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Commonwealth v. Jacobs
372 A.2d 873
Pa. Super. Ct.
1977
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*1 contribution statutory above liability impose cannot at .” 231 . . . the employer demanded 550. at 426, 332 A.2d to the third liability bar against that a

Nevertheless, we held joinder: against a bar necessarily was not party the issue of between a distinction must draw “we and that of to contribution defendant original anof right a determination defendant original of the the right unfounded as him was brought against the suit negligent.” defendant —was original employer—not 550. also Hinton 427, 332 A.2d at See at 189, 364 A.2d 724 Corp., Techniques Waste our persuasive finds longer no be that It may However, the argument be it. in Burke. So decision view, is, to not my Burke amendment overruled the 1974 it is correct. nor persuasive court. the lower the order of

I would affirm Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH JACOBS, Appellant. Bruce Pennsylvania. Superior Court of 22, 1976. June Submitted April Decided *3 Packel, Defender,

John W. Assistant Public Philadelphia, for appellant. Goldblatt, H.

Deborah E. Glass and Assistant Dis- Steven trict Philadelphia, appellee. Attorneys, WATKINS, JACOBS,

Before President and Judge, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

JACOBS, Judge: 14, 1975, Bruce Jacobs was arrested on

Appellant August and with theft unlawful charged burglary, attempted and of an instrument of crime. These taking possession out of incident same in which charges grew day was arrested Police by Philadelphia Housing who was a stakeout of conducting Apartment Officer A-6 in the Norris was vacat- Apartments. recently stove, ed and contained refrigerator, sink. m., Around 10:40 officer heard the noise p. police metal from the lock on the metal on outside coming part the door. After a few minutes door opened appel- lant walked in with a screwdriver in his pocket. Appellant was arrested officer who from immediately emerged with his drawn. At trial after gun closet *4 case, the rested its lower court sustained the Commonwealth to the of charge demurrer theft appellant’s attempted by unlawful on the that there was no taking ground overt act on the of the The appellant. Commonwealth has not part from that was found appealed ruling. appellant guilty 244 on indictment number the crime of charging burglary1 245 and indictment number of an instru- charging possession Code, 6, 1972, 1482, 334, 1. The Crimes Act of Dec. P.L. No. 18 (1973). 3502 Pa.C.S. §

377 ment of crime.2 motions the Following post-trial appellant was sentenced to four to ten on years imprisonment and two to five on the burglary charge years imprisonment sentences to run possession charge, This concurrently. ap- followed. peal raises several

Appellant allegations error on this He first contends that the evidence was insuffi appeal.3 cient to the crime of prove burglary. Appellant’s indictment him with without into an charged permission apart ment with the intent to commit the crime of theft therein. It is axiomatic that criminal trials the offered proof the Commonwealth must measure to the made in up Lambert, the indictment. 226 Pa.Super. Commonwealth 41, (1973), Aurick, 313 A.2d 300 Commonwealth v. 342 citing 291, 920, see, 282, (1941); Pa. 924 v. United Stirone States, 270, 80 4 252 (1960); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. Simione, (1972) Therefore, (bill particulars). could insist that he the Commonwealth entered the with the prove Bruce, intent to commit a theft. See Commonwealth v. 507, 326 A.2d 628 (1974); v. Free man, 396, 313 A.2d 770 In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of we burglary charge must read the entire facts, record and consider the and all reasonable inferences therefrom, arising in the most light favorable to the Com Blevins, monwealth. Commonwealth v. 453 Pa. (1973);

A.2d 421 Allen, Commonwealth v. Lynch, 227 Pa.Super. 316, 323 A.2d 808 (1974). It is equally true that the Com monwealth does not have to establish to a guilt mathemati cal in a case certainty may proper rely on wholly Code, 6, 1972, 2. The Crimes Act of Dec. P.L. No. Pa.C.S. Appellant also contends that the dismissal the lower court of the attempted charges precluded burglary. theft his conviction for Since we hold that the evidence case was insufficient in this to sustain appellant’s necessary conviction of not be it will for us to point. decide that *5 Roscioli, evidence. v. circumstantial Larkins, Commonwealth v. 59, 19, Nevertheless, 204 (1975). when the is viewed in this it is clear that light evidence Common- wealth did not advance sufficient evidence order to sus- tain conviction. burglary is defined the Act of December

