OPINION BY
Thе Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s May 9, 2012 order granting the suppression motion of Appellee, Brian Johnson (“Johnson”). We reverse.
The pertinent facts are as follows: On or about December 12, 2011, officers of the Bensalem Township Police Department, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, received information from two anonymous informants that controlled substances, specifically marijuana and prescription pills, were being sold from Unit 97-A at 1313 Gibson Road, a trailer park within the Township of Bensalem. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/14/11; N.T., 5/9/12, at 6. One of the informants advised the officers that an older white female with red hair, who resided in the trailer park, was involved in the drug transactions. Id. at 46-54.
On December 12, 2011, at approximately 10 a.m., Officers Adam Schwartz, Michael Brady, and Joseph Gansky responded to the report of drug activity, arriving at the trailer park in plain clothes and in an unmarked police vehicle, but wearing po
Officers Brady and Schwartz then approached Unit 97-A, and while ascending a set of wooden steps leading to the elevated deck of the trailer, the officers detected the strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Unit 97-A. Id. at 8, 35-37. Fearing that the woman with red hair would alert the occupants of Unit 97-A to their presence, leading to the destruction of evidence, the officers opted not to leave to obtain a search warrant, and instead knocked on the door of the trailer. Id. at 47. Johnson opened the door, remaining inside the doorway in the “threshold area” of the trailer. Id. at 9, 25, 37. When the door opened, the officers observed that the trailer was smoke-filled, and detеcted an even stronger smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the trailer, leading the officers to believe that marijuana was actively burning inside the residence. Id. at 9-11, 36. Johnson stepped out of the trailer and onto the porch area, approximately one and a half feet outside the front door. Id. at 24; 37. The officers asked Johnson if they could enter the trailer to speak with him, to which Johnson replied, “go fuck yourself, you’re not coming in my house.” Id. at 10, 23-24, 37-38. Officer Schwartz informed Johnson that he would obtain a search warrant, whereupon Johnson told them to “go ahead and do that” before turning around to re-enter the trailer. Id. at 10-12, 24, 37-38.
Fearing that Johnson was going to destroy evidence, Officers Schwarz and Brady informed Johnson that they needed to secure the residence, and took hold of Johnson by the arm to prevent him from re-entering the trailer. Id. at 12, 37-38. Johnson pulled away, “became aggressive” and pushed at the police officers. Id. at 10-12, 24, 37-38. In the ensuing struggle, all three men slipped and fell from the porch to the pavement. Id. The officers subsequently placed Johnson under arrest. During a search incident to the arrest, the officers recovered $458 from Johnson. Id. at 12-14.
After restraining Johnson, the police officers asked him if there was anybody else in the trailer, to which Johnson responded “yes.” Id. at 14. Wfiiile Officer Brady transported Johnson to the police station, Officers Schwartz and Gansky knocked again on the front door of Unit 97-A and called for the occupants. Receiving no response, the officers entered Unit 97-A “to make sure there was no one else inside.” Id. Upon entering, the officers encountered Johnson’s wife. Id. at 17. Mrs. Johnson asked the officers to leave, but after the officers explained that they were securing the residence pending a search warrant, Mrs. Johnson voluntarily left the trailer. Id. at 14-17. The officers “looked into” the various rooms of the trailer to ensure nobody else was present, but did not conduct a search for contraband. Id. at 44. The officers did however observe, in plain view, a marijuana cigarette actively burning in the living room area. Id. at 17-18. The offiсers did not see any other drugs or paraphernalia. Id. After Mrs. Johnson departed, Officer Gansky remained on the porch to ensure the security of the trailer pending issuance of the search warrant. Id. at 40.
Johnson was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, person not to possess a firearm, and resisting arrest.
On August 21, 2012, Johnson filed a pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence from the trailer and the incriminating statements he made after his arrest, asserting that the evidencе was obtained in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The trial court convened a hearing on May 9, 2012, at the conclusion of which the trial court granted Johnson’s suppression motion. N.T., 5/9/12, at 75. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal asserting that the grant of Johnson’s suppression motion would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Johnson did not file a responsive brief before this Court.
The Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review:
A. WHETHER THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERRED AND/OR MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES BY SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED IN THIS CASE BASED ON ITS FINDINGS THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT FOR [JOHNSON’S] RESIDENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER SMELLING THE ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA COMING FROM THE RESIDENCE, AND WERE NOT OTHERWISE PERMITTED TO FURTHER THEIR INVESTIGATION THROUGH OTHER REASONABLE MEANS, SUCH AS ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK WITH THE RESIDENT OR SEEK CONSENT?
