443 Mass. 597 | Mass. | 2005
The defendant has been indicted on charges of murder in the second degree (five counts), burning a dwelling (G. L. c. 266, § 1), and causing injury to a fire fighter (G. L. c. 265, § 13D ½). The defendant moved to suppress her statement to the police (in which she ultimately made a full confession) and her later statement to a court officer following her arraignment (in which she confirmed that she had lit the fire in question). After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge concluded that the police interrogation of the defendant was custodial in nature, and suppressed the entirety of her statement on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the defendant’s waiver of her Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. With respect to the defendant’s statements to the court officer, the judge denied the motion to suppress the defendant’s initial spontaneous remarks, as they were not the product of any improper questioning, but suppressed the
Both the Commonwealth and the defendant were granted leave to appeal the judge’s decision, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. With respect to the defendant’s statement to the police, we hold that the judge erred in concluding that the interrogation was custodial at its inception, and therefore reverse the ruling insofar as it suppressed the statements made during the initial noncustodial phase of the interview. We see no error in the judge’s finding that the defendant’s mental infirmities were such that she did not understand the Miranda warnings, and we therefore conclude that statements made after the interrogation did become custodial were properly suppressed. We find no error in the partial suppression of the statements made to the court officer, and therefore affirm that portion of the judge’s ruling.
1. Facts. The motion judge’s detailed findings of fact are summarized as follows. At 10:57 p.m. on February 24, 1999, the Lynn fire department responded to an alarm at a three-family dwelling. Five people were killed in the blaze. Suspicion initially centered on the defendant’s son, Charles Loayza. Loayza’s estranged girl friend, Krystina Sutherland, and their two children lived in the building; Loayza had argued with Sutherland that very afternoon and had threatened to bum the building; and Loayza had set fire to a wreath on the door of Sutherland’s apartment just two months earlier.
At approximately 2:15 a.m. on February 25, Sergeant Michael Cronin of the State police, accompanied by a Lynn police captain, went to the defendant’s apartment (approximately one-quarter mile from the scene of the fire) attempting to locate Loayza. Cronin informed the defendant that they were investigating a fire, told her they were looking for her son, and asked her some questions about him. The defendant told them that Loayza lived with her; that he had recently broken up with Sutherland; that he had been upset that evening after speaking with Sutherland on the telephone; and that he had left the apartment to go to work at approximately 7:30 p.m. This interview of the defendant lasted approximately twenty minutes.
Thereafter, the police found Loayza and arrested him on an outstanding warrant unrelated to the fire. Loayza provided an account of his whereabouts on the night of the fire, and the police were able to confirm his alibi. The police also received information that the defendant herself may have been involved in setting other fires, and the investigation therefore shifted its focus from Loayza to the defendant.
On the afternoon of February 27, Cronin returned to the defendant’s apartment, this time accompanied by a State trooper. They were in plain clothes and driving an unmarked vehicle. They asked the defendant to come to the police station again and give a further statement. The defendant agreed, and was driven to the station and taken to the same interview room where she had been questioned two days earlier. She was left on her own for approximately five minutes. Cronin then returned, accompanied by the same police captain who had been with him when the defendant was first questioned at her home on the night of the fire.
At the outset of the interview, Cronin advised the defendant of her Miranda warnings, reading them off of a sheet; she said that she understood the warnings, and all three signed the sheet. The interview began along the same lines as the earlier
Approximately fifty minutes into the interview, the defendant asked to use the bathroom. They took a break, and a female trooper escorted the defendant to the bathroom.
When they resumed, the officers suggested to the defendant that there was a “possibility” that she had set the fire. The defendant adamantly rejected that suggestion, pointing out that she had no reason to set the fire and would not do anything to hurt her own grandchildren. She said that she did not know who
When the interview resumed, the defendant appeared very upset. The officers adopted a sympathetic tone, suggesting that it would be “better” if the defendant told them exactly what happened. The defendant then said that her “babies” had been hurt enough, and that her son would hate her and never forgive her. Cronin suggested that she just “tell [them] what happened.” At that point, the defendant said that she had started the fire using a lit cigarette and some oil thrown on the stairway. She explained that her hope had been that if Sutherland had nowhere to stay, Sutherland and the children would return to Loayza.
