23 Pa. Super. 104 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1903
Opinion by
By section 169 of the Penal Code of March 31, 1860, Purdon (12th ed.), p. 506, it is made a misdemeanor for any person to “ fraudulently make, sign, alter, utter or publish or be concerned in the fraudulent making, signing, altering’, uttering or publishing of any written instrument, other than notes, bills, checks
In the present case the indictment charges the defendant in a single count as follows: “That John M. Hall, late of said county, on the 13th day of November, A. D. 1901, at the county aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, with force and arms, etc., unlawfulty, falsely and fraudulently did make, utter and publish and cause to be made, uttered and published a certain written instrument, purporting to be made by one John Benson, Jr., commonly known as a note for the payment of money to the said John M. Hall, of which the following is a copy: ” then follows a copy of the note, and the indictment closes in proper form. The appellant contends that the indictment is bad for duplicity, in charging, in a single count, three separate and distinct offenses, viz: (1) forgery of the writing; (2) uttering and publishing the forged writing; (3) causing it to be made, uttered and published; and the first specification of error is to the refusal of the court below to quash the indictment on thiá ground.
There is some diversity of judicial opinion in some jurisdictions as to whether an exception lies to the denial of a motion to quash an indictment. But we think this question may be regarded as settled in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Church, 1 Pa. 105, the Supreme Court sustained an exception and reversed the order of the court below in quashing an indictment. In Commonwealth v. Bradney et al., 126 Pa. 199, it was held that a proceeding to quash the indictment is to he considered as a part of the trial, and that an indictment may be quashed for matters not appearing upon the face of the record. In Kilrow v. The Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 480, it was held that duplicity is not ground for arrest of judgment, but that the question ought to have been raised by motion, or by demurrer. In Hutchison and another v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 472, assignments of error to the refusal of the court to quash were sustained by the Supreme Court. In Brown v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. 321, an assignment of error was sustained for the refusal to quash an indictment. We, therefore, think it may be considered as settled that the defendant’s motion to quash and his assignment of error to the refusal of the court
This brings us to the question of whether the indictment is bad for duplicity and ought to have been quashed. It must be conceded that in criminal pleading, as a general rule, two or more offenses, distinct and unconnected, should be charged in separate counts, and if they are charged in a single count, such count is bad for duplicity. It must also be conceded that when two or more offenses arise from a single act or transaction, or are closely related, they may be joined in one count. An early case in this state on this question is Commonwealth v. Rogers et ah, 1 S. & R. 124. In that case the indictment charged that the defendants “ on the 13th day of April, 1810, at, etc., in, etc., and within, etc., with force and arms, and with a strong hand, into a certain messuage and ten acres of arable land, situated in the township of Rye, in the county of Cumberland, of which Moses Kirkpatrick was then and there possessed, for a certain term of years, then, and still to come, and unexpired, unlawfully did enter, and the said Moses Kirkpatrick from the peaceable possession of the said messuage, then and there, with force and arms, and with a strong hand, unlawfully did expel and put out, and the said Moses Kirkpatrick from the possession thereof, so as aforesaid, with force and arms, and with a strong hand, being unlawfully expelled and put out, the said defendants him, the said Moses Kirkpatrick, from the aforesaid 13th day of April, 1810, until the day of taking this inquisition, from the possession of the said messuage and ten acres of arable land, with force and arms, and with a strong hand, unlawfully and injuriously then and there did keep, and still do keep out, to the great damage of the said Moses Kirkpatrick,” etc. The jury found all the defendants not guilty of forcible entry, but that two of them were guilty of the forcible detainer. There was a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the separate parts of the indictment were repugnant to each other. The judgment was arrested by the court below, and the record of the proceedings was removed to the Supreme Court by writ of error. Chief Justice Tilghman and Yates, J., both wrote opinions in that case, and it was distinctly held that, “ a forcible entry, and a forcible detainer, are distinct offenses, and although both are charged in the same indictment, the defend
Several distinct misdemeanors maj'- he charged in the different counts of the same indictment, but an indictment which charges distinct and separate offenses in a single count, is generally bad for duplicity, and upon proper application will be quashed ; the grand jury should be allowed to pass upon the charges separately: Hutchison v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 472; Kilrow v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 480; Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. 503.
It is contended that forcible entry and forcible detainer are distinct offenses, and that as they are coupled in a single count, the indictment is bad. It must be conceded, of course, that under the 21st and 22d sections of the Crimes Act these offenses are, in the abstract, distinct and separate; the provisions of the statute are plain, and it is unnecessary by any proper definition of each to draw the distinction between them. But this distinction was as clearly defined before the act of 1860 as
It ought not to be overlooked that the Crimes Act of 1860 deals with the offense of forcible entry in section one and with forcible detainer in a separate and distinct section of the act.
