Appellant was convicted under section 1543 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543, of driving while his license was suspended. Because the license suspension resulted from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), appellant was sentenced to a 90-day prison term and fine of $1000 pursuant to subsection (b) of § 1543, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b), which reads as follows:
(b) Certain offenses. — Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when their operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerаted Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relаting to suspension for refusal) or 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.
The sole issue raised on appeal is the constitutionality of § 1543(b). For the reasons stated below we affirm.
Appellant argues that § 1543(b) violates the equal protection clause by making an imprоper classification of “suspension offenders” and imposing a much harsher penalty 1 on DUI-related suspension offenders than others, with no rational basis for the distinction. He further argues that the mаndatory sentence imposed under § 1543(b) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that it violates the separation of powers doctrine by taking away the court’s sentencing discretion, and that the mandаtory fine violates due process. Finally, he argues that the statute should not be *376 applied where' the underlying DUI conviction took place before the January 14, 1983 effective date of the “New Drunk Driving Law,” Act of December 15, 1982, P.L. 1268, No. 289, §§ 9-11, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3731, 3732, 3735. In this context he contends that such application “denies him due process of law by retroactively increasing the legal consequences of his рrior guilty plea to driving while intoxicated.”
Section 1543(b) was enacted in coordination with the New Drunk Driving Law as part of the legislature’s broad response to the serious problem of intoxicated drivеrs. The economic losses, social disruptions and personal tragedies resulting from drunk driving are well documented and the subject of increasing public awareness.
See Commonwealth v. Mikulan,
Appellant’s constitutional сhallenges to § 1543(b) are without merit for the same reasons that similar constitutional attacks on the New Drunk Driving Law itself have failed. Hoover’s equal protection, separation of powers, аnd cruel and unusual punishment arguments are essentially indistinguishable from those advanced against the mandatory sentencing provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3731 and 3735 in
Commonwealth v. Hernandez,
We agree with the reasoning of Hernandez and believe it is equally applicable to the corresponding arguments raised by appellant with respect to § 1543(b). Section 1543(b) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature was acting within its recognized power to delineate the penalties for criminal conduct. The sentences imposed under § 1543(b) are not disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and are not repugnant to societal standards of justice. Finally, section 1543(b) is rationally related to the same state interests which motivated thе legislature to enact the statutes at issue in Hernandez. The imposition of mandatory license suspensions for drunk driving reflects a proper legislative determination of the seriousness of the drunk driving problem, and § 1543(b) is rationally related to the legitimate goal of keeping those convicted drunk drivers off the roads during the period of their suspensions.
Appellant makes an additional equal proteсtion claim not directly addressed in
Hernandez.
He argues that the distinction drawn in § 1543(b) between different classes of “suspension offenders” is constitutionally infirm because other violators whose suspensions or revocations stemmed from serious offenses, such as homicide by vehicle or racing on the highway, are not subject to the stiffer penalties of § 1543(b), and there is an equally persuasive rationale fоr imposing additional penalties to discourage such persons from driving. This argument fails because the equal protection clause does not force the legislature to choose between attacking all aspects of a problem or none at all.
Dandridge v. Williams,
Appellant further contends that § 1543(b) may not constitutionally aрply to cases where the underlying DUI conviction resulting in a suspension antedated the January 14, 1983 effective date of the New Drunk Driving Law. Appellant frames his argument in due process terms, urging that the impоsition of the sentence prescribed by § 1543(b) denies him due process by retroactively increasing the consequences of his pre-January 14, 1983 guilty plea to DUI.
Although appellant does not refеr to § 1543 as an impermissible ex post facto law, his argument is in substance a claim that § 1543(b) changes the punishment for his prior DUI offense, making it greater than it was when the offense was committed. This is one of the criteria for determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
See Commonwealth v. Hoetzel,
As the Grady court correctly noted, recidivist statutes have generally been upheld against ex post facto challenges. Appellant’s “due process” claim is identical in substance to the ex post facto claim in Grady despite the difference in language. Grady thеrefore controls and appellant’s argument is meritless. Section 1543(b) does not impose an additional punishment for the underlying DUI conviction. The fact that appellant’s DUI conviction followed a plea of guilty is irrelevant. Although a defendant *379 must be informed before pleading guilty to a crime of the sentences which may be imposed for that crime, there is no requirement that the guilty plеa colloquy include discussion of the penalties for subsequent offenses which the defendant may commit at some unspecified time in the future. When appellant chose to drive while under suspension, section 1543(b) was in effect and appellant knew or should have known what the statutory punishment would be for his offense. Therefore, appellant had adequate prior notice of thе possible consequences of his conduct and cannot claim his due process rights have been violated.
Finally, appellant argues that the imposition of a mandatory $1000 fine regardlеss of the defendant’s ability to pay violates the due process clause. Appellant correctly notes that in
Commonwealth v. Mead,
However, we do not read
Mead
as holding or even suggesting that we should find a statute unconstitutional merely because it imposes a mandatory fine. Rather, we believe the proper focus of our due process inquiry is on what procedural safeguаrds exist in the event a defendant is unable to pay a “legislatively mandated fine.” Appellant’s claim that section 1543(b) “rob[s him] of a fair procedure — indeed, any procedure — for determining how large a fine he is able to pay” (Appellant’s Brief at 21), is meritless in light of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6504, which provides that the court may order installment payments where the defendant demonstrates his inability to pay a fine imposed under the Vehicle Code.
2
Moreover, it is clear that appellant cannot
*380
be imprisoned for nonpayment of the fine if he establishes he is unable to pay.
Tate v. Short,
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
. The penalty for driving under suspension in cases not covered by § 1543(b) is a fine of $200. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a).
. Section 6504 applies only to Vehicle Code offenses. We do not decide at this juncture what procedures should be followed in other cases involving “legislatively mandated fines.”