The interrogating officers left briefly to get State Trooper Kevin Condon from the fire marshal’s office, as he was familiar with the forensic evidence concerning the origin and nature of the fire. Condon introduced himself to the defendant, and Cronin explained to her that Condon investigated fires. The defendant then related in detail how she started the fire, with Condon asking specific questions about those details. Condon also drew a diagram of the building, and asked the defendant to supply specific information to be placed on the diagram. In addition to providing details about how and where she started the fire, the defendant further described her motive, explaining that Sutherland had treated Loayza badly, and that Sutherland was not a good mother. The defendant expressed relief that the children had not been hurt in the fire, and stated that she had not known that there were other children on the top floor of the building.
The defendant was arraigned on March 1, 1999, in the Lynn division of the District Court department.
After the defendant’s arraignment, Marrin was escorting the defendant back to the holding area. On the way, the defendant began to complain about her leg irons, and told Marrin that her
2. Discussion, a. Statement to the police. The motion judge concluded that, from the outset of the February 27 interview at the station, the defendant was in custody. Although the officers gave the defendant Miranda warnings before questioning her, the judge concluded that the defendant’s mental illness and impairments were such that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of proving that the defendant “understood her legal rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them.” He simultaneously concluded that the defendant’s statement to the police was made voluntarily in the sense that it was not coerced by either the police or by the effects of her mental illness. However, because of the judge’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights was not “knowing and intelligent,” he decided that the resulting statement was not the product of a “rational intellect” and therefore not voluntary. He thus suppressed the entirety of the defendant’s statement to the police. On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the judge applied the wrong legal standard to his analysis of the validity of the defendant’s waiver of her rights and the voluntariness of her statement. The Commonwealth also contends that the issue of the defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights does not need to be
i. Validity of the waiver. If an interrogation is custodial in nature, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made a valid waiver of Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 366 (1997). Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 669-670 (1995). We give substantial deference to the motion judge’s determination of the validity of a waiver, and will not reject the judge’s subsidiary findings if warranted by the evidence. Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 412 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 389 Mass. 411, 419 (1983). However, we conduct an independent review to determine whether the judge properly applied the correct legal principles to those findings. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, supra at 364.
To be valid, the waiver of Miranda rights must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 669. The validity of a waiver is assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, which includes, inter alia, “the defendant’s age, education, intelligence and emotional stability.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, supra at 366, quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra at 413. Here, the factor that was of the greatest concern to the motion judge was the nature and extent of the defendant’s mental impairment. In light of the evidence before him, the judge properly gave considerable weight to that factor. A judge must give “special attention” when confronted with a waiver of rights by a person who suffers from mental deficits. Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 381 (1997). See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Mass. 660, 664 (1982) (reviewing court considering suspect’s waiver of rights must also “scrutinize record with special care when the suspect has a diminished or subnormal mental capacity”). “[M]ental illness is certainly a factor that a trial court should consider when deciding on the validity of a waiver. If a defendant cannot understand the nature of his rights, he cannot waive them intelligently.” Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988).
