323 Mass. 639 | Mass. | 1949
The defendant, who together with one Colatrella was indicted for robbery, was found guilty. The case comes here on his exceptions to certain rulings on evidence and to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict.
From the testimony of one Craghan, called by the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts: Shortly before one o’clock on the morning of December 2, 1946, Craghan went to the Red Roof Cafe in Revere where he purchased a drink of whiskey. As he was leaving the café a taxicab, which was owned by the defendant, drove up and stopped. The defendant, Colatrella, and a man who he later learned was Duggan, were in the cab. A man with whom Craghan had been talking told one of the men in the cab that Craghan wanted to go to East Boston. The man
' Gannon, a police officer, testified that on the morning of December 11, 1946, he took Duggan to the defendant’s cell in the Revere police station and that the following took place: In response to questions put by Gannon each ad
All of the testimony of' Officer Gannon recited above was admittedJ over the defendant’s objections and exceptions. There was no error. Relying on cases such as Commonwealth v. Kosior, 280 Mass. 418, 422, and Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 496, the defendant argues that this evidence was not admissible. But those cases are not controlling here. This is not a case of the introduction in evidence of an accusation made to a defendant which he unequivocally denied. The evidence objected to here consisted of a conversation in which the defendant, Duggan and Officer Gannon participated. In the course of that conversation the defendant admitted that he knew Duggan and that he had been at the Open Door Cafe with Duggan, Colatrella and another man on the morning of December 2. And his statement to Duggan, “Look Joe I didn’t want to do this, but you are in this as much as me and I ain’t going to take this rap alone,” was evidence in the nature of an admission. The fact that during the same conversation he also denied that he had committed the robbery did not make the evidence inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Hebert, 264 Mass.
The defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict must be overruled. The evidence recited above shows that the defendant, Colatrella and Duggan had been with Craghan at the Open Door Cafe on the morning of December 2 at a time shortly before the robbery; and that Craghan, who had been told to leave the taxicab, was later attacked by two men. One of the assailants was identified by Craghan as Colatrella, and the other was described by him as wearing a sport coat and sport shirt which were "the same kind of clothes [the defendant had worn] when he saw him earlier.” This evidence, when considered together with the statements of the defendant discussed above, was sufficient to warrant the judge in submitting the case to the jury. This is not a case of which it can be said that the evidence is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. Cases such as Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 305 Mass. 393, 400-401, Commonwealth v. Carter, 306 Mass. 141, 147, and Commonwealth v. Albert, 310 Mass. 811, 816-817, relied on by the defendant, are not controlling. “A jury may find a crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt even though the inference of guilt from the facts established is not inescapable or necessary.” Commonwealth v. Ehrlich, 308 Mass. 498, 500.
Exceptions overruled.