B. WHETHER THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERRED AND/OR MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE OFFICERS UNLAWFULLY ENTERED [JOHNSON’S] RESIDENCE PRIOR TO OBTAINING THE SEARCH WARRANT WHERE THE OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN BRIEFLY ENTERING AND SECURING [JOHNSON’S] HOME TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OR REMOVAL OF EVIDENCE WHILE THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS BEING OBTAINED BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: THE OFFICERS SMELLED THE ODOR OF BURNT MARI*934 JUANA AND OBSERVED SMOKE INSIDE [JOHNSON’S] RESIDENCE, AND WHERE AFTER [JOHNSON] DENIED CONSENT TO ENTER AND/OR SEARCH AND WAS ADVISED THAT A SEARCH WARRANT WOULD BE OBTAINED, [JOHNSON] ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENTER THE HOME?
C. WHETHER THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERRED AND/OR MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN FINDING THAT THE DETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF [JOHNSON] WAS UNLAWFUL WHERE THE OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN STOPPING [JOHNSON] FROM REENTERING HIS HOME AND DETAINING HIM UNDER THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES: WHERE THE OFFICERS SMELLED THE ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA AND OBSERVED SMOKE INSIDE [JOHNSON’S] RESIDENCE; WHERE AFTER [JOHNSON] DENIED POLICE CONSENT TO ENTER AND WAS ADVISED THAT A SEARCH WARRANT WOULD BE OBTAINED, [JOHNSON] ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENTER HIS HOME; AND, WHEN OFFICERS ATTEMPTED TO STOP [JOHNSON] FROM REENTERING HIS HOME, [JOHNSON] PUSHED AND/OR PULLED AWAY FROM THE OFFICERS AND CREATED A STRUGGLE WHICH LED TO [SIC] THE OFFICERS AND [JOHNSON] TO FALL FROM THE FRONT STEPS TO THE GROUND?
D. WHETHER THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT [JOHNSON’S] STATEMENT TO POLICE WAS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE BY FINDING THAT IT WAS OBTAINED FOLLOWING WHAT THE COURT DETERMINED TO BE AN UNLAWFUL ARREST?
Commonwealth Brief at 4.
The Commonwealth’s first three issues challenging the trial court’s grant of suppression are interrelated. Therefore, we will address them together. Our standard of review of a Commonwealth’s appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress is as follows:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Miller,
The Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s determination that the actions of the police officers were unlawful. Specifically, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the police officers lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary to take Johnson into custody and search his trailer. Because we conclude that the police officers’ actions were supported by probable cause and exigent circumstаnces, we agree with the Commonwealth.
In the present case, the police officers arrived at Johnson’s trailer in response to a report of ongoing drug dealing. While making their way to Johnson’s trailer, the police officers encountered a woman who met the description provided to them as being involved in the drug activity which they were investigating. Fearing that the woman would alert the occupants of the trailer to their presence, leading to the destruction of evidence, the police officers opted to knock on the door of Johnson’s trailer in furtherance of their investigation. N.T., 5/9/12, at 47.
Upon ascending the steps to the door of the trailer, the officers immediately detected “a strong odor of burnt marijuana сoming from within the trailer.” Id. at 8. Officer Schwarz testified that he was familiar with the odor of burnt marijuana having encountered it “countless” times in the thirteen years he had worked as a police officer. Id. at 4-9. Having detected the strong smell of marijuana emanating from Johnson’s trailer, Officers Brady and Schwartz had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. See Commonwealth v. Waddell,
At that point, in my opinion [Johnson] was going in there to destroy evidence. So I wasn’t going to allow him back inside that residence at that point when there is an ongoing crime in progress.
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I told him we were securing his residence for a search warrant. He was not permitted to go back inside.
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It happened very quick. When he told us to go fuck ourselves, I said, that’s fine. He said, you do that, you go get a search warrant. I said, that’s fine, we are going to get a search warrant. It was simultaneous. He was going back inside. As he was going back inside, as I was grabbing him, I explained to him he’s not going back inside, he’s not free to go in there, and we’re now obtaining a search warrant for the residence.
N.T., 5/9/12, at 12, 25-26.
Johnson resisted the officers’ attempt to restrain him. Following a scuffle, the officers subdued Johnson, placed him in handcuffs, and then conducted a protective sweep of Johnson’s trailer, looking into the rooms to ensure that there were no other occupants.
