COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Charles J. GRISCAVAGE, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Nov. 17, 1986
517 A.2d 1256
Submitted June 4, 1986.
Robert E. Dalton, Jr., Public Defender, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION
MCDERMOTT, Justice.
Appellee was convicted by a jury on charges of driving while under the influence of alcohol,1 driving on the wrong side of the road,2 reckless driving,3 and driving at an unsafe speed,4 in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County on July 20, 1983. Citing grounds of insufficiency of the evidence and erroneous jury instructions, he filed post-verdict motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment which were denied. Judgment of sentence was imposed on August 25, 1983, following which he appealed to Superior Court.
The sole issue here involves the sufficiency of the evidence. The test for reviewing a sufficiency claim on appeal from a conviction is well established.
[W]hether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence . . . Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire trial record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered . . . Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. (Citations omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Harper, 485 Pa. 572, 576-77, 403 A.2d 536, 538-39 (1979).
The salient facts of the case are these. Officer Young of the Wellsboro Police Department observed a Chevrolet traveling in gross excess of the posted speed limit at 12:40 A.M. on January 30, 1983, in Wellsboro. He entered his cruiser and gave chase. As the pursued vehicle was entering a curve about a quarter of a mile ahead of him he saw its brake lights go on and observed that it was over the center line of the highway. On rounding the curve he saw that the pursued vehicle had collided with a vehicle in the oncoming lane. He entered the Chevrolet first and observed Mr. Griscavage. He was slumped over the wheel and bleeding profusely from a severe laceration of the forehead. The
At 3:15 A.M. a lab technician drew the blood necessary to perform the test and found Mr. Griscavage knowledgeable of what was being done and why. She was not able to tell whether he was intoxicated. The test showed that his blood contained .09% alcohol by weight. Id.
In order to establish appellee‘s guilt the Commonwealth had to prove: (1) that he was operating a motor vehicle, (2) while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.
The statute does not require that a person be drunk, or intoxicated, or unable to drive his automobile safely in traffic, but merely that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating his automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . .
The statutory expression “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” includes not only all the well known and easily recognized conditions and degrees of intoxication, but also any mental or physical condition which is the result of drinking alcoholic beverages and (a) which makes one unfit to drive an automobile, or (b) which substantially impairs his judgment, or clearness of intellect, or any of the normal faculties essential to the safe operation of an automobile.
Commonwealth v. Horn, 395 Pa. 585, 590-91, 150 A.2d 872, 875 (1959) (emphasis added).5
Thus, substantial impairment, in this context, means a diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing circumstances and conditions. Its meaning is not limited to some extreme condition of disability.
The facts of this case indicate that Mr. Griscavage was observed speeding. He then engaged a police officer in a chase during which he sped into a curve, left his proper lane, crossed the center line of a highway, and ran his automobile headlong into another. Other evidence established conclusively the fact that he had been drinking. On these facts the trier concluded that at the time of the collision those faculties essential to the safe operation of an automobile were in fact substantially impaired by his drinking.
Given the standard of appellate review applicable in appeals from convictions, Harper, supra, we think this evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for driving under the influence. Consequently the Superior Court‘s reversal of that conviction must itself be reversed.
In examining the opinion of the Superior Court we find that they erred in two respects. First, the court did not
The flaw in this method of analysis is its infidelity to our test for sufficiency set forth in Harper, a faithful application of which requires the reviewing court in measuring the sufficiency of the evidence to consider that evidence in the aggregate, as it was the obligation of the trier of fact to do, drawing all inferences favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner.
A reviewing court must not give weight to or speculate upon matters not in evidence, and must recognize and honor the right and obligation of the trier of fact to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Harper, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Madison, 501 Pa. 485, 462 A.2d 228 (1983) and cases cited therein. The trier of fact has the unique opportunity to see and hear subtleties of answers and movements of witnesses and parties not viewable from the cold record. Words are delivered in a wider context than appear on a printed page. What they mean is often determined from how they are said, by whom and for what reason, for which reason a trier of fact is not required to accept all he hears.
In this case a proper application of the test would have required the court to consider the perceived odor of alcohol on appellee‘s person, his admission of prior drinking, and the blood test result, in combination with the circumstances of the collision, i.e., driving an automobile at a speed in gross excess of the allowable limit, failure to negotiate a
The second error in the Superior Court‘s opinion was their application of a hitherto unapproved rule of law which provided that the manner of operation of an automobile must be extreme and uncontrolled before it may be allowed to serve as a basis for a reasonable inference that it was caused by the influence of alcohol. This rule was abstracted from prior decisions of that court. See Commonwealth v. Long, 131 Pa.Super. 28, 198 A. 474 (1938), Commonwealth v. Cave, 219 Pa.Super. 512, 281 A.2d 733 (1971) and Commonwealth v. Richardson, 307 Pa.Super. 191, 452 A.2d 1379 (1982).
We expressly disapprove of the Superior Court‘s “rule“. When dealing with the question of driving under the influence we cannot condone a requirement that the driver exhibit some extreme eccentricity before allowing a reasonable inference of substantial impairment. See Horn, supra.
In conclusion, we hold that in applying the test of Harper, supra, to the record before us the evidence of the
The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County is reinstated.
NIX, C.J., concurs in the result.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion.
FLAHERTY, J., notes his dissent.
JUDGMENT
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the Order of the Superior Court is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County is reinstated.
ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent and would affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned Opinion of the Superior Court authored by Judge Frank Montemuro. 336 Pa.Super. 141, 485 A.2d 470 (1984).