Opinion by
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County. After being convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and after denial of his post-trial motions, appellant was sentenced to six to twelve years imprisonment. The victim, Mark Brooks, stepson of appellant, died on January 9, 1963, as the result of a ruptured spleen. Although there were multiple other injuries on the body of the decedent, the testimony of the pathologist, called by the prosecution, was that death resulted from rupture of the spleen, as a result of great force being applied in the area of that organ.
Appellant’s motions for arrest of judgment and new trial were denied by the court below. He asserts, in support of his new trial motion, numerous trial errors, particularly in the admission of evidence. We find it unnecessary to consider any of those contentions, for we are of the opinion that the admitted evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and that the motion in arrest of judgment must be granted.
We are not unmindful of the standard to be applied in considering a motion in arrest of judgment, set forth
*478
fully in
Commonwealth v. Tabb,
Yet. despite our revulsion at the conduct of appellant, we are compelled to conclude that the Commonwealth failed to prove appellant’s criminal responsibility for the death of his stepson. There is not one iota of evidence as to the force which caused the rup *479 ture of the spleen. It would be sheer conjecture to find this defendant guilty, when there is nothing connecting appellant to the fatal injury. There was much testimony of numerous falls on decedent’s part, which falls, among other things, could have caused his death.
Abhorrent as child maltreatment is to this Court, we cannot sustain a verdict of manslaughter where the only evidence (here assumed to be admissible) is of a past course of conduct. While the Commonwealth proved appellant a likely suspect, the evidence falls far short of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of sentence is reversed, and the motion in arrest of judgment is granted.
