Opinion by
On petition of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County directed that a special grand jury be impaneled to investigate alleged lack of law enforcement in certain boroughs within the. County of Allegheny. The grand jurors called for that: purpose when sworn, were instructed by the court as to their duties and the restrictions upon the scope of their ■ inquiry. The investigation with which we are concerned has to-do with *136 the Borough of McKees Bocks. In its presentment the grand jury reported that it had heard more than 100 witnesses and examined bank accounts, deposit slips and checks and other exhibits including the Dockets of proceedings at hearings held by the Burgess of the Borough. From the evidence before it the investigating grand jury in the present presentment recommended the indictment of David Hershman, Burgess of McKees Rocks, for Misdemeanor [i.e., malfeasance] in Office. The special grand jury recommended other prosecutions in McKees Rocks. The presentment was filed in the court below on January 18, 1951 and thereupon the Attorney General was ordered by the court “to submit to a [regular] Grand Jury for its consideration the indictments as recommended in said Presentment”. Three indictments, so ordered, were filed on February 23, 1951. They charged David Hershman, and other officers of the borough with various offenses. After the bills were returned by the regular grand jury, they were quashed on motion of the defendants by order of the lower court en banc. Although the Commonwealth appealed from the orders in each instance, the Deputy Attorney General appearing for appellant limited his argument before us to the first count of Bill No. 655 and agreed that the orders otherwise may be affirmed.
The first count of that bill and the only count with which we are concerned, charges that: “David Hershman, late of the County aforesaid, on the eighth day of December in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty, and divers other times prior to that date, at the County aforesaid and within the jurisdiction of this Court, being then and there a lawfully elected Burgess of the Borough of McKees Rocks, a municipal corporation under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and being then and there duly qualified and acting as such Burgess of the Borough *137 of McKees Rocks, did then and there wilfully misbehave himself in said office in that he knowingly, wilfully, and corruptly and in violation of his oath of office procured, permitted, and allowed Nicholas Antonelli, Chief of Police of said Borough of McKees Rocks, and all other subordinate officers or employees of said Police Department, to fail to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and in the official performance of his duties as such Burgess failed to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by knowingly, wilfully, corruptly, and unlawfully permitting the commercial operation of houses of ill fame, gambling, houses frequented by persons for lewd and unchaste purposes, houses and places where intoxicating liquors were sold without license and contrary to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and knowingly, wilfully, and corruptly permitted vice and corruption to exist in an open, notorious manner in the Borough of McKees Rocks and to the great scandal, dishonor and prostitution of the public justice of said Commonwealth, to the evil example of all others in like case offending and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” (Italics supplied)
On motion of that defendant the court had ordered the Commonwealth to submit a bill of particulars. The opinion of the lower court indicates that it considered the bill of particulars as interpretive of the indictment and taking the view that proof of the facts to the extent so particularized could not sustain the charge, quashed the indictment in the exercise of its discretion. The well-settled rule is stated in
Com. v. Hegedus,
The function of a special grand jury is to inform the court as to the facts under investigation with a view to determine against whom, if anyone, there is sufficient just suspicion to warrant holding him for trial. Cf. 24 Am. Jur., Grand Jury, §2;
Frisbie v. United States,
The court properly concluded that the accused in this instance was entitled to a bill of particulars and the Commonwealth was bound to take his rule seriously. This was not done. The so-called bill of particulars filed by an Assistant Deputy Attorney General, merely refers to the presentment perfunctorily and without *139 supplying the requested information. This defendant had access to the presentment which had been filed of record, and the particulars of the offenses there reported. Under the order of the lower court he was entitled to more, and the Commonwealth was bound to supply it for his information in preparing his defense.
But the fact that the bill of particulars as filed in this case was wholly inadequate, was no ground for a motion to quash the indictment. A motion for a bill of particulars does not question the sufficiency of an indictment but rather assumes its validity. When filed, such bill of particulars does not become a part of the indictment. It therefore cannot remedy by way of amendment a fatal defect in an indictment which charges no offense under the law
(Commonwealth v. B. & O. R. R. Co.,
In this case the indictment is sufficient, since it charges that an offense has been committed and describes the same so plainly that its nature easily may be understood by a jury. Since the indictment meets this standard, the remedy is not by motion to quash but by rule for a more specific bill of particulars
(Commonwealth v. Lenhart,
*140 The order as to the first count of Bill 655 is reversed with a procedendo. The orders otherwise are affirmed.