Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of a majority of the Court, in substance as follows. The first question is, whether the defendant was duly empowered as an agent, to reclaim the slave. We do not decide whether a scrawl is a seal, though probably it would not be so considered in this State.*
The question then is, whether Mason, having been duly appointed administrator under the laws of Virginia, had a right to come here himself and claim the slave ; for the claim by his agent was the same as if made by himself. It has been decided, that a foreign administrator cannot come here to collect a debt; and if it was necessary to pursue the slave in the character of administrator, the authorities are clear against the defendant. But by the statute of the United States the person to whom the service is due may reclaim, and by the laws of Virginia an administrator is such person.
This brings the case to a single point, whether the statute of the United Slates giving power to seize a slave without a warrant is constitutional. It is difficult in a case like this, for persons who are not inhabitants of slaveholding States, to prevent prejudice from having too strong an effect on their minds. We must reflect, however, that the constitution was made with some Stales in which it would not occur to the mind, to inquire whether slaves were property. It was a very serious question, when they came to make the constitution, what should be done with their slaves. They might Lave kept aloof from the constitution. That instrument was a compromise. It was a compact by which all are bound. We are to consider then what was the intention of the constitution. The words of it were used out of delicacy, so as not to oil end some in the convention whose feelings were abhorrent to slavery ; but we there entered into an agreement that slaves should be considered as property. Slavery would still have continued if no constitution had been made.
The constitution does not prescribe the mode of reclaiming a slave, but leaves it to be determined by Congress. It is very clear, that it was not intended that application should be made to the executive authority of the State. It is said that the act which Congress has passed on this subject, is contrary to the amendment of the constitution, securing the people in their persons and property against seizures &c., without a complaint upon oath. But all the parts of the instrument are to be taken together. It is very obvious that slaves are not parties to the constitution, and the amendment has relation to the parties.
But it is said, that when a seizure is made, it should be made conformably to our laws. This does not follow from the constitution, and the act of Congress says that the person to whom the service is due may seize &c. Whether the statute is a harsh one, is not for us to determine. But it is objected, that a person may in this summary manner seize
Notes
A scrawl is a sufficient seal in the following States; — Pennsylvania, M'Dill v. M'Dill,
A scrawl is most frequently employed for a seal in Louisiana. 4 Griff. Law Reg. 678.
In Virginia there must be evidence of an intention to substitute the scrawl for a seal. Austin v. Whitlock,
A scrawl is not a sufficient seal in the following States; — New York, Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. R. 239; — Rhode Island, 3 Griff. Law Reg. 96; — New Hampshire, Douglass v. Oldham, 6 N. H. R. 150; — Maine, 4 Griff. Law Reg. 983; — and New Jersey, Overseers of the Poor of Hopewell v. Overseers of the Poor of Amwell, 1 Halsted, 169; Perrine v. Cheeseman, 6 id. 174; except in this last State on instruments for the payment of money; in which case a scrawl is sufficient; 1 Rev. Laws of N. J. 305; Force v. Craig, 2 Halsted, 272. A scrawl is not a sufficient seal in Vermont; Beardsley v. Knight, 4 Vermont R. 479. So it would seem also in Indiana; Deming v. Bullitt, 1 Blackford’s Indiana Rep. 241.
A piece of paper annexed to an instrument by a wafer is held to be a sufficient seal in Massachusetts. Bradford v. Randall,
A printed stamp is a sufficient seal to a bond in Virginia; Buckner v. Mackay,
A ribbon drawn through horizontal slits opposite the name of the grantors, was held in Pennsylvania not to give an instrument the character of a deed. Duncan v. Duncan,
See Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cowen, 508; 2 Bl. Com. 305; 4 Kent’s Com. (2nd ed.) 453, n. (a); Newbold v. Lamb, 2 Southard, 449.
Glen v. Hodges, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 62 ; 3 Story on the Constitution, 676, 677, 678. The provisions of U. S. Laws, 2 Cong. 2 Sess. c. 7, § 3, do not extend to the case of a slave voluntarily qprried and left by his master under the protection of laws declaring him free. Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 499; 3 Amer. Jurist, 404, 405; Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall’s (Kentuck.) R. 471 ; David, v. Porter, 4 Harr. & M’Henry, 418. See also Commonwealth v. Cook,
When a foreign slave comes into this State, either as a fugitive or otherwise, he becomes ipso facto a freeman, discharged from the state of servi-° tude. Shaw C. J., In re Francisco, 9 Amer. Jurist, 490. See also Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 499 ; Saul v. His Creditors, 17 Martin’s (Louis) R. 598 ; Story's Conflict of I ,aws, 92, 93.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Though I agree to many things said by the Chief Justice, I do not entirely coincide with him-I am not disposed to question the constitutionality of the statute, but I think it intended that the seizures should be made in conformity to the laws of the several States, and not in violation of the laws of any one of them. The laws here do not recognise a slave. Every person here is a freeman, and entitled to all the privileges of a freeman; one of which is, to be secure against all seizures &c., without a complaint upon oath. I admit that in the southern States they may seize a slave without a warrant, because it is according to the laws of those States. But it does not follow that the same may be done here. I think it is the intention of the statute, that the seizure of a slave here shall be by process of law here. The complaint should not state that Randolph was a slave, for our law knows no such creature, but that he was a person held to service by the laws of Virginia. I admit that Congress might prescribe a new mode of apprehending a fugitive from service, which should supersede our law. In the case before the Court, the defendant, in my opinion, violated the law of our State.
The Chief Justice then remarked, that the construction now
Defendant discharged.