Commonwealth v. HomeyerCommonwealth v. Homeyer
Opinion by
Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and the penalty was fixed at death. His counsel cited over 80 reasons for a new trial; 9 of these are pressed on this appeal.
On March 28th or March 29th, 1950, Anna Snelleman Homeyer, wife of the defendant, died or was murdered in their residence in Factoryville, Wyoming County, Pennsylvania. On March 7, 1951, a well preserved head, which had been severed from the body at the neck, and a part of the pelvis of a female Avere found encased in concrete buried in a wash tub in the cellar of the Homeyer home. The head Avas identified as that of Anna Snelleman Homeyer.
The defendant told so many different and conflicting stories to so many people that it would take a great many pages to recount them, or even to enumerate his fabrications. It will suffice Ave believe to give the following brief summary.
The defendant told the District Attorney and the police that March 28, 1950, was Anna Homeyer’s birthday. Although he alleges she had no friends, she became angry, according to him, because no one called on her to wish her a happy birthday. Consequently defendant went to a store and purchased a cake and whipping cream for the purpose of making her a birthday cake. When he went back to her bedroom he found her dead. She had been sickly for five years and had had high blood pressure. On the floor in her bedroom defendant said he found a sleeping pill and an empty bottle which he had received from Doctor Patrick the day before and which had contained 20 Napentals. He said the bottle was open and only one capsule remained. Eighteen capsules would be a fatal dosage to a person in the physical condition of Anna 'Homeyer. ' Upon discovering the body defendant alleged that he was
Defendant, like most defendants, proceeds on the assumption that you must believe all of his statements or confessions; of course, that is erroneous; a jury can believe all or a part of or none of a defendant’s statements, confessions or testimony. The theory of the defense is that Anna committed suicide, and the dismemberment of her body after she was dead does not constitute a crime. Defendant’s principal contention on this appeal is that, apart from his own statements or confessions, there was no proof of the corpus delicti and consequently an acquittal should have been directed, or a new trial must be granted.
Defendant married Anna Snelleman in 1944. At the time of her death he was 52 and she was 64. In 1948 she purchased with her own money premises known as 210 Riverside Drive, Factoryville, Pennsyl
In the Fall of 1949 defendant began corresponding with a woman named Nancy Parker through a “Lonely Hearts” magazine. In his letters he told her he was a widower, said he had a house, a diamond ring and an engagement ring which he offered her and suggested marriage. In March, 1950 he wrote her and secured her telephone number at a near-by drug store. On March 29 he telephoned her, arranging to meet her at New Castle, Pa., on March 31. He took her to California under promise of marriage; what happened thereafter is not clear. On the way to California and after he got there he wrote many cards and letters to Anna’s friends and neighbors telling them Anna was with him, was happy and never felt better in her life, loved California and planned to sell her Factoryville home and live in California. He told Nancy Parker that his wife had died the year before.
On June 3, 1950, defendant returned to Factory-ville and told his neighbors Anna was in California and did not want to make the trip back. He told another neighbor Anna was in Montana with his .daughter. Previously he had told some people, that Anna
Defendant on his return to Factoryville did some cementing inside his house, sold the household furniture, burned Anna’s clothing; sold meat saws and gave away butcher knives. He likewise sold the house for approximately $5700; forged his wife’s name to the deed and had a notary public acknowledge it even though his wife was not present. He again sent letters and cards to Anna’s friends saying how much she was enjoying California. He then returned to California with another woman, Maggie Woodal, whom he first contacted in July 1950, and married in September 1950. He told Maggie that his wife had died in bed five years before of kidney trouble. After that, he wrote an acquaintance of Anna’s in New York that Mrs. Homeyer had passed away in her sleep the morning of September 3 and there had been no illness
On January 16, 1951, he forged Anna’s signature to a letter asking for the cash surrender value of her policy of insurance. On January 24, 1951, he was located in Los Angeles by a deputy sheriff who asked him the present whereabouts of his wife, Anna. He told the sheriff that Anna died March 7, 1950, in Bronx, New York, from high blood pressure and was buried March 11, 1950, in St. John’s Cemetery and that she had no life insurance. Defendant left Los Angeles immediately after this statement, but foolishly returned a week later and was arrested, charged with forgery. While being brought back from California by detectives, defendant attempted suicide on the train. It is unnecessary to narrate any more of defendant’s many fabrications, lies and conflicting statements.
The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing in order to constitute murder in the first degree. The Commonwealth in such a case, in order to establish the corpus delicti, must prove (1) that the alleged victim is dead, and (2) that the death occurred as a result of a felonious act. The corpus delicti, like other facts, may be shown by circumstantial evidence; it is sufficient if these circumstances are consistent with crime even though they are also consistent with suicide or accident; if it were otherwise it would be impossible in many cases, where there were no eye witnesses, to convict a criminal.
Commonwealth v. Gardner,
Commonwealth v. Jones,
297 Pa., supra, is analogous on its facts to the instant case. In that case de
“ ‘Possession of the fruits of crime is of great weight in establishing the proof of murder, when that crime has been accompanied with robbery’ ”:
Commonwealth v. Newman,
Flight, manifestations of mental distress, fear at the time of or just before or just after discovery of the crime, an attempt to commit suicide at such time, as well as evidence to prove motive, intent, plan or design are admissible. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Giacobbe,
Defendant contends that a new trial should be granted because the verdict was against the Aveight of the evidence. The evidence was not only ample but, we believe, overAvhelming to prove defendant guilty of murder in the first degree; indeed, we fail to see how the jury could have arrived at any other verdict.
“A recommendation” of death, as the defendant correctly contends, is not a “fixing of the death penalty” in accord with the law.
Commonwealth v. Petrillo,
We have considered all of the other contentions of the defendant and find no merit in any of them. They, together with his 70 additional contentions have been convincingly answered in the painstaking and able 140-page opinion of President Judge Little.
The sentence and judgment are affirmed.