COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Cameron Shawn JACKSON, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Feb. 6, 2006. Filed May 31, 2006.
899 A.2d 1154
Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Amy E. Constantine, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Com., appellee.
BEFORE: STEVENS, BENDER, JJ., and McEWEN, P.J.E.
OPINION BY STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Com
The evidence presented at trial established that [Appellаnt] and the victim, Dionne Scott, had a long-time romantic relationship and had two children together. [Appellant] had a history of assaulting Ms. Scott throughout their relationship and had violated numerous PFA orders obtained by Ms. Scott. In the evening of October 17, 2003, Ms. Scott, [Appellant], and Ms. Scott‘s brother-in-law, Reginald Hurt, were at Ms. Scott‘s home socializing, drinking, and smoking crack cocaine, while Ms. Scott‘s three (3) children, two of whom were fathered by [Appellant], were upstairs sleeping. Mr. Hurt eventually left, while [Appellant] remained with Ms. Scott. At some point in the early morning hours of October 18, 2003, an argument ensued between Ms. Scott and [Appellant]. [Appellant] grabbed Ms. Scott by the arms, threw her onto the couch, and said “the next time I go to jail, it is going to be for something good.” (Trial Transcript p. 277). [Appellant] then sat down on a chair in the room and began to think about killing Ms. Scott. He then noticed the vacuum cleaner, grabbed the cord, wrapped it arоund Ms. Scott‘s neck, and strangled her until she was dead. [Appellant] then left the house, bought some crack cocaine and returned to Ms. Scott‘s house where he smoked it. He wrote a note addressed to Magistrate Alberta Thompson, which he left near Ms. Scott‘s body, and then went to the home of his cousin, Charlene Ramsey. He told Ramsey there had been an accident, he had fought with Ms. Scott, and he thought he might have killed her. [Appellant‘s] family subsequently called the pоlice. [Appellant] was arrested and eventually confessed to killing Ms. Scott. Trial Court Opinion filed 8/22/05 at 1-2.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years to forty years in prison. Appellant filed a timely motion to modify his sentence, which the trial court denied on December 9, 2004. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 3 By order entered on April 5, 2005, the trial court directed Appellant to file a
¶ 4 Before addressing the merits of the issues raised by Appellant, we must determine whether the issues have been properly preserved for our review. Rather recently, in Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the bright-line rule established in Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998), which requires waiver whenever an appellant fails to raise an issue in a court-ordered
¶ 5 In the case sub judice, Appellant filed a timely
¶ 6 Regarding the evidence of Appellant‘s prior bad acts, Appellant contends it was improper for the trial court to permit several police officers to testify about the pattern of domestic abuse which existed between Appellant and the victim 4 and Appellant‘s repeated violation of numerous Protection From Abuse (PFA) orders.5 Specifically, Appellant contends
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on relevance and probative valuе. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact. Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 570 Pa. 117, 135, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (2002) (quotation and quotation marks omitted).
It is axiomatic that evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant‘s propensity to commit crimes. This rule is not without exception, however. Evidence may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant‘s character. It is well-established that reference to prior criminal aсtivity of the accused may be introduced where relevant to some purpose other than demonstrating defendant‘s general criminal propensity. Thus, evidence of other crimes may be introduced to show (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absenсe of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan; and (5) identity. The evidence may also be admissible to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant; to show that the defendant has used the prior bad acts to thrеaten the victim; and in situations where the bad acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development. In order for evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible as evidence of motive, the prior bad acts must give sufficient ground to believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or was in any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283 (Pa.Super.2004) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). “Furthermore, evidence of prior abuse between a defendant and a homicide victim tending to establish motive, intent, malice, or ill will is generally admissible.” Commonwealth v. Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 711 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, the apрellate courts have held that there is no set express time limitation on when evidence of prior abuse becomes inadmissible. See Drumheller, supra; Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 740 A.2d 237 (Pa.Super.1999).
¶ 7 Here, the evidence established that, since 1993, police officers responded to the parties’ residence for numerous incidents where Appellant had beaten the victim, several times in violation of an existing PFA order. The evidence suggests that the abuse by Appellant of the victim continued to escalate until Appellant ultimate
¶ 8 Affirmed.
¶ 9 McEWEN, P.J.E. FILES A CONCURRING STATEMENT.
¶ 10 BENDER, J. JOINS THE OPINION BY STEVENS, J. AND THE CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.
CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.:
¶ 1 Since the author of the majority Opinion has provided a careful and perceptive analysis, I hasten to join the decision of the majority to affirm the ruling by the trial judge which permitted the admission of evidence of appellant‘s prior bad acts. I further share the view of the majority that the record makes clear that appellant‘s supplemental Rule 1925(b) statements,6 in which he sought to raise challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the sentence imposed by the trial judge, were filed without leave of the trial court. I аm inclined, however, to complement that holding by observing that the strict view espoused by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005), should not be construed as removing all discretion from trial courts to grant permission to file supplemental Rule 1925(b) statements.
¶ 2 I am impelled to the further observation that even if we were to reach the merits of the questions which have been deemed waived, there is no basis for this Court to afford the relief appellant seeks since (1) the evidence firmly supports the verdict of the distinguished Judge Donna Jo McDaniel, who presided as the fact-finder in the nonjury trial, and (2) the sentence imposed fell within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See generally: Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 687, 887 A.2d 1240 (2005).