As previously explained, the officers developed probable cause to believe that a drug-related crime was occurring
[VJarious factors need to be taken into account to assess the presence of exigent circumstances; for example: (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is a clear showing of probable cause; (4) whether there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered; (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) whether the entry is peaceable; (7) the timing of the entry; (8) whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (9) whether there is a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to obtain a warrant; and (10) whether there is a danger to police or other persons inside or outside of the dwelling to require immediate and swift action.
Commonwealth v. Dean,
To determine in this case whether exigent circumstances existed under the foregoing balancing test, an examination of the relevant jurisprudence regarding warrant-less searches and seizures in private homes is warranted.
In Commonwealth v. Mason,
Our Supreme Court concluded in Mason that the forcible, warrantless entry violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that evidence seized pursuant to the search should have been suppressed. The Court explained:
Were we to accept the police contention that the circumstances of this case were exigent, it is difficult to imagine a case in which the warrantless forcible entry of police would not be excused. It is always possible that criminals may destroy evidence before the police arrive with a warrant, but unless there is something more than suspicion that such destruction of evidence may occur, the circumstances are not exigent.
Mason,
Thereafter, our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Roland,
[W]e regard the entry by police into appellant’s home as improper. Clearly, the police were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Nor was there a danger to police or other persons that would have necessitated an immediate entry. There was no reason to believe that [the defendant] or the minors were armed. Further, the entry occurred at nighttime, which is a particularly suspect time for searches to be conducted.
At the suppression hearing the police did not testify that they had any information, prior to entering [the defendant’s] home, that [the defendant] had furnished beer and liquor to the minors. Nor did they testify that they observed any indication of marijuana use prior to making their entry. Rather, they stated that their entry was triggered by their belief that underage drinking was taking place, due to their own observation of minors inside the residence who were attempting to shield cans of beer from view.
Given probable cause to believe that the offense of underage drinking was present, police should have obtained a warrant before searching [the defendant’s] home. Underage drinking is not a grave crime of violence, such as might have justified a warrantless entry.
Roland,
In Commonwealth v. Melendez,
Our Supreme Court held in Melendez that, under Pennsylvania jurisprudence, the warrantless entry into the residence was unsupported by exigent circumstances. The Court explained:
[I]f the police created a danger that their surveillance might be discovered because they stopped [the defendant’s] car, they can hardly be allowed to rely*939 on that to justify a warrantless intrusion. Had the police simply waited for the search warrant, they could have searched the dwelling and avoided the problems of the present case. Had contraband been found during the search, the police could then have arrested [the defendant] on the basis of this evidence. There were no exigent circumstances.
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If the concern was that police activity might have been witnessed by a person remaining in the house who might begin to destroy evidence, such a possibility is of no legal consequence, for police may not create their own exigencies, which they then use as justification for exclusion from normal warrant requirements.
Melendez,
In Commonwealth v. Gillespie,
The plurality in Gillespie held that the police officers were engaged in a “legitimate act” because “securing the premises was an appropriate response to [the defendant’s] exercise of his right to demand a warrant.” Gillespie,
In McArthur, supra, the United States Supreme Court held thаt a brief seizure (where the police officers prevented a suspect from re-entering his home unaccompanied while they obtained a search warrant) was reasonable, and hence lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the seizure was lawful because: the police had probable cause to believe that the suspect’s trailer home contained drugs; the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, the suspect would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant; the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy in that they neither searched the trailer nor arrested the suspect before obtaining a warrant but only prevented him from entering the trailer unaccompanied; and the police
In Commonwealth v. Walker,
This Court held in Walker that the Commonwealth established exigent circumstances to support the warrantless entry. We explained:
Although [the officer] had no reason to believe that Appellant was armed, would be a danger to the officer or others, or might easily escape, other factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of exigеnt circumstances. First, Appellant was suspected of possession of narcotics and paraphernalia, both serious offenses.... [T]here was more than a clear showing of probable cause, and no question that Appellant would be in the motel room, as the officer personally saw him enter it. The time of entry was mid-morning, not at night ... Moreover, the officer’s entry was peaceable. Although the door was closed, it was not latched ... it was [j]ust a matter of pushing the weight of the door. Finally, because drugs and crack pipes may be easily disposed, there was a strong likelihood here that evidence would be destroyed. Immediately after seeing the officer approach, and while holding a crack pipe in plain view, Appellant turned, reentered the room, and closed the door. It was certainly reasonable for the officer to determine that Appellant might destroy any narcotics and paraphernalia stored in that room.
Walker,
In Commonwealth v. Demshock,
The police were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, there was no indication that anyone was in danger, including the police or the partygoers, there was no reason to believe that the occupants of the apartment were armed, and the entry occurred at night.