Burglary P.L. No. 3502 (1973): Pa.C.S. § A if he enters a “(a) build person structure, or secured or occu ing occupied separately thereof, with intent to commit a crime there pied portion in . added.) . .” (Emphasis intent specific required to make out be found in the burglary may defendant’s words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances with all rea- together Freeman, inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. sonable However, when actions supra. are relied on must bear they a reasonable to the relationship crime, commission of the i. e. be to the sufficiently proximate alleged intended crime to constitute one of the natural series of acts required for its Freeman, commission. Common- supra; Ellis, wealth 349 Pa. 37 A.2d 504 (1944); Common- wealth v. Reynolds, 366, 222 In the case at bar the fact from which an intent to steal could be inferred is possibly appellant’s unlawful into entry this apartment. point, On we have held expressly evidence of intentional into an occupied building itself insufficient support inference of an intent steal. Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra 225 Pa.Super. at 399, 313 A.2d at 772. The Commonwealth did not produce any additional evidence that the appellant had, at the time he the apartment, entered the intent to commit a theft. The con- clusion is thus inescapable absent such evidence on which an inference to steal could based, be reasonably the Common- proof. Com- wealth has failed to meet its burden of simply Larkins, monwealth in that it failed to prove that supra, with the entered the commit a theft as set the indictment. The judg- forth in ment on bur- of sentence indictment number charging must, therefore, reversed verdict glary be and the of guilty *6 vacated.

However, while evidence insufficient sup the is to on of the it was port finding guilt burglary charge, of trespass. sufficient to a verdict for criminal support guilty Carter, v. Commonwealth In

(1975), we held that the crime of for which the burglary, tried, appellant was indicted and includes the lesser offense of criminal It is of trespass.4 therefore strength Carter that of on judgment sentence indictment number reversed, charging appellant the with is the verdict burglary of vacated and the case remanded with guilty directions enter a of verdict of criminal guilty trespass impose sentence thereon. See Commonwealth v. Lynch, Pa.Su Freeman, per. 316, 323 A.2d 808 (1974); Super. final Appellant’s argument that a mistrial should have been when granted counsel for the Common wealth to the argued that the jury of certain testimony Commonwealth who witnesses were not called at trial either by the Commonwealth or defense would have been unfavor able to the defense. The lower court sustained defense objection counsel’s and cautioned the in the jury following manner:

“Yes. Ladies and gentlemen the as I jury, instructed you before and as I again, will instruct the you defendant is not required to present any evidence. You not may draw any inference not favorable the defendant be- cause the not presented defendant has or any witnesses any other manner.”

It is hornbook law person that a with a crime is charged under no duty to take stand or produce the evidence of his innocence but the may stand mute protected presumption of innocence and its demand that the Commonwealth sustain burden of proving his a reasonable doubt. guilt beyond Judges Hoffman, In Spaeth that case opinion the writer of this dissented. Miller, However, the situation unlike we held that it was reversible error

Miller, wherein supra, the it could draw an jury court to instruct for the lower to call from the defendant’s failure wit- guilt inference of gave in. this case nesses, immediately the lower court had that the defendant no jury instruction to cautionary This cau- evidence witnesses. any obligation produce correct instruction, subsequent and the tionary need witness- any not produce lower court from be drawn that no adverse inference could es and cured so, to do completely of the appellant failure remark. improper 244 charging of sentence on indictment number

Judgment reversed, the verdict of is vacated *7 to enter a verdict of of remanded with directions case sentence thereon. impose Nothing criminal and trespass challenge judgment raised on this appeal been having 245 charging possession on indictment number of of sentence crime, the sentence on that judgment of of an instrument affirmed.5 is accordingly count HOFFMAN, J., a and concurring dissenting opinion files SPAETH, J., joins. in which

PRICE, J., in which VAN der dissenting opinion files a VOORT, J., joins.

HOFFMAN, and concurring dissenting: Judge, JACOBS that opinion Judge I with the agree plurality criminal requisite failed to prove Commonwealth case. in the instant See necessary burglary intent to prove A.2d 316, 227 323 808 Pa.Super. Commonwealth v. Lynch, disposition supported by of the case is court 5. The of this CERCONE, J., join WATKINS, Judge, in as follows: President and J., HOFFMAN, J., by SPAETH, concurring joined opinion; in a this is dissenting opinion supports the conviction of which reversal of and trespass; burglary sentencing remand for criminal but would not on VOORT,. dissenting opinion PRICE, J., J., joined by VAN der is in a which, agreeing included trespass criminal a lesser while burglary, burglary not reverse the conviction. of would offense

381 Freeman, 396, 770 (1973). In both remanded for Freeman and the Court Lynch, unlawful a lesser resentencing charge entry, of included under the offense to the of Penal burglary Code, 901; 1939, Act of June P.L. P.S. 4901. § § However, view, in the crime criminal as my trespass Code, 6, 1972, defined Crimes Act of December P.L. 334, 1; No. 18 Pa.C.S. not included within § § offense of burglary, Pa.C.S. 3502. Carter, (1975), A.2d 899 allocatur xli granted, 236 Pa.Super. (dissenting opinion by HOFF- MAN, SPAETH, inJ. which and JJ. joined). Ap- JACOBS was not with and charged criminal could not pellant trespass been I Therefore, have convicted thereof. would reverse order appellant discharged. SPAETH, J., this joins opinion.

