193 Mass. 464 | Mass. | 1907
Because guilty knowledge of its contents is not specifically averred, and only the general allegation appears that she “ knowingly ” distributed a circular or advertisement, the defendant’s first contention is that no criminal offence has been described, and the motions to quash should have been granted. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 12 Cush. 499. Compare Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29; Price v. United States, 165 U. S. 311. But the indictment follows the language of R. L. c. 212, § 16, as amended by the St. of 1905, c. 316, as to the first of the offences created and defined, and under R. L. c. 218, §§ 17 and 29, the crime charged may be set forth in the words used in the statute, with a general averment that the defendant committed the act, which obviates any further technical description of an evil intent. Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173, 180. Commonwealth v. Lavery, 188 Mass. 13, 16. If there was any uncertainty as to the particulars of the offence further information would have been furnished upon the defendant’s motion if otherwise the charge had not been plainly and substantially stated. R. L. c. 218, § 39. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 581. This course was not taken, and the indictment being sufficient the motions were properly denied.
The defendant’s further contention is that in substance the entire testimony introduced by the Commonwealth was incom
So ordered.