The Commonwealth also contends that the judge imposed too high a standard in terms of what a suspect must understand and appreciate in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. For example, the Commonwealth claims that the judge’s analysis improperly focused on the defendant’s lack of concern for herself and her desire to protect her son, rather than on her ability to understand her Miranda rights. In order for a waiver to be “knowing” and “intelligent,” the defendant must understand “the [Miranda] warnings themselves,” but does not need to understand or appreciate the tactical or strategic consequences of waiving Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 393 (1997), citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567-577 (1987). See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 Mass. 646, 656-657 (1989) (failure to appreciate legal ramifications of admitting role as joint venturer while identifying another as actual perpetrator did not render waiver of Miranda rights invalid on theory that waiver was not “intelligent”); Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 529-530 (1980) (defendant’s “understanding” of Miranda warnings refers to “comprehension of the rights guaranteed to him,” not to defendant’s “appreciation of the legal ramifications of his waiver”). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it” (emphasis in original). United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
ii. Voluntariness. The validity of a waiver (which must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary) is a separate inquiry from whether the ensuing statement itself was voluntarily made. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 851 n.2 (1983), and cases cited. With respect to the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement, the judge found that the statement was not the product of the defendant’s mental illness, that she had been coherent and rational during the course of the interrogation, and that there had been no coercion or unfair interrogation tactics
However, because the defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived her Miranda rights, the judge concluded that her statement was not “the product of a rational intellect” and, in that sense, not “voluntary.” When our cases have spoken of voluntariness in terms of a defendant’s “rational intellect,” we have done so to contrast a statement that is the product of a defendant’s mental illness or incapacity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benoit, 410 Mass. 506, 511 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 455 (1985) (statements “attributable in large measure to a defendant’s debilitated condition, such as insanity ... are not the product of a rational intellect or free will and are involuntary”). See also Commonwealth v. Hunter, 416 Mass. 831, 834 (1994). Here, the judge expressly found that the defendant’s statement was not the product of her mental illness. Her lack of comprehension of the Miranda warnings would not, by itself, taint the voluntariness of her statement. The judge ultimately grounded his decision to suppress the defendant’s statement on his conclusion that the Commonwealth had not proved a valid waiver of Miranda rights, a conclusion that is amply supported by the record and the judge’s subsidiary findings, and not on grounds of involuntariness, a conclusion that would not be supported by the record or the judge’s subsidiary findings. Based on those findings that were germane to the issue of voluntariness, the Commonwealth had established that the defendant’s statement was voluntarily made.
iii. Custodial interrogation. Finding no error in the judge’s determination that the Commonwealth failed to prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights, we must address the Commonwealth’s contention that the judge erred in concluding that the interrogation of the defendant was custodial in nature. The requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), are not triggered unless the interrogation is custodial, and a defendant’s failure to receive or understand Miranda warnings, or police failure to honor Miranda rights, does not result in suppression
In assessing whether a defendant was in “custody” for purposes of the Miranda requirements, “[t]he crucial question is whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that he was in custody. . . . Thus, if the defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave, the interrogation occurred while the defendant was in custody, and Miranda warnings were required” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996). In making that determination, we consider various factors: “(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview ended with an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 121-127 (1998), and Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984).
The fact that the defendant’s interview occurred at the police
The Commonwealth concedes that the interrogation ultimately became custodial. The issue is when that change occurred. The defendant places great significance on the fact that when she asked to use the bathroom after approximately fifty minutes of questioning, she was accompanied to the bathroom by a female trooper. We reject the argument that that escorted trip to the
The uncontroverted testimony was that the escort was not provided for purposes of preventing the defendant from leaving the station, but rather for purposes of direction and privacy. The officers explained that the defendant needed to be shown where the bathroom was and, because it was a unisex bathroom used primarily by male officers, the female trooper was asked to accompany the defendant to make sure that the men remained away from the bathroom while the defendant used it. At the time of this trip to the bathroom, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, and knew that they did not have sufficient grounds to detain her. And, up to that point in the interview, their questioning still had not communicated to the defendant that she was under suspicion. Rather, the focus had remained where it had been during the two prior encounters, namely, questioning the defendant about her son and his relationship to Sutherland. From the defendant’s perspective at that point in the interview, the police still appeared suspicious of her son, not of her. When questioning resumed after the trip to the bathroom, the judge found that the officers “kept the interview low-key and acted sympathetic toward the defendant.” The mere fact that a female officer had just gone with her to the bathroom would not have made the defendant feel that she was prohibited from leaving.
During the next phase of the interview, the officers began to reveal some degree of suspicion concerning the defendant, although they stopped short of an outright accusation. When they suggested the “possibility” that she may have set the fire, the defendant denied any such suggestion, explaining that she would not have done anything to hurt her own grandchildren. The officers then took another break and left the defendant by herself in the interview room for approximately five minutes. At that juncture, the officers still lacked grounds to arrest the defendant, left her on her own, and did nothing that would suggest she was not free to leave.