PRICE, Judge, dissenting: Appellant was convicted of possession of an burglary instrument crime. indictment charged the unauthorized into with the commit the crime of theft.1 I agree that Commonwealth v. Carter, (1975) was decided evidence correctly that the in this case was sufficient to I support conviction for criminal would trespass. agree with the decision remand for majority’s sentencing except *8 belief my that the evidence was sufficient for the jury infer that entered the appellant with the to commit a reason, theft. For this I would affirm the judgment of sentence on the and charge burglary must dissent from the majority’s decision to remand. pointed It should be out that the Commonwealth could have avoid- problem ed the in immediate this case if the indictment had not specified appellant upon gaining what crime intended to commit jurisdictions may entrance. require While other the indictment crime, specify Pennsylvania, statute, requires only the intended substantially the language indictment “the crime in the prohibiting assembly prescribing of the act of the and the crime punishment.” (19 261). Act of March P.S. P.L. § on this court’s opinion primarily

The relies Freeman, officers observed the defend- two police In that case surveillance manner. set They up in a suspicious ant acting distance, some observed him and, him for following after Because of an apartment building. enter the basement of unable to discern the method were their the officers position, later, few the A minutes which was achieved. entry The officers approached building. defendant left the Although to flee. he attempted arrested him after the officers have jimmied, been door appeared basement arrest, his appellant At the time of tools. found no burglary despite in his possession stolen goods did not have any have the basement which could were items in that there fact facts, the court concluded that these On away. been carried rela- not bear such a reasonable actions did defendant’s to infer that jury the crime of theft to permit tionship intent at the time of entertained a larcenous the defendant entry. consistent with other cases in

The result in Freeman is have been reversed when the which convictions burglary the mere of the defendant in a “presence evidence was intent, criminal whose own lacked building, explanation where no evidence was to show that contrary produced entry was with the intent to commit crime within.” any made 420, 424, McLaughlin, cases, In most of these Freeman-type or was leaving the defendant had left under building which did not indicate or fear of flight appre- circumstances or the hension, breaking there was no evidence of while inside. e. Common- g., commission of crime See any Larkins, wealth v. 235 Pa.Super. case, In the instant v. McLaughlin, supra. into immediately upon breaking was apprehended not extend Freeman to this situa- I would apartment.

tion. of a building consists of offense of therein. 19 to commit a crime Pa.C.S.

with the intent

888 3502. “The to make out a specific required burgla- ry be found in words conduct or charge may appellant’s from the attendant circumstances with all together reasona- ble Atkins, inferences therefrom. v. 282 206, 375, 212, A.2d 377-8 If law the intent, definite required proof and substantive it is gener- it would ally agreed be almost to convict impossible without facts disclosing a culmination the intent. 13 Am.Jur.2d 52 (1964). Burglary §

The notes that the majority because evidence was insuffi- cient to sustain appellant’s conviction of burglary it is not necessary appellant’s decide remaining contention that the dismissal of attempted theft charge precluded Ms conviction for burglary. (Majority Opn. 247 at 875, A.2d at 3). clear, n. however, It that the test employed by required the majority prosecution prove attempted larceny. difference between at- and intent was tempt reiterated in Commonwealth Wil- lard, 116 A.2d 751 (1955).

“[Attempt defined ‘. . .an overt act done in as] pursuance of an intent to a specific do thing, tending end, but falling short of complete accomplishment of law, it. In the the definition must have this further qualification, overt act be must sufficiently —that proximate to the intended crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent full requires its execution, (emphasis added) So long as acts are confined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any of the law transgression or other's rights, are they within of intent and do not sphere amount to attempts.” 371-2,116 Id. 179Pa. (emphasis original) Super, at at Eagen, quoting A.

