COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jason HOLMES, Appellee.
2069 MDA 2007
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Feb. 22, 2011.
14 A.3d 89
Submitted July 14, 2010.
Joseph F. Sklarosky, Sr., Forty Fort, for Jason Holmes, appellee.
BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.
OPINION
Justice TODD.
In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the police articulated reasonable suspicion of a violation of
The record reveals the following factual background. On the evening of December 6, 2006, Assistant Chief Leonard Trotta1 of the Pittston Township Police Department was on general patrol and sitting in his marked police vehicle, parked at the Sunoco gas station on Route 315.2 According to his testimony at Holmes’ suppression hearing, Officer Trotta ob-
Officer Evans also testified at the suppression hearing, explaining that, when he arrived at the scene in response to Officer Trotta’s call for assistance, he observed Officer Trotta and Holmes outside of the vehicle. Id. at 24. Officer Evans testified he observed Officer Trotta ask Holmes for consent to search the vehicle, and Holmes gave consent, although when asked at the suppression hearing to point out the driver who gave consent, Officer Evans pointed to Ballard, who was the passenger in the vehicle. Id. at 24-25. Officer Evans indicated that, after Officer Trotta received consent to search the vehicle from Holmes, Officer Evans had the dog perform a sniff of the perimeter of the vehicle, and that the dog “alerted” to the presence of drugs on the driver and passenger side doors. Officer Evans testified that, after the dog alerted during the exterior sniff, Ballard was removed from the passenger seat of the vehicle.7
According to Officer Evans, once inside the vehicle, the dog alerted in the area of the floor and the backseat, where police found marijuana. Officer Evans testified that, after removing the dog from the inside of the vehicle, he overheard a conversation between Holmes and Ballard, suggesting that the dog would not be able to detect cocaine. Id. at 28. Officer Evans put the dog back inside the vehicle, where the dog alerted to the console area between the driver and front passenger seats, in which police ultimately recovered marijuana cigarettes, packets of cocaine, a digital scale, and a semiautomatic handgun and a magazine for the handgun. Id. at 29-30. Officer Evans testified that the items were seized and given to Officer Trotta. Id. at 31. After Holmes was transported to the police station, Officer Evans discovered several additional packets of cocaine in Holmes’ sock. When asked at the suppression hearing if he seized the object which he observed hanging from the vehicle, Officer Trotta replied “I don’t recall. I don’t think so, sir.” Id. at 19. Officer Evans also testified that he did not seize the object hanging from the rearview mirror. Id. at 40.
Holmes was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID“)9 and several weapons of-
Holmes appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court, and, on April 17, 2009, the Superior Court, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, vacated Holmes’ judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 2069 MDA 2007 (Pa.Super. filed April 17, 2009). In doing so, the Superior Court relied on its decisions in Commonwealth v. Felty, 443 Pa.Super. 559, 662 A.2d 1102 (1995), and Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa.Super. 441, 655 A.2d 1030 (1995). In each of those cases, the Superior Court held that the traffic stop of the appellant’s vehicle was unlawful because the police officer who stopped the vehicle for an alleged violation of Section 4524(c) did not possess reasonable and articulable grounds to believe that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code had occurred. In the instant case, the Superior Court concluded, “the case is even stronger to disallow the stop because not only was there no description of the size of the object, but there was no testimony as to what the object was.” Holmes, 2069 MDA 2007, at 2. As a result, the Superior Court held that the stop of Holmes’ vehicle was unlawful.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and, on April 8, 2010, this Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition with respect to the following issue:
Whether the Superior Court erred in reversing [Holmes’] judgment of sentence, based on a misapplication of the relevant precedent permitting stops of motor vehicles for an alleged violation of
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) (windshield obstructions and wipers)?
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 605 Pa. 567, 992 A.2d 845 (2010) (order).
The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in order to conduct a vehicle stop based on a possible violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 88, 960 A.2d 108, 112 (2008). However, in determining whether the suppression court properly denied a suppression motion, we consider whether the record supports the court’s factual findings. If so, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa. 319, 328, 935 A.2d 1275, 1280 (2007).
Pursuant to
Section 4524(c) of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:
No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material hung from the inside rearview mirror or otherwise hung, placed or attached in such a position as to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver’s vision through the front windshield or any manner as to constitute a safety hazard.
