Commonwealth v. Hernandez-GonzalezCommonwealth v. Hernandez-Gonzalez
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Graves
CERTIFICATION OF THE LAW
GRAVES, Justice.
Respondent, Fernando Hernandez-Gonzalez, was arrested for first offense driving under the influence.
[I]s the Implied Consent Warning read to the Defendant and contained inKRS 189A.105 defective on its face; and, if so does the defect unconstitutionally coerce the Defendant into submitting to a bloodalcohol test under KRS 189A.103 , in violation of Defendant’s right to due process of law under both the Federal and Kentucky Constitutions?
That, if the person refuses to submit to such tests, the fact of refusal may be used against him in court as evidence of violation ofKRS 189A.010 and will result in revocation of his driver’s license, and if the person is subsequently convicted of violating KRS 189A.Q10(1) then he will be subject to a mandatory minimum jail sentence which is twice as long as the mandatory minimum jail sentence imposed if he submits to the tests ....
The penalties for a first offense of driving under the influence are set forth in
(a) For the first offense within a five (5) year period, [a person shall] be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days, or both.... If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present while the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be four (4) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release.
Therefore, under the provisions of
Pursuant to the 2000 legislative amendments,
As suggested by its name, the “implied consent” statute begins with the premise that all persons driving on the public highways of this Commonwealth have consented to a blood, breath, or urine test pursuant to a statutorily prescribed procedure. The legal theory of implied consent was developed by the United States Supreme Court in
Hess v. Pawloski
274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091(1927). In
Hess,
a resident plaintiff brought suit against an out-of-state defendant as a re-
Soon after Hess, states began recognizing that they had an analogous power to prohibit drinking drivers from using their highways. State legislatures determined that they could condition the use of state highways upon a driver’s implied consent to submit to a test for blood alcohol concentration in much the same way that a state could condition an out-of-state driver’s right to use its highways upon the driver giving his implied consent to being sued in the forum state. This theory of a driver’s implied acquiescence to chemical testing was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), and against Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).
In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court upheld the admission of the results of a chemical analysis of a sample of blood taken involuntarily from the body of the defendant at the direction of a police officer after the defendant’s arrest for driving while under the influence. The Court concluded that such did not violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination; did not deny the defendant due process since there was ample justification for the police officer’s conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol; did not violate the defendant’s right to counsel, even when such sample of blood was taken against the advice of counsel; and did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, notwithstanding that the sample was taken without a warrant, where the police officer was justified in requiring the test and manner in which the test was performed was reasonable.
In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the United States Supreme Court again dealt directly with the rights of a suspected drunk driver and held that the Fifth Amendment did not bar admission of the defendant’s refusal because the refusal was not coerced within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 564, 103 S.Ct at 923. The Court also did not find it fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth Amendment to admit the refusal even though the arresting officer failed to warn the defendant about the statutory consequences of his refusal. The following excerpt is illustrative:
[Gjiven, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.
Id. at 563-564, 103 S.Ct. at 922.
Recently, in
Commonwealth v. Wirth,
Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78 (1996), this Court inter
In addition, we wish to correct what appears to be a widespread misinterpretation of the statute. By virtue ofKRS 189A.103 , one who operates a motor vehicle consents to a test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration, The phrase “no person shall be compelled” inKRS 189A.105 could not rationally have been intended to contradict the consent provisions ofKRS 189A.103. A more reasonable interpretation of the language used is that one who refuses will not be physically forced to submit to a chemical test. It does not mean that such person has a lawful right to refuse such testing.
Id. at 82.
Under Kentucky law, one who refuses to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test faces numerous personal consequences, including pretrial suspension of the defendant’s driver’s license (
The present warning, as set forth in
The implied consent warning in
Accordingly, the law is so certified.
All concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., not sitting.