 320 | Mass. | 1924
The complaint on which the defendant was tried and convicted charged him with stealing on February 7, 1923, fifty-nine pounds “ of rib roast of beef of the value of less than three hundred . . . dollars of the property of G. F. Richardson.” G. L. c. 266, § 30. The record fails to show any evidence either direct or circumstantial tending to support the verdict of guilty. The order of proof is immaterial. A witness for the Commonwealth, one Cornelius F. Driscoll, testified, that he was the proprietor of an express business and was present when an automobile was loaded with six packages, two bundles weighing about seventy pounds, a large bundle weighing about two hundred and four pounds and three bundles which he estimated weighed about sixty or seventy pounds each. The express charges at that time were twenty-five cents for bundles weighing less than one hundred pounds, and fifty cents for bundles weighing more than one hundred pounds, and that he had the defendant “Johnson’s signature on his consignee’s sheet for February second.” But, the sheet having been produced, the signature of Johnson was not found. James Driscoll, son of Cornelius and employed by his father as a chauffeur, testified, that on February 7, 1923, there were three bundles of meat and three boxes on the automobile which he was driving, two bundles and three boxes of which were marked “ H. Johnson,” and one bundle to which a tag marked “ G. H. Richardson ” was attached, and that he did not know the contents of this bundle. The witness, when he arrived at
This evidence for the prosecution was in no way enlarged or strengthened by the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses, who in substance denied that a bundle whose contents were unknown, or a bundle tagged “ G. H. Richardson” was delivered; nor was there any proof that “ G. H. Richardson” or G. F. Richardson had any property either general or special in the bundle, or that the defendant got possession of the bundle to his own use by fraud with intent to convert it. Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Mass. 453.
The question presented is not a question of variance, which in some cases may riot be fatal under G. L. c. 277, § 35, but is one of error going to the merits of the accusation. Commonwealth v. Strangford, 112 Mass. 289, 291, 292. The defendant’s request, that “ on all the evidence the verdict must be not guilty ” should have been given.
At the close of the instructions, the defendant asked the judge to instruct the jury, that he came into court with a presumption of innocence in his favor. The request was denied, and the defendant excepted. But, even if no request in writing had been made before the arguments to the jury were begun, the defendant well might assume that this fundamental principle under our law would be stated. Very plainly justice to the defendant called for such instruction,
We do not find it necessary to consider the remaining exceptions to the denial of the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth requests, or to the instructions.
Exceptions sustained.