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*941 [T]he exigency relied upon, that is, the need to secure the premises to prevent destruction of evidence, was a direct result of the failure to secure a warrant upon observing underage drinking and the choice to gain entry through subterfuge. It is well established that police cannot rely upon exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry where the exigency derives from their own actions .... Under these circumstances, the officers could have made efforts to secure a search warrant and quite possibly could have secured a warrant prior to any of the partygoers realizing that the police were outside.
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[H]ad the police simply applied for a search warrant and waited for its arrival before deciding to enter the premises, they could have effectuated the law enforcement purрose without sacrificing the Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches. Conversely, if exigency can be found under facts like those presented here, the need for a warrant could be obviated in many cases. Once police developed probable cause to believe illegal activity was taking place inside a residence, or even the suspicion of the same, police could simply knock upon the door rather than go through the trouble of obtaining a warrant. If the police officer’s suspicions are confirmed by what they see when the door is opened, or if the occupants act in such a manner as to suggest evidence might be destroyed if the officers waited, then the “exigency” found here would be created and the police could then make a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence. The Fourth Amendment could be made substantially impotent if this were the case.
Demshock,
In Commonwealth v. Dommel,
In Commonwealth v. Bostick,
We held that the exigency justifying the warrantless entry arose when Jerome Sanders opened the door and saw police, creating a danger that evidence would be destroyed. Moreover, we held that the officers conducted a legitimate protective sweep to secure the premises and persons therein after properly entering the premises under exigent circumstances. Therefore, the defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied.
Recently, this Court in Commonwealth v. Waddell,
While the distribution of large quantities of marijuana is a serious offense, the instant case did not present a situation where a warrantless entry was neces*943 sary to prevent or stop an immediate threat of violence. Police were also not in hot pursuit of a felon whose felonious conduct had been directly observed by police. Furthermore, Appellant did not fleе from police into the residence in response to spotting the police, as was the case in Bostick ... and Walker. Instead, and similar to the case in Dem-shock, Appellant appeared to be unaware that the police were investigating until they arrived at his home to conduct a ‘knock and talk.’ ...
[The] officers lacked any specific evidence that anyone inside the home was armed. Rather, [the] suspicion that firearms or other weapons might be found within the home was premised upon generalized experience with those that traffic in narcotics, not any particular evidence derived from the investigation in this case....
The evidence certainly surpassed the threshold necessary to establish probable cause after [the officers] detected the smell of marijuana emanating from Appellant’s house.... Once the odor of marijuana was detected emanating from the residence, the threshold necessary to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant was met....
Waddell, supra at 215.
Balancing the foregoing factors, we concluded in Waddell that while probable causе existed at the time of the warrant-less entry, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances. In so doing, we reasoned that while there was a risk that evidence would be destroyed, there was no evidence that such destruction of evidence was occurring, as hurried movement does not provide a strong inference that evidence was being destroyed, and there was nothing to indicate there was anyone else in the house after the defendant’s exit through the window. Waddell at 217-18. Additionally, we concluded that any exigency that occurred was created by the police, since the loud noises behind the door and the defendant’s exit from the window occurred after police knocked on the door. Id. at 213-14, 217-18 quoting Demshock,
Having examined the foregoing jurisprudence, we now review the trial court’s grant of suppression in this case, balancing the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and protect
In the instant case, the police officers arrived at the trailer park to investigate a report of drug activity. Upon their arrival, the officers encountered a woman with red hair who matched the description provided to them as one of the drug-dealing suspects. Fearing that the woman with red hair would alert the occupants of Johnson’s trailer to their presence, the offiсers opted to proceed with their investigation by knocking on the door of the trailer. See Florida v. Jardines, — U.S. -,
When the officers ascended the steps of the trailer they detected the odor of marijuana. Now in possession of probable cause to obtain a search warrant, rather than descending the steps directly outside the front door, in the hope that the occupants of the trailer had not seen them, the officers opted to knock on the front door in furtherance of their investigation. It was not unreasonable, under these circumstances, for the officers to knock on the door, rather than wait outside for a search warrant, given that they were аlready standing in full view on the porch steps, together with their concern that the red-haired woman would alert the occupants of the trailer to their presence, and that the occupants would have the opportunity to dispose of the burning marijuana.
When the police officers informed Johnson that he could not re-enter the trailer, Johnson forcibly resisted, which culminated in his arrest. Compare McArthur, supra (no evidence that the suspect resisted the police officers after being told he could not go back into his residence unaccompanied; rather, the suspect complied with the police officers’ request and re-entered the house two or three times to get cigarettes and make phone calls, while accompanied by a police officer).
