242 Pa. 244 | Pa. | 1913
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The Constitution is the supreme law of the State, and the duty of the judiciary is to determine whether any legislation violates or fails to conform to its provisions. It forbids the legislature to do certain things, and expressly authorizes others. When the legislature does what is forbidden, or undertakes to do what is authorized, but in a way that is violative of the constitutional direction, the duty of the courts to pronounce such legislation void is not to be evaded. In doing so judges speak not for themselves, but for the people, so that the compact which they made with one another for their own self-government may continue to be supreme in all legislation. That supremacy is to be maintained only through the judiciary, and, in the discharge of the abiding duty resting upon courts to maintain that supremacy, there is involved a responsibility so great that no statute ought to be declared void except for clear and palpable violation or disregard of the Constitution.
On March 29, 1913, the governor of the Commonwealth approved an act of assembly entitled “Act providing for another judge in each of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.” The two sections of the act are as follows: “Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., That it shall be the duty of the governor to appoint to each of the five Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County a competent person, learned in the law, to be a judge, in addition to the judges now composing said courts. The five persons so appointed shall hold their offices until the first Monday of January next, and shall have the same powers, authority, and jurisdiction, and receive the same compensation, as the other judges of the said courts, respectively. Section 2. That on the day of the next municipal election, and thereafter at such time and times as may be prescribed by the Constitution of this Commonwealth, the qualified electors of the
By the third section of the judiciary article of the Constitution this court is given original jurisdiction in cases of “quo warranto as to all officers of the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the State”; and a Common Pleas judge is such an officer: Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Dumbauld, et al., 97 Pa. 293.
The right of the defendant to continue in his office depends upon the validity of the act of the legislature under which he was appointed. The touchstone by which that validity is to be tested is the above-quoted section of the Constitution. A clear, dominant thought of the framers of the Constitution, and of the people who adopted and amended it, was that each Court of Common Pleas of the County of Philadelphia should be composed of three judges. While the number of these courts may be increased from time to time, each additional court must be composed of three judges. Three judges are the unit of a Court of Common Pleas in the said county. The number of judges in any one of these courts may be increased from time to time, as the public needs or the prompt administration of justice may require, but the sentence in Section 6 of the judiciary article authorizing such increase provides consistently with what precedes — “whenever such increase shall amount in the whole to three, such three judges shall compose a distinct and separate court as aforesaid, which shall be numbered as aforesaid.” What is the unmistakable meaning of these words? If they mean,
.Under the construction which we are asked to place upon the section of the Constitution under consideration, there might be ten additional judges created for the County of Philadelphia — two for each.of the existing courts — and a sixth court could not be established until eleven additional new judges had been created. The mere statement of this proposition ought to be all sufficient to carry conviction to any one that such a condition was never contemplated, the clear intendment of the Constitution, if “studied in the light of ordinary language,” being that every three judges in that county shall constitute a court.
It may be said that & difference of opinion among us as to the constitutionality of the Act of March 29, 1913, ought of itself to create a doubt in the minds of a majority to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act. The answer to this is, that the supreme duty resting upon every member of the court in every case, without regard to the character of the question involved —from performance of which duty he cannot shrink — is to record his considerate judgment, when reached without doubt or hesitation and after having given all due consideration to the conflicting views of colleagues. In many notable cases, familiar to all, where federal or state legislation has been pronounced unconstitutional, dissenting opinions have been filed by learned judges who differed from the majority — in some instances a bare majority of the court — but such difference of opinion has never been regarded as a sufficient reason for inducing the majority to change their view or with
The number of judges in the County of Philadelphia may be increased by the legislature from time to time, but only in the way the Constitution permits. This is conceded. The direction of that instrument was not followed in the passage of the Act of 1913, and the judges appointed under it do not, therefore, have a tenure to their offices.
And now, to wit, July 10, 1913, after hearing and upon due consideration, judgment is entered for the Commonwealth; and it is further ordered and adjudged by the court that the said Samuel M. Hyneman be and he is hereby ousted from the office of judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 1 of the County of Philadelphia, and from the franchises, fees and emoluments thereof, and that he pay the costs of this proceeding.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
July 10, 1913:
I cannot agree that the Act of March 29, 1913, is unconstitutional. This act provides for an additional judge in each of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, and in my opinion is a valid exercise of legislative power. The Federal government has no powers except such as were expressly reserved by, or necessarily implied from, the Constitution of the United States, while the several states possess all powers not expressly forbidden. Congress can pass no laws but those authorized by the Federal Constitution, while the legislature of each state has jurisdiction of all subjects of a legislative character not prohibited. The legislative powers of the several states are limited only by the constitution of each particular state and by powers reserved to the national
The Constitution provides in express terms not only for the increase of judges, but for the increase of courts. As to the increase in the number of courts the language is not mandatory but permissive. The number of courts may be increased from time to time, and this power is separate and distinct from the power to increase the number of judges. There is one power to increase the number of courts and another power to increase the number of judges in each of said courts. The legislature may exercise either or both powers as necessity seems to require. In this respect the legislature was vested with large powers and wide discretion, and in my opinion this was a wise provision of the Constitution. There may be a very good reason, such as lack of suitable quarters, for preferring to increase the number of judges in courts already established rather than to increase the number of courts which would require additional officers and a separate organization. The work would .no doubt be as expeditiously done by adding another judge to courts already established, and such considerations may have been controlling with the legislature. The Constitution gave the legislature the power
If the legislature had limited the increase to an additional judge in Common Pleas numbers one and two, no one would question the constitutionality of such an act. It, however, did not stop there, but also added a judge to Courts Nos. 3, á and 5. How does this fact affect the unquestioned power to add judges to numbers one and two? Or why should a valid exercise of power in adding two additional judges be declared void and of no effect because three other judges were added, even if we accept the view so strongly pressed upon us by learned counsel for relator? Under no theory can I see any justification for striking down the act in so far as it added an additional judge to two of the courts. The legislature had the power to add two new judges no matter what view we may take of the Constitution.