The defendant’s confession began during the next segment of the interview, in response to the officer’s “sympathetic” suggestion that she “tell [them] what happened.” As a suspect makes
Here, we similarly decline to “freeze-frame” the instant when the defendant first made an inculpatory remark to the effect that her son would hate her and never forgive her. The officer’s suggestion (“Why don’t you tell us what happened?”), made immediately after that remark, did not result in any “fundamental
The setting became custodial when Condon was brought into the room and began to question the defendant about the particulars of how she had lit the fire. Condon was introduced to the defendant as someone with expertise in investigating fires, and his questions were based on specific forensic evidence concerning this particular fire. This kind of detailed questioning, with the defendant as the evident focal point of the investigation after her more general confession, transformed the previously sympathetic and nonaccusatory interview into a custodial interrogation. Not surprisingly, that interrogation culminated in the defendant’s formal arrest.
We therefore conclude that the judge erred in suppressing statements made by the defendant prior to Condon’s arrival, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to custodial interrogation until that time. On Condon’s involvement in the questioning, the interrogation became custodial in nature, thus triggering the requirement that the defendant be given Miranda warnings and make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Where the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, the defendant’s statements made in the final phase of the interview were properly suppressed.
b. Questioning by the court officer. With respect to the statements made by the defendant to court officer Marrin, the motion judge held that Marrin was “a government official in an enforcement status with respect to the defendant,” that her initial remarks to the defendant were not the functional equivalent of interrogation, but that Marrin should have known that her subsequent express questions about the fire were likely to elicit an incriminating response. The judge therefore found no violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to the defendant’s initial remarks to Marrin, but suppressed the defendant’s responses to Marrin’s specific questions. On appeal, the Commonwealth claims that
The Commonwealth acknowledges that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights had attached by the time of her conversation with Martin. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of counsel after formal adversary proceedings have begun. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977). Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (Massiah). Once Sixth Amendment rights have attached, government agents may not “deliberately elicit[]” statements from a defendant without his lawyer present. Massiah, supra. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 457 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 271 (1980). This principle not only prohibits direct interrogation of a defendant, but more generally prohibits any “knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). See United States v. Henry, supra at 274 (Sixth Amendment violated by government’s “intentionally creating a situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel”). The Sixth Amendment thus imposes on law enforcement an “obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel.” Maine v. Moulton, supra at 171.
The Commonwealth contends that because a court officer’s job is not “to investigate or enforce the law for the police,” a court officer is not “an instrument or agent of the police,” and questioning by a court officer would therefore not violate the Sixth Amendment. The Commonwealth’s argument mistakenly assumes that Massiah and its progeny only prohibit questioning
Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the Massiah line of cases more broadly prohibits “government efforts to elicit information from the accused” (emphasis added), Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 630 (1986), including interrogation by “the government or someone acting on its behalf” (emphasis added), United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 1999), citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra at 459. The concern is not merely with the actions of the police themselves, but with “secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra at 459. Courts have sometimes characterized the scope of this prohibition as extending to questioning by a State or government “official” or an agent of such an “official.” See, e.g., Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 794 (11th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983). We have at times characterized it as a prohibition directed at “law enforcement” officials and their agents. See Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 273 (1987) (where fellow inmate was “not an agent of any law enforcement official,” his questioning of defendant did not violate Sixth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Allen, supra at 454 (Massiah prohibits deliberate elicitation of information by “law
The present case asks us to address the status of court officers for Sixth Amendment purposes under Massiah.
Beyond any technical analysis of whether a court officer is an agent of “law enforcement,” we are also cognizant that allowing court officers to question defendants concerning the crimes with which they are charged would operate to “circumvent[] and thereby dilute[] the protection afforded by the right to counsel.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985). Court officers regularly interact with defendants without counsel present, and must do so as part of the ordinary process of escorting them to and from the courtroom and overseeing their welfare while in the holding cells. And, by virtue of their presence in the court room during ongoing proceedings, court officers regularly become aware (as did Martin) of the nature of the pending charges and the specific evidence against a defendant. The right to the assistance of counsel would be seriously “dilute[d],” id., if court officers could, on their own initiative, question defendants about their pending cases and then turn a defendant’s incriminating responses over to the police and prosecutor. The command of Massiah and its progeny is that we not tolerate interrogation practices by government officials or their agents that will provide the prosecution with the “equivalent of direct police interrogation.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). Interrogation of defendants by court officers would pose the very threat to Sixth Amendment rights that Massiah sought to prevent. We thus agree with the judge’s assessment that, for purposes of a Sixth Amendment analysis, court officer Martin must be viewed as an agent of law enforcement.
