172 Pa. 39 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion by
This was an action upon a recognizance for the appearance of Hickey to answer a criminal charge in the quarter sessions. On the trial the plaintiff made various offers of proof to support the allegation that Boyle, the responsible defendant, had actually entered into the recognizance upon which the action was founded. The affidavit of defense denied in the most absolute and positive terms that Boyle had ever, at any time, entered into any recognizance before C. A. Scott, Esq., who, it was alleged in the plaintiff’s claim, had taken the recognizance, for the appearance of James Hickey, and denied also that he had ever authorized any one to sign his name to any such recognizance. The affidavit further averred that such a recognizance was brought to his residence and he was asked to sign it, but that he positively refused to do so, and did not authorize any one to sign it for him. It was further alleged in the affidavit
As a matter of course if the magistrate was not present he could not have taken the recognizance, and the offer was properly rejected.
A final offer was made to prove by Mrs. Hickey that she and the defendant Bojde went to the jail, that Hickey there signed the obligation, and that Boyle directed his son to sign his, defendant’s name to the instrument and that that was done; that afterwards the obligation was taken to C. A. Scott, a justice of the peace, who signed the acknowledgment as follows, “ Taken and acknowledged before me this 7th day of October, A. D. 1893, C. A. Scott, Justice of the Peace,” and that after it was so signed Hickey was released and subsequently escaped. This offer was also objected to and rejected. As the release and escape have nothing to do with the obligation of the defendant they contribute nothing to the admissibility of the offer. The other portion of the offer is a proposal to prove that the magistrate never did take the recognizance of the defendant, but signed it as if he had done so. This of course invalidated the whole transaction and hence the proof could not be received. The magistrate could not certify that he had done an act which he had not done, and as that act was essential to any obligation of the
Judgment affirmed.