I assume that in order to facilitate the work of the courts in Philadelphia there is an existing necessity to provide more judges, and it is apparent that the legislature was so impressed; and it seems to me that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the validity of an act intended to expedite the trial of causes and the dispatch of business in the largest county of the Commonwealth, having one-fifth of our total population and perhaps even a greater proportion of legal business.
Then, again, it may be worthy of a passing thought to suggest that the Constitution in mandatory language provides that “whenever such increase shall amount in the whole to three, such three judges shall compose a distinct and separate court.” Why does not this plain provision of the Constitution take care of the present situation? When three judges are added they shall compose a separate court. Three judges have been added, why not follow the mandate of the Constitution by saying that three of the judges shall compose a separate
Assuming, however, that the language of the Constitution is not clear, and that it is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, under the settled rule of our cases, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the validity of the act. If there be doubt or hesitation in our minds as to the meaning of the Constitution, the act should not be declared void. It has been so decided in many of our cases. The case at bar comes clearly within this rule. Counsel and court are divided in opinion as to the meaning of the section of the Constitution in question in this proceeding, and according to my view these doubts should be resolved in favor of the act. This court has frequently so declared, and in no- case called to my attention was there greater reason for the application of the rule than in the one we are now considering. A statute should never be declared void unless clearly in violation of the Constitution. When the meaning of the Constitution is in doubt the act should stand because the power of the legislature is supreme except as limited by the organic law.
I would sustain the Act of 1913 and dismiss the present proceeding.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
July 10, 1913:
The general scheme of the judiciary article in our Constitution contemplates probable increased business demands in the County of Philadelphia requiring additional judicial facilities to those therein provided. To meet such contingency two distinct methods of enlargement are provided: one looking to an increase of judges in the several courts as established; the other looking to an increase in the number of the courts. It is
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
July 10, 1913:
The power of the judiciary to declare void a legislative enactment which contravenes the organic law, is established, but this is subject to the restriction that no court has the right to exercise such power unless the
With the superfluous words eliminated, Section 4, of the Constitution reads: “Until otherwise directed by law the Courts of Common Pleas shall continue as at present established, except as herein changed” ; and Section 6: “In the County of Philadelphia all the jurisdiction and powers now vested in the District Courts and Courts of Common Pleas, subject to such changes as may be made by this Constitution or by law, shall be vested in five distinct and separate courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction composed of three judges each. The number of judges in any of said courts, or in any county where the establishment of an additional court may be authorized by law, may be increased from time to time, and whenever such increase shall amount in the whole to three, such three judges shall compose a distinct and separate court as aforesaid.”
The only question is, do the words of the above quoted section require the construction adopted by the majority, which limits the control of the legislature over the re-organization of the courts of Philadelphia County in such a manner and to such an extent that the present act cannot stand? In approaching a solution of this question we must start with the thought that the general assembly has full authority to reorganize existing courts, subject only to the restrictions expressed in the
A mere glance at the part of the Constitution in question will show to anyone that the unit in contemplation is the separate court and not the combination of courts ; this is plain, for each court is expressly recognized throughout the section as “a distinct and separate court.” With this key to the situation, when the words dealing with the subject of an .increase are reached, the language, “the number of judges in any of said courts may be increased from time to time, and whenever such increase shall amount in the whole to three, such three judges shall compose a distinct and separate court,” can well be read to mean, “such increase in the number of judges in any one of said courts,” and not “in all of said courts”; thus the word “whole” is made to qualify the word “increase,” which is warranted by the rules of grammar as well as the principles of legal construction. The section is susceptible of this interpretation, and hence it should be so construed. To my mind, under the rules controlling constitutional interpretation, it not only should but must be so construed; and with the Constitution thus read, the act before us is valid. If there is a doubt as to the real meaning of the Constitution, all our cases hold that it must be resolved in favor of and not against the validity of the act; and under the circumstances, particularly when we find this court almost evenly divided upon the subject, it is difficult to understand how the language for consideration can be looked upon as free from doubt.
It seems to me that the endurance of the American system under which constitutional questions are submitted to the courts for final determination is dependent on a close adherence to the general principles stated in