166 Pa. 89 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion by
The judgment now appealed from rests on three distinct findings of fact made by the learned judge of the court below. These are, first, that the defendant was engaged in April, 1894, in the business of selling clocks in Allegheny county; second, that he made his sales not as a merchant having a place of business but as a peddler going from house to house and exposing his clocks for sale in the homes he had invaded; and, third, that he was in so doing violating the act of 6th February, 1830, P. L. 39, as he had no license authorizing him to sell clocks.
These findings have not the conclusive effect of a verdict but they are entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed unless plain error is shown. As to the second and third findings no serious question is raised. It is conceded that the defendant had no license under the act of 1830, and it is not denied that he carried his clocks from house to House and disposed of them wherever he could bring a possible customer to bay.
The first finding is attacked on the allegation that the defend
The findings of fact standing undisturbed, there is but one question left and that a question of law. Is the act of 1830 constitutional? It is not alleged that it violates any provision
This court has uniformly asserted the validity of such legislation as a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power and we do not propose to travel over the argument again in this case.
It is urged that the act is a trade regulation like the ordinance of Sayre borough considered in 148 Pa. 482. But this statute is not directed against certain persons engaged in peddling clocks. It is directed against all persons. It does not distinguish between the citizens of different civil subdivisions
In the recent case of Brennan v. The City of Titusville, the judgment of this court was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the ordinance upon which the prosecution rested was not a police, but a trade regulation, but it was said in that case that “ by virtue of its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits a state may provide for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons, and the protection of property so situated,” subject to the qualification that a “ subject-matter which has. been confided exclusively to Congress by the constitution is not within the police power of the state unless placed there by congressional action.”
We submit with great respect that the control of no branch of retail trade “ has been confided exclusively to Congress by the constitution; ” and that the interstate commerce clause was never intended to do more than keep the great channels of commerce open, and to guard against such obstructions as state custom houses, state inspections, state taxes and the like on goods passing from manufacturer or wholesaler in one state to retail dealer or consumer in another.
It must be conceded that these clocks may be sent into this state in manufacturer’s packages, and they may be sold in the same packages under the authority of the interstate commerce clause; but once in this state and the package opened by the consignee, the disposition of the separate articles at retail is infra-state traffic and subject to the police regulations that experience may show to be necessary for the protection of citizens in the comfort of their homes and the enjoyment of their property. To deny this power to the states and to assert that the wandering and unscrupulous adventurers who buy their brass jewelry or worthless clocks on one side of a state line may, as agents of interstate commerce, invade any other state to cheat
It is suggested that these clocks standing on the shelves of purchasers belong to the Rhode Island corporation still. This overlooks the finding of the court below that they were sold. It overlooks the testimony of the general agent of the corporation who says distinctly “ they were sold on monthly installments.”
Finally the general principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is appealed to as a reason for reversing the judgment of the court below. We cannot see its applicability. The statute forbids the peddling of clocks. .The defendant was fairly and properly convicted, on the evidence, of violating the statute.' He did exactly that thing which the statute commanded him not to do. He has been found guilty of violating it and this finding is abundantly supported by the testimony. He should therefore suffer the penalty he has incurred.
If any vestiges of the police power of the states remain to them for the protection of the property or of the comfort of the people, we must think the statute now before us is a proper exercise of that power, and. that the states do not invade the jurisdiction of Congress when they seek to regulate a business conducted, in the language of the preamble to the peddler’s act, by “ idle and vagrant persons,” and in a manner that does “ greatly impose on many persons in the quality and price of goods,” and which results in the commission by these irrepressible vagrants of “ felonies and other misdemeanors.”
We cannot bring ourselves to doubt the validity of the statute of 6th February, 1830, or the justice of the conviction and judgment appealed from
The judgment is affirmed.