In urging this Court to reverse the Superior Court’s decision to award Holmes a new trial, the Commonwealth first
the [Superior] Court addressed vehicle stops based on alleged violations of
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) due to alleged obstructions of a driver’s vision by objects hanging from rearview mirrors. In both of those cases, the Superior Court found that the testimony of the arresting officers was insufficient to establish that the objects actually obstructed the driver’s vision. In Benton, there was no testimony by the officer indicating that the air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror materially impaired the driver’s vision. In Felty, the officer also failed to testify that the object materially impaired the driver’s vision.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citations omitted).
By contrast, the Commonwealth points out, in the instant case, Officer Trotta testified at the suppression hearing that he saw “objects hanging from the rearview mirror which were ‘obstructing the driver’s view,’” and that Officer Trotta was “able to observe this even before the vehicle stop.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citing N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 4). The Commonwealth avers “[t]his is precisely the sort of testimony regarding the obstructing item that is required under the statute, and whose absence in Benton and Felty led the court in those cases to find that reasonable suspicion did not exist.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-10. The Commonwealth further maintains the statute does not require that the police identify the object before conducting a vehicle stop, and that the Superior Court improperly read such a requirement into the law.13
As noted above, Section 6308(b) allows a police officer to conduct a vehicle stop if he has reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring
Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. [Commonwealth v.] Melendez, [544 Pa. 323, 676 A.2d 226], at 228 [(1996)] (citing Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1], at 21 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ]). In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999) (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 996 A.2d 473, 477 (2010) (emphasis added). Thus, under the present version of Section 6308(b), in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, in this case, Section 4524(c).15
The determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Chase, 599 Pa. at 101, 960 A.2d at 120 (“[r]easonable suspicion
[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. And simple “good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.’ * * * If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.[“]
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citations and footnotes omitted).
This Court has recognized the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Terry, noting, for example, “before the
As noted above, Section 4524(c) prohibits an individual from driving a motor vehicle “with any object or material hung from the inside rearview mirror or otherwise hung, placed or attached in such a position as to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver’s vision through the front windshield or any manner as to constitute a safety hazard.”
Our consideration of other sections of the Motor Vehicle Code informs our conclusion. For example, in order to independently assess whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to suspect a violation of Section 3361 (Driving vehicle at a safe speed), a suppression court would require more than a single statement from an officer that a motorist was driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent.”
Based on our review of this record, we agree with the Superior Court that the testimony at the suppression hearing was insufficient to support the required independent evaluation and finding by the suppression court that Officer Trotta had reasonable suspicion to stop Holmes’ vehicle for a suspected violation of Section 4524(c). At Holmes’ suppression hearing, Officer Trotta’s sole testimony was that he “observed a vehicle traveling north on 315 with objects hanging from the rearview mirror which were obstructing the driver’s view.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/4/07, at 4. There was no testimony as to the size or general description of the objects hanging from the rearview mirror, or how the objects impaired
Although Judge Conahan apparently found Officer Trotta’s bare statement that he saw objects hanging from the mirror which “were obstructing” Holmes’ view to be credible, such statement simply was insufficient to allow the suppression court to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that Holmes’ view was obstructed, let alone materially obstructed, as the statute requires. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 22 (recognizing that police officers’ “judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime’” and holding that good faith on part of the arresting officer is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion).17 As previously noted, Offi-
Finally, we note there are myriad objects which drivers commonly hang from their rearview mirrors. Air fresheners; parking placards; mortarboard tassels; crosses; rosary beads; medallions of St. Christopher, the patron saint of travel; and rabbits’ feet are but a few. It is not illegal for a driver to hang such items from his or her rearview mirror, so long as the items do not materially obstruct the driver’s view. The legislature could have written Section 4524(c) to prohibit a driver from hanging any object from the vehicle’s rearview mirror, or it could have prohibited hanging objects that obstruct a driver’s view to any degree, but it did not; rather, it prohibited only material obstructions. Were this Court to conclude that an officer’s bare testimony that he saw an object hanging from a rearview mirror which obstructed the driver’s view, without any additional testimony or other evidence supporting the officer’s conclusion that the object materially obstructed the driver’s view, was sufficient to demonstrate reasonable suspicion to constitutionally support the intrusion of a vehicle stop, we would obviate the suppression court’s role in ensuring there is an objectively reasonable basis for the vehicle stop, and expose every law-abiding motorist who hangs an object from his or her rearview mirror to a potentially unwarranted intrusion. See Terry.