The first italicized portion of this quotation sets forth sub- stantially same test as the applies to the requirement of (See intent. Majority Opn. 247 Pa.Super. at 372 A.2d at 876). This same language 378— has 875— been quoted in several opinions reversing burglary convic- *10 Ellis, e. v. 349 Pa. 37 g.,

tions. Commonwealth See Pa.Super. (1944); 154 504, reversing Freeman, In cases supra. v. similar to Commonwealth supra, entirely it is McLaughlin, proper Freeman an or near proof absent of a attempt attempt hold that mere conjecture would be based on verdict such rule to the apply I would not a instant case surmise. intent was thwarted efficient police in which appellant’s the I would hold Using majority’s language, action. actions did bear a to the appellant’s relationship reasonable the the commission of crime did constitute one of for of acts its commission. The acts required natural series alleged were as to the intended crime as proximate they could have been under circumstances. Freeman, v. as supra, cites Commonwealth intentional into an entry occupied that “evidence

holding .of an of itself insufficient inference support building 247 at (Majority Pa.Super. steal.” Opn. intent 875-876). First, the evidence in the A.2d at 378-379, 372 than the mere more substantially instant case reveals nature which the court trespassory of a intentional Appellant obviously in Freeman. broke hypothesized tools. Compare entered possessing burglary lock and v. v. Commonwealth McLaughlin, supra; Commonwealth (1973); Common- Muniem, Hooks, v. Ellis, with supra; wealth v. Commonwealth facts have held A.2d 827 been Similar entered to infer that a defendant jury sufficient to a permit crime therein. E. g., with the intent to commit a a building v. Lynch, Commonwealth Moreover, the Freeman, supra. Commonwealth a much than enunciates rule broader statement

majority’s dicta, the statement of the case As required. the facts the context of case. Our read out of not be should nothing out the fact that pointed have previously courts intent to commit not finding does preclude stolen was where, as legally significant fact is not Such larceny. case, the defendant before apprehended instant have been consummated. See could Muniem, supra. Hooks, supra; Marmol, In v. Del (1965), held, facts, A.2d 264 this court on similar that a jury could infer an intent to commit reasonably when a larceny defendant was in the act of caught into an breaking apart- Jacobs, ment. Judge writing noted that majority, fact that the jury chose ... to infer an intent “[t]he to commit from the larceny appellant’s unusual and surrepti- tious activities does not mean that its decision was based on ” conjecture and surmise . . . . Id. 206 Pa.Super. at 517, 214 A.2d at 266. This appears to be in accordance with the view of a majority jurisdictions which have that an unexplained breaking decided into a entering is in itself sufficient to building sustain a conviction for *11 with the intent to commit rather than larceny crime. “The some other fundamental in the theory, of evidence explanation absence of other intent or for breaking entering, object is that the usual or purpose

is theft.” 13 Am.Jur.2d p. n. 18 Brown, In his in Commonwealth v. dissenting opinion (1973) (affirmed curiam), per Del Judge attempted distinguish Spaeth unsuccessfully Marmol the fact that the in the latter case and, therefore, a “good target was It occupied larceny.” has been the law that one can be a long entering structure with the intent to commit of certain larceny spe- cific items even the structure is vacant or though contains other items. See e. Commonwealth v. g., Stefanc- addition, 77 Pa. In zyk, Super. the apartment involved this case was not It had empty. been recently contained, least, refurbished and at refrigerator, a stove fixtures. light decision is not affected the fact that the My arresting officer was on the scene to guard vandalism. In against my the reason for the officer’s opinion, is irrelevant to presence the issue of intent. In event, the record indicates that any on several occasions fixtures such as stoves had been stolen from vacant apartments. The officer had been assigned guard this of theft'as well apartment against as type vandalism. based on suspicion cannot be verdict

Although guilty to establish is not required the Commonwealth conjecture, v. Rosci- certainty. to a mathematical guilt oli, A.2d 396 the evidence was Muniem, I believe supra. Since a reasonable doubt to find beyond the jury sufficient for larceny intent to commit at entertained have had the might that he entered, time the fact he would not necessi- damage property additional intent to v. Del tate an In acquittal. my opinion, Marmol, the instant case. controls supra, I that the evidence noted,

As previously although agree I trespass, was of criminal sufficient convict appellant of this would affirm the of sentence basis judgment dissent. VOORT, J.,

VAN this joins opinion. der Pennsylvania

COMMONWEALTH BRYANT, Appellant. L. Donald *12 Superior Pennsylvania. Court of Dec. 1976.

Submitted Decided April

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Jacobs
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Apr 19, 1977
Citation: 372 A.2d 873
Docket Number: 1226
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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