Commonwealth v. HurleyCommonwealth v. Hurley
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- Before:
- Nolan
The defendant, John Kevin Hurley, requests that this court reinstate his appeal and reconsider his case
The defendant was admitted to bail after our decision in Cobb. Later, after the Supreme Court’s decision, the Commonwealth moved to have the defendant’s bail revoked. The defendant failed to appear at his bail revocation hearing. As a result, on October 16, 1980, the defendant having been found in default, a capias was issued for his arrest. Thereafter, this court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Commonwealth v. Hurley, 382 Mass. 690, 691 (1981). The defendant remained a fugitive from justice until May 26, 1981.
The importance of the issues involved persuades us to grant the defendant’s motion to reinstate his appeal. Moreover, pursuant to our authority under
1. The defendant contends that this court should reinstate his appeal because he should not be denied the beneficial effect of the court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Cobb, supra, and those cases relying on the decision. See Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165 (1982). We agree, as already indicated, that the defendant’s appeal should be reinstated.
We conclude that the allowance of a motion for reinstatement of an appeal is within the discretion of this court. 2 The United States Supreme Court, in Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970), noted that while a court need not adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after a convicted defendant who has sought review has escaped, the escape itself “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy.” Id.
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant, through his escape, has voluntarily waived his rights to appellate review and therefore is not entitled to reinstatement of his appeal. Although we have stated that by his voluntary act
While this court has discretion to grant a reinstatement, we note that a motion to reinstate an appeal is an extraordinary request and should not be granted lightly. See Estrada v. United States, 585 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, a defendant has no constitutional right to have his appeal reinstated. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 536-537 (1975). Nonetheless, we conclude, in the present case, that the defendant’s request for reinstatement should be granted.
We are drawn to the reasoning in White v. State, 514 P.2d 814, 816 (Alaska 1973). In deciding to grant the defendant’s motion to reinstate, that court stressed the defendant’s meritorious grounds for appeal in light of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Similarly, in the instant case, the defendant’s claim on appeal is meritorious. The recent decision of Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165 (1982), decided after the defendant’s original appeal, has a favorable impact on his case. See Commonwealth v. Pires, 389 Mass. 657, 659-662 (1983).
2. The United States Supreme Court has requested that we reconsider the issue whether the defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel in light of
Cuyler
v.
Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335 (1980).
Massachusetts
v.
Hurley,
449 U.S. 809 (1980). The defendant also requests that we reconsider his case pursuant to our powers under
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), interprets the right of effective assistance of counsel in the Sixth Amendment to require that a defendant “demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. at 348. With respect to the effective assistance of counsel, art. 12 provides greater safeguards than the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169-170 (1982). In Commonwealth v. Hodge, supra, we stressed that the right to the effective assistance of counsel was a fundamental right. Such a fundamental right should not depend on a defendant’s ability to meet the nearly impossible burden of proving that a genuine conflict of interest resulted in an adverse effect on his trial counsel’s performance. Id. at 170. Therefore, since the defendant has already demonstrated that a genuine conflict of interest existed, he need not be required to prove an adverse effect on his trial counsel’s performance, much less actual prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Cobb, supra at 460-461.
As we noted in
Commonwealth
v.
Cobb, supra
at 459, the facts of this case present “a more egregious situation than
Commonwealth
v.
Geraway,
364 Mass. 168 (1973), where a borderline conflict of interest was found sufficient to warrant a discretionary reversal of a conviction under
For these reasons we remand this case to the Superior Court for a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth’s case has been prejudiced by the defendant’s flight. If the Commonwealth can make no showing of prejudice other than the mere passage of time (whether the showing made is sufficient rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge), the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
So ordered.
Notes
In Commonwealth v. Richards, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 911 (1980), the Appeals Court vacated the dismissal of an appeal because the defendant had been apprehended before the dismissal took place. The court concluded that the appeal had been improperly dismissed. However, the present situation differs from Commonwealth v. Richards, supra, because here the dismissal took place before the defendant was apprehended.
A number of jurisdictions considering this issue have left the decision within the discretion of the court upon a showing of good cause. See Estrada v. United States, 585 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1978); White v. State, 514 P.2d 814, 816 (Alaska 1973); Bretti v. Wainwright, 225 So. 2d 516, 518 (Fla. 1969), modified, 255 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1971); Derrick v. State, 406 So. 2d 48 (Miss. 1981). Texas, on the other hand, has dealt with the problem by statute and, once the appeal is dismissed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court no longer attaches. Thompson v. State, 641 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Some Federal jurisdictions address the problem by refusing to allow a motion for reinstatement once the dismissal has become final. See United States v. Macias, 519 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1975) (if the defendant fails to return to the jurisdiction of the court within thirty days of the order, the dismissal is deemed final and no motion for reinstatement will be entertained). See also State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1982) (an appeal dismissed prior to a fugitive’s return to custody will not be reinstated).
The Commonwealth suggests that our application of the Hodge holding to the facts of this case would amount to retroactive application of a constitutional principle. We do not agree. First, we believe that the decision in Commonwealth v. Hodge, supra, did not change the law and create new constitutional principles. Even assuming, however, that this is such a case, newly created constitutional principles should be applied to pending cases on direct appeal. Reddick v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 398, 400 (1980). Since we have reinstated the defendant’s direct appeal, we are not applying the Hodge decision to cases seeking postconviction relief or collateral attack. Id.