In Commonwealth v. Bachop, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 294, will be found a case where “ the dofendant was convicted upon an indictment in which it was charged (in a single count) that he did fraudulently make, sign, utter and publish and was then and there concerned in the fraudulently making, signing, uttering and publishing of a written instrument, to wit: a judgment note for the payment of money,” etc. In that case the defendant was convicted and sentenced, and the case being-removed “to this court on appeal the judgment was affirmed. It is true that the question of duplicity was not specially raised in the court below or in this court, but it is of some significance that the case so far as the indictment is concerned is precisely like the one under consideration, and it was vigorously contested in the court below, and after argument in this court the judgment was affirmed. No one connected with the case seemed to have thought worth while to suggest that the indictment was bad in charging the fraudulent making, uttering and publishing of a note in a single count. In Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 162 Pa. 646, it is held, as stated in the syllabus, “ Where a statute makes two or more distinct acts connected with the same transaction indictable, each one of which may be considered as representing a phase in the same offense, the different acts may be coupled in one count. It is not regarded as duplicity thus to join successive statutory phases of the same offense.”
(Page 648.) “ The 65th section of the Act of March 31,1860, clearly specifies four distinct and separate acts with reference to public money, which shall constitute the offense of embezzlement. . . . Each of these acts, therefore, though of very varying character and degree of moral turpitude, is of equal legal im
Now if a person should fraudulently make, sign, alter, utter and publish a forged note at the same time and place, and as one transaction, it seems beyond question that it would be proper pleading to charge the offense in a single count, and on the trial the question would be for a jury as to whether or not the several acts did constitute a single offense, and if they did it might be a general verdict of guilty in manner and form as indicted. But if under the testimony it should appear that the defendant had fraudulently made or altered the instrument with intent to defraud any person, but that he was not concerned in the uttering or publishing the same, then it would be the duty of the court to control the matter by appropriate instructions to the jury. So also if it should appear on the trial that one person had forged the note and another, the defendant on trial for instance, had uttered it with the knowledge that it was a forgery, then the court could instruct the jury that the defendant could only be convicted, if at all, of the uttering. The view we take of this case is that it comes within the same class as the cases referred to in Commonwealth v. Miller, supra. It should be noticed that the indictment under consideration charges in a single count that John M. Hall on November 13, 1901, with force and arms, etc., unlawfully, falsely and fraudulently did make, utter and publish, and cause to be made, uttered and published a certain written instrument, etc. This charges it all as a single transaction by the same person and at the same time and place and under the authorities, supra, we are unable to see how the court could have quashed this indictment. The motion to quash was in effect a demurrer, and the facts averred in the indictment must at the time be taken as true, If it was true that the defendant
We find in the record a large number of assignments of error in regard to the admission of testimony which we do not think necessary to consider at this time for the reason that the judgment must be reversed úpon the assignments of error based upon the charge of the court.
The thirteenth assignment is as follows : “ The court erred in charging the jury as follows : If this note had been forged, he brought suit upon it and made a demand upon John Benson’s representatives for payment, then he was just as guilty in our opinion as though he had gone to the bank and obtained the money upon it, because that was an uttering and a demand for payment of the note.” Manifestly this instruction to the jury is error. It ignores the question of whether the defendant forged the note or knew it was forged. Now, he could not be convicted of forgery unless he fraudulently made or altered the note to the prejudice of the rights of another, neither could he be convicted of uttering the note unless the jury found from the evidence that he had either forged it or knew that it was a forged note. This assignment is sustained.
The fourteenth assignment is as follows : “Now, gentlemen of the jury, if you found that the note was a forgery, then we think there has been sufficient evidence given you to comply with the statute which makes it necessary for there to be an uttering and publishing of the note in order to secure a conviction. Now the great question for you to determine is, was that note a forgery ? Because if it was not, and the common
The seventeenth assignment is in regard to the statute of limitations. The court said: “ There is no question about the statute of limitations in this case. If that note was a hundred years old it would not have made any difference in this case. When was that note uttered? And when was the demand made upon the estate of John Benson? Was that within five years? There is no contradiction about that.”
Now, it is true that if the jury had upon proper testimony and instructions from the court found that the note was a forgery, and that the defendant knew it, and then made demand for its payment by bringing suit thereon within five years prior to the finding of the indictment, he might have been convicted of uttering the note, but the instructions given by the court were entirely inadequate to protect the rights of the defendant. Suppose it was a forged note, but that the defendant did not know it and came honestly by the note and made demand for its payment, it is absurd to say that he could be convicted of uttering the note on such a state of facts, and yet the charge may have been so understood by the jury. The jury should have been instructed to determine from the evidence whether or not the defendant forged the note. If he did and the
Upon the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth assignments of error the judgment of the court is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
Note. — For concurring opinion of Smith, J., see supra, p. 232.