We find the urgent circumstances of this case comparable to those in Walker and Bostick in that, before Johnson attempted to re-entеr his trailer, he was fully aware of the presence of police, creating a very real possibility that evidence would be destroyed if he returned indoors. (Compare Mason, supra, where there was no indication that the defendant knew of the police presence to spark the destruction of evidence). As in Walker and Bostick, it was certainly reasonable for the officers here to believe that Johnson might destroy any drugs inside the trailer, and otherwise act to frustrate the police investigation. Walker,
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Waddell, supra, where the raw marijuana that the officers detected was in the residence, and was of such quantity that it could not be easily destroyed without alerting officers stationed outside the residence. In the present case, the police officers suspected that there was marijuana burning in the trailer, аnd, unlike Wad-dell, such evidence, e.g. in the form of a marijuana cigarette, is of the type that could have been readily disposed of. Accordingly, we conclude that the officers’ restraint of Johnson was supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances.
In addition to our determination that the restraint of Johnson was justified by exi
The Commonwealth also asserts that because Johnson’s arrest was lawful, the trial court erred in holding that Johnson’s post-Miranda statements to police following his arrest should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Commonwealth Brief at 25-26. We agree.
“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Brown,
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his trailer and his incriminating statements to the police.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Miranda v. Arizona,
. 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), and 5104, respectively-
. At the time of his arrest, Johnson was not inside the trailer but was standing outside on the front porch. "Our courts have extended [the] constitutional protection [of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution] to the curtilage of a person’s homе.” Commonwealth v. Simmen,
Here, Officer Schwartz described the front porch on which Johnson was arrested as follows: "there's five or six steps that walk up to the trailer, and there’s I guess, you would call it, maybe a three foot by four foot landing area.” N.T., 5/9/12, at 12. Officer Gansky described the front porch as "a small deck, elevated deck that comes off the ground, about three or four steps onto a deck that would lead into the front door of the trailer.” Id. at 37.
In its brief, the Commonwealth does not address whether the porch was "curtilage,” requiring exigent circumstances for the search and seizure to be valid. "It would be improper for this Court to act as counsel for a party. That is, we must not write a party’s brief and develop the analysis necessary to support the party’s position.” Commonwealth v. Frey,
. The Commonwealth does not assert that Johnson’s wife, Mrs. Johnson consented to the search of the trailer. See Commonwealth v. Perry,
. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution "embodies a strong notion of privacy [and] often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution....” Commonwealth v. Hughes,
. Both Melendez and Mason focused on the application of the "inevitable discovery” and "independent source” doctrines, which are not at issue in this case.
. We recognize that the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court in Gillespie lacks precedential value because it failed to command the joinder of a majority of participating justices. Nevertheless, we find its analysis informative.
. Compare with Kentucky v. King, — U.S. -,
Over the years, lower courts have developed an exception to the exigent circumr stances rule, the so-called "police-created exigency” doctrine. Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evidence when that exigency was "created” or "manufactured” by the conduct of the police
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[However] a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of the [exigency] exception to the warrant requirement.
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[Rather] warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement.... [T]he exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where ... the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.
King,
. See Kentucky v. King, - U.S. -,
Some courts, in applying the police-created exigency doctrine, fault law enforcement officers if, after acquiring evidence that is sufficient to establish probable cause to search particular premises, the officers do not seek a warrant but instead knock on the door and seek either to speak with an occupant or to obtain consent to search....
This approaсh unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement strategies. There are many entirely proper reasons why police may not want to seek a search warrant as soon as the bare minimum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is acquired. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive list of these reasons, we note a few.
First, the police may wish to speak with the occupants of a dwelling before deciding whether it is worthwhile to seek authorization for a search. They may think that a short and simple conversation may obviate the need to apply for and execute a warrant. Second, the police may want to ask an occupant of the premises for consent to search because doing so is simpler, faster, and less burdensome than applying for a warrant. A consensual search also may result in considerably less inconvenience and embarrassment to the occupants than a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. Third, law enforcement officers may wish to obtain more evidence before submitting what might otherwise be considered a marginal warrant application. Fourth, prosecutors may wish to wait until they acquire evidence that can justify a search that is broader in scope than the search that a judicial officer is likely to authorize based on the evidence then available. And finally, in many cases, law enforcement may not want to execute a search that will disclose the existence of an investigation because doing so may interfere with the acquisition of additional evidence against those already under suspicion or evidence about additional but as yet unknown participants in a criminal scheme.