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Superior Court that the evidence does not support the findings of the
Order affirmed.
Justices BAER and ORIE MELVIN join the opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice CASTILLE joins.
Justice EAKIN files a dissenting opinion in which Justice McCAFFERY joins.
Justice SAYLOR, concurring.
I join the majority opinion as to the issue on which allocatur was granted, see Commonwealth v. Holmes, 605 Pa. 567, 992 A.2d 845 (2010) (allowing appeal relative to the validity of the underlying vehicle stop),1 but write separately to explain my understanding of the limits of its holding. See Majority Opinion, at 17, 14 A.3d at 98 (“Lacking any evidence of such specific and articulable facts, the suppression court in the instant case was unable to perform its required independent
Central to the majority’s ruling is the fact that the officer’s testimony amounted to a conclusory statement, in that he essentially recited the elements of the alleged Vehicle Code infraction, instead of providing a factual basis for the supposed violation. See, e.g., N.T., Sept. 4, 2007, at 4. Although inadequate under these circumstances to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful vehicle stop, especially since the suppression court was without any means to evaluate whether the purported object materially obstructed Appellee’s view, see
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring opinion.
Justice EAKIN, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the officer illegally stopped appellee’s car. It is true that he did not testify to specifics that allow us to review whether the obstruction was “material.” This lynchpin of the Superior Court’s theory, adopted by my colleagues, is true—it is also irrelevant.
The majority bases its result on the officer’s failure to identify the object hanging from appellee’s rearview mirror, and to describe it such that an appellate court may evaluate whether the object not only impaired the driver’s vision but did so materially. If this case had anything to do with whether the evidence allowed a conviction for violating
The officer testified he observed an object hanging from appellee’s rearview mirror so as to obstruct the driver’s vision. Whether it did so “materially“—indeed, whether it actually blocked the driver’s vision at all—is neither here nor there. The purpose of the stop was, in classic Terry language, to investigate further. The officer need not have proof, or even probable cause at this point. Seeing an object hanging there, believing it obstructed vision as the suppression court found, would any reasonable officer suspect there may be a violation? If an officer sees what he reasonably believes to be blocked visibility, an uncontrived safety concern, it can hardly be illegal, as my colleagues find, to investigate whether vision is blocked to the point of comprising a violation. It is the right to stop and investigate, not the results of the investigation, that is at issue.
“In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (1997)). In this case, Assistant Chief Trotta testified he saw objects hanging from the rearview mirror which obstructed the driver’s view. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/4/07, at 4. The sole issue is reasonable suspicion that visibility was materially blocked, and the fact found by the trial court as true was that the officer believed
Again, it is not what the officer finds after the stop that determines the issue. If the officer stopped the car in the belief there were drugs in the trunk, when evaluating the stop, it matters not one bit whether drugs are ultimately found in the trunk or not. Likewise, when evaluating this stop, it matters not whether the driver’s vision was materially impaired or not—if there had been nothing hanging from the mirror when the officer arrived, the stop is still valid if supported by reasonable suspicion, not proof, that vision was blocked. Something was blocking the driver’s vision here, making clear the existence of reasonable suspicion there may be a violation of § 4524(c).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice McCAFFERY joins this opinion.
Notes
Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. at 87-88, 960 A.2d at 112 (emphasis original, footnote omitted).The former version of
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) required an officer to have “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of [the Vehicle Code]” to effectuate a vehicle stop. . . . This Court interpreted “articulable and reasonable grounds” to be the equivalent of “probable cause,” requiring police have probable cause to believe the vehicle or its driver was in violation of the Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111, 785 A.2d 983, 986 (2001); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116–17 (1995). Gleason thus held the statutory standard for stops based on potential Vehicle Code violations was probable cause, even if an investigative stop would be constitutionally permitted in a non-vehicle situation based on reasonable articulable suspicion. Gleason did so based on interpretation of the former § 6308(b). The legislature thereafter modified § 6308(b), bringing it into line with requirements of constitutional case law for stops not involving the Vehicle Code.