75 Pa. Super. 116 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1920
Opinion by
The trial of the defendant in the court below, upon an indictment charging involuntary manslaughter, resulted in a conviction. When called upon to plead to the indictment he filed a special plea in bar setting forth that he had been indicted in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Blair County upon a charge of murder for the same killing, to which indictment he had entered the plea of not guilty, upon which plea the Commonwealth joined issue; that upon the trial of that issue the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty; that the offense charged in the said former indictment was the same as that charged in the present indictment and that the defendant was the same person who had been thus tried and acquitted. This is a correct statement of the matters of record set forth in the plea and’ a brief summary of the matters of
The Commonwealth demurred to the plea and the prisoner joined issue on the demurrer. The court entered judgment in favor of the Commonwealth upon the demurrer, to which the defendant excepted. The defendant then entered the pleas of autrefois acquit, in the form authorized by the Criminal Procedure Act of March 31, 1860, and “not guilty.” The Commonwealth joined issue upon these pleas, and the issues thus raised were submitted to the same jury. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty, but did not say anything on the question of former acquittal, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment, which motion the court overruled and sentenced the prisoner.
The first assignment of error refers to the action of the court in entering judgment in favor of the Commonwealth upon the demurrer to the special plea in bar. The appellant did not, in presenting his special plea in bar, avail himself of the right to file the short plea, “that he had been lawfully acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment,” conferred by the Act of March 31,1860, sec. 30, P. L. 437. The statute was intended to relieve a prisoner from embarrassment, it conferred a privilege, but it did not prohibit the filing of a special plea, in the forms used at common law. The appellant having elected to resort to the common law forms of pleading, the sufficiency of his plea must be determined upon common law principles. “The plea of autrefois acquit consists of two hinds of matter. 1. Matter of record, namely, the former indictment and acquittal, and before what jus
The decision of the question presented, the proper judgment to be entered upon the demurrer to defend
The learned judge of the court below was of opinion that the question raised by defendant’s special plea in bar had been ruled by the decision in Hilands v. Com., 114 Pa. 372. The sufficiency of a plea in bar must, in any case, depend upon the facts established by the record pleaded. We must, therefore, look into the record which was relied upon as a bar in the Hilands case and consider whether the principles upon which that case
This principle is essential to the maintenance of the right of trial by jury. The jury system would become a mockery if, in the administration of the criminal law, officers of the government were permitted time and again to bring a man to trial for the same alleged unlawful act, after a jury had upon a fair trial found him not guilty of the fact upon which all of the indictments depended. If the government could try a man a second time after one jury has found a fact in his favor, then there can be no limit to the number of times that he may be brought to trial. It is true, that, in some of the cases holding that the discharge of a jury in a capital case, without the consent of the prisoner, brought him within the protection of the constitutional provision, it has been said that such discharge was equivalent to an acquittal, but that must be accepted as meaning acquittal of any offense of which he might have been convicted on that indictment. Hilands against the Commonwealth decided that when, upon an indictment of murder, the jury was discharged without the consent of the prisoner, he could not be again tried for the felony, but that he might be indicted and tried for involuntary manslaughter, and that was all that it did decide.
The courts, in the administration of the common law, so jealously guarded the right .of trial by jury and took such care to secure to a prisoner the full fruits of a verdict in his favor, that there was no danger of a man acquitted by verdict upon an indictment of murder being afterwards called upon to answer an indictment for a minor offense, involving the same killing. Homicide per infortunium or se defendendo, were not felonies at common law, but were minor offenses involving a forfeiture of goods, and the slayer might be charged in a special indictment for the same: Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, book 1, ch. 29. When upon the trial of an indictment of murder it appeared from the evidence that the prisoner had killed the deceased se defendendo or per infortunium, the jury were required to render a special verdict. “But in these cases it is not sufficient generally to find it done se defendendo, or per infortunium, but the special matter must be set down how it was done, and if upon the special matter shown it shall appear to be murder or manslaughter, the court will accordingly judge of it, though the jury conclude, et sic per infortunium, or sic se defendendo”: 2 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 302-305 (side paging); Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, book 2, ch. 47, sec. 4. Mr. Justice Foster, whose views were most humane, did not think it was “the business of judges to be hunting up forfeitures,” and was more liberal in receiving general verdicts of not guilty; yet he was of opinion that in any case in which the prisoner might be considered as blameworthy, though not a
Chief Justice Gibson declared, in Peiffer v. The Com., 15 Pa. 470: “Even the forms and usages of the law conduce to justice; but the common law, which forbids the separation of a jury in a capital case before they have been discharged of the prisoner, touches not matter of form, but matter of substance.” It cannot with reason be affirmed that the common law principle that, in a criminal case, the finding of a fact in favor of the prisoner, by a general verdict of not guilty, in a court of
It may be said that, even if the jury, upon the trial of an indictment for murder, should render a verdict that the defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the court could not enter judgment upon the verdict. That is true, but the answer is, that such a verdict would
The defendant after his special plea in bar had been adjudged insufficient filed the pleas of autrefois acquit, in the form authorized by the statute, and not guilty, on both of which pleas issue was joined and the jury was sworn to try both issues. The jury found the defendant guilty, but rendered no verdict on the plea of autrefois acquit. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment for the reason that the verdict did not dispose of the plea of autrefois acquit. The court overruled the motion in arrest of judgment, which action is assigned for error. It is argued that there was no evidence to support this plea, but, even if that be true, it did not obviate the necessity of a verdict upon that issue. Mr. Justice Black, discussing the identical question, said, in Solliday v. Com., 28 Pa. 15, “The defendant has pleaded it. The prosecuting officer of the government has denied it, and appealed to a jury to determine the issue. Until it is determined by a jury, any sentence which treats it as false must be against law......We can know nothing here but the naked record, and from that we cannot pronounce it impossible for the defendant to have proved the identity of the two charges. Besides, this, I have already said that the clearness of the fact does not take away from the jury the right, nor relieve them from the duty of pronouncing upon it. No man shall be convicted, unless by the judgment of his peers, in a plain case more than a doubtful one. Nor can we think that a verdict of guilty implies that the jury found against the defendant on the plea of former conviction.” We do not deem it necessary to further discuss this assignment of error, for that the judgment should be arrested is au
The judgment is reversed and the defendant is discharged without day.