153 Mass. 343 | Mass. | 1891
The Pub. Sts. c. 207, § 9, provide that whoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, shall do certain acts or use certain means, shall if the woman dies in consequence be imprisoned in the state prison not exceeding twenty nor less than five years, and if the woman does not die in consequence shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than five years or by a fine. The St. of 1889, c. 100, provides : “ In criminal prosecutions under and for violation of the provisions of section nine of chapter two hundred and seven of the Public Statutes, where the death of the woman is alleged to have resulted from the means therein described, the dying declarations of such woman shall be admissible in evidence.” The defendant was tried on an indictment found after the passage of the latter statute for an offence under the former, alleged to have been committed before the passage of the latter, in which the death of the woman was alleged to have resulted from the means described. At the trial, the dying declarations of the woman were admitted, against the objection of the defendant.
The statute describes a single offence, that of using means with a certain intent. The death of the woman is no part of the offence. The indictment need not allege whether she did or did not die, and if it alleges that her death was the result of the means used, it is not an indictment for manslaughter. The fact of the death affects the punishment only. Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 Gray, 419. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 108 Mass. 461. The death of the woman is not the subject of the charge, and her dying declarations are not admissible under the common law rule. Rex v. Hutchinson, 2 B. & C. 608, note. People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95. Railing v. Commonwealth, 110 Penn. St. 100. The question, therefore, is whether the statute of 1889 has a retrospective effect, and renders the evidence competent to prove an offence committed before its passage.
The defendant contends that, if the statute is construed to apply to offences committed before its passage, it comes within the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, and refers to the definition of such laws given in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, and Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. But there is no occasion to consider this question, because we think that the statute
Verdict set aside.