We also agree with the judge’s assessment that the defendant’s
Finally, we also agree with the judge’s conclusion that Mar
3. Conclusion. We therefore reverse so much of the judge’s order that suppressed the defendant’s statements made prior to Trooper Condon’s participation in the February 27, 1999, interview. In all other respects, the judge’s order on the defendant’s motion to suppress is affirmed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The judge referred to the trooper as “armed” at the time of this escort. There was testimony that “most” of the “officers or detectives” in the area of the interview room were armed, but no testimony as to whether the female trooper was armed, nor evidence as to whether any such weapon would have been carried in a manner visible to the defendant. There was also no evidence as to whether the female trooper was in uniform or in plain clothes.
According to the testimony, this break lasted approximately five minutes, with the officers leaving the defendant alone in the interview room while they conversed elsewhere.
From the context of those statements and the defendant’s later statement to the court officer, it appears that the victims who perished in the fire had been on the top floor.
The defendant was examined that day by the court’s forensic psychiatrist, who concluded that there was a question as to the defendant’s competency to stand trial and recommended that the defendant be hospitalized pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15B. The same psychiatrist examined the defendant with respect to her competency later that same month, when she was arraigned in the Superior Court. He again expressed concern that she may lack the ability to consult with her lawyer, and again recommended that she be hospitalized. At the time of the evidentiary hearing the following year, defense counsel assured the judge that he had no difficulty communicating with the defendant and that there was no issue as to her competence to proceed with the hearing on the motion to suppress. The issue of the defendant’s competency is not before us.
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant’s inability to understand explanations given to her during her competency examination was irrelevant, because the issues are completely different from Miranda rights. That the concepts being explained were different does not undermine the relevance of what occurred during the competency examination. The defendant’s inability to comprehend such matters as the role of the judge and jury, even with repeated explanation, was highly probative as to whether she would have understood Miranda warnings that were merely read to her a single time with no further explanation.
Indeed, the defendant’s affidavit in support of the motion to suppress explained that she was upset during police questioning because she “believed that [her] son was being accused of setting the fire.” She similarly claimed to her own experts that she ultimately confessed because the police were pressuring her to implicate her son.
That Miranda warnings were given to the defendant does not make the interrogation custodial. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 386 (1989), and cases cited. Indeed, we have encouraged police to give Miranda warnings prior to the point at which an encounter becomes custodial rather than “wait until the exact moment when the warnings are constitutionally required.” Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 393 n.9 (1997).
Neither party has made any separate argument under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, and we therefore do not address it.
We need not address the status of other types of State employees or other types of court house personnel. The application of Sixth Amendment principles to other government employees has yielded mixed results. See Commonwealth v. Bandy, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 333 & n.4 (1995) (assuming, without deciding, that probation officer was law enforcement agent for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1989) (Federal probation officer conducting presentence interview is “an extension of the court and not an agent of the government” for Sixth Amendment purposes); State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 320-321, 325 (1987) (interview of defendant at prison by supervisor of protective services at State social service agency not prohibited by Sixth Amendment where supervisor had no affiliation with “law enforcement agency” and had not acted at behest of “any law enforcement agency”); State v. Bey, 258 N.J. Super. 451, 467-468 (1992) (correction officer is “law enforcement agent”).
While the Commonwealth stresses that Marrin was intending to report to her supervisor rather than to the police, Marrin herself testified that she was obligated to report either to the police or to her “bosses.” On the way to report to her supervisor concerning her conversation with the defendant, she instead reported to a police officer working on the case whom she happened to encounter first.
Mamn was examined and cross-examined in detail with respect to the tenor and purpose of this specific remark:
For the first time on appeal, the defendant argues that her statements to Martin were not voluntarily made, suggesting that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntariness issue in the motion to suppress as originally filed and presented. We do not normally consider on appeal issues that were not fairly raised below (see Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 678-