*1 exists, that no claim the claimant convinces employer he needs to do that reason believe has no claimant situation, begin little sense to it makes In such a anything. in claimant must act which the during computing on which he was from the date rights, preserve order to rights preserve. informed no that he had last a claimant in cases in which Instead, I hold that would employer’s petition because filing his claim delayed has he had no reasonably him to believe caused statements the first date is tolled until claim, of limitations the statute does, fact, he learns that the claimant on which petition. file a claim right to a fact that case, found as the referee
In this claim might have a valid that she first aware became article concern- newspaper had read a June, after she victims. for heart attack compensation workmen’s ing tolled until 1978. Since was thus of limitations statute one year less than petition fatal claim filed her hold that later, I would April, timely. Court order of
I would reverse merits. on the proceedings for further remand this case C.J., dissenting opinion. in this ROBERTS, joins A.2d 552 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH GREEN, Appellant. Derek Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 28, 1983. Oct. Submitted Dec. Decided *2 Moser, Donald M. (court Philadelphia appointed), for ap- pellant. Lawler, B. Chief,
Robert Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., Henson, B. Eric Dist. Deputy Atty., for appellee. FLAHERTY, ROBERTS, C.J., NIX, LARSEN, and Before ZAPPALA, McDERMOTT, and JJ. INSON HUTCH OF THE COURT OPINION FLAHERTY, Justice. 15, 1977, by jury Derek convicted April Green was
On robbery Sylvester family at the and Smith again post-trial Prior and Philadelphia. to trial home motions, basis of challenged his conviction 1100(a)(1).1 Appellant alleged violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. ultimately discharged appel- trial court and the prevailed, provision. a violation of that lant on basis of Commonwealth, Court, panel appeal by Hoff- (Spaeth, 437 A.2d Pa.Super. Brosky man, JJ.) reversed, voluntarily held had within 270 knowingly waived granted of time. We Green’s an indefinite *3 and affirm. appeal for allowance of 5, Pa.R. January filed on complaint 1100(a)(1) “Trial in a court case in which provides: Crim.P. against filed the defendant after June complaint written 1, shall commence no later July but before from on seventy the date than two hundred Thus, pursuant to Rule filed.” complaint which in Rule 1100(a)(1), provided time excludable any absent d), commence 1100(c, last for trial to would day October been appeared counsel with provided tried as right court and waived be open appel defense counsel engaged 1100. At that in a as follows: colloquy
lant
BY Counsel]: [Defense How Green, you? Mr. to His Honor. old are
Q. speak A. ingo school?
Q. you How far did thus, and, alleged we make on has not no comment right abridged. trial was whether his constitutional grade. A. Tenth
Q. you Do read and the English language? write Yes, A. sir.
Q. you Do realize you are here today these four outstanding robbery charges?
A. (Indicating.)
THE COURT: Don’t nod your head. You have to answer yes or no for the record. Yes,
A. sir. Q. Are you presently under the any influence of drugs or alcohol?
A. No.
Q. you Do physically feel well today? Yes,
A. sir. Q. Do you understand these cases must be tried by days? you the Commonwealth within 270 Do understand that? Yes,
A. sir. Q. And do you understand that that period will end around year? October 2nd of this Yes, A. sir.
Q. 1974? Yes,
A. sir. Q. Are you willing to waive that to have those cases tried days? within the 270 A. Yes.
Q. Is it further desire to your have this waived because you want to have your outstanding disposed homicide first?
A. Yes. THE Any questions? COURT: District I no Attorney]: questions. [Assistant BY THE COURT:
Q. Have that has you everything understood been said to you? Yes,
A. sir. Q. you questions? Do have any 282 No,
A. sir. the waiver. THE Let the defendant execute COURT: “The defendant following: then executed the rule in case—1974 Jan. 1671 to the '270 this day’ waives signed defense by The waiver document was also 1678.” no requirements the court.2 There are formal counsel and 1100, thus, the record a valid waiver of where for voluntary act the is the informed and discloses that waiver validity. the is accorded facie prima the accused waiver of (1981). Brown, Pa. A.2d v. 497 438 592 Commonwealth case. Instantly, such the invalid himself has not asserted his waiver was rather, his unknowing; or attacked involuntary
as it void for ground on the that was waiver court indefinite, precise as exact extension it lacked an being on 1974 was intent Appellant’s expressed date. charge 1100 that an homicide outstanding to waive Rule so “disposed of” meant disposed Apparently could be of first. on the homicide simply completion than more charges that the trial on the charge, for the record reveals agree- stemming again, by from the was continued defense, January until prosecution ment of the As post-trial motions on the homicide. disposition of “disposed of” was charge when the homicide would be time and unknowable at the time obviously unknown waiver, it is must have apparent appellant executed an Rule 1100 for indefinite intended to waive time.3 the trial court’s reliance on
Although Pa. A.2d Coleman, (plurality that misplaced, accurately it stated the docket opinion) was waiver, appellant executed court a trial date 2. At the time set 23; however, September on another he then court matter, appellant’s September trial was continued only by appellant's on his This conclusion buttressed not attack petition set exact and in his to dismiss "failure to Pennsylvania Criminal precise date is a violation of Rule of extension 1100(c),” by attorney's hearing but also assertion at the Procedure on the open-ended that "It was an waiver.” *5 entries do not clearly precise indicate the amount of time during each continuance which is to appellant. attributable While we are not prepared agree it is clear “manifestly that fewer than 100 days chargeable are to the [appellant],” court, as by stated the trial it seems safe to conclude that where, here, more than three years elapsed before appel- lant brought was to trial and there was no Commonwealth extension, would, for an in all probability, entitled discharge be to a but for his waiver of Rule 1100 for an indefinite time. us,
On the record before we hold appellant executed voluntary and informed waiver of Rule 1100 for an time, indefinite one; and that waiver awas valid thus, he is not entitled discharge pursuant to Pa.R. 1100(f). Crim.P.
Order of the Superior Court is affirmed. ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion which ROB- ERTS, C.J., joins.
ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s opinion today refusing to discharge 1100(f). under Rule 5, 1974,
On January Appellant was arrested and charged with a robbery burglary occurring on January arrest, At the time of Appellant’s the trial run date for purposes of Rule 11001 was set at October 1974. On 1974, in a formal proceeding, court the Appel- lant waived Rule 1100. In dispute, is whether the Appellant waived his right to a speedy trial indefinitely.
court held that the waived his to a speedy until only Appellant’s homicide trial was completed or until September Since the was not tried by 23, 1974, September and excludable time amounted at most to 100 days, and the total delay was approximately days, the trial granted court the Appellant’s motion for According applicable to Rule 1100 at that the trial had to 1100(a)(1). commence within 270 of the arrest. Pa.R.Crim.P. him. judgment discharged appeal,
arrest JJ.) reversed, Hoffman, (Spaeth, Brosky Court indefinite concluding Appellant’s that the for an *6 and, therefore, Rule any was not violative of delay time 1100.
First, ruling I am in the agreement with Court’s 400, Coleman, v. 477 Pa. 383 A.2d that Commonwealth clear, (1978), It as we inapplicable 1268 is to this case. is case, in 1100 held the that a waiver under Rule Coleman however, ruling, only for time. This was must be a definite However, the of applied prospectively. inapplicability to be dispositive appeal. is not of this Coleman 1100, of in whether adoption evaluating Prior to the Rule of four delay permissible, balancing trial was a test a reason “the of the the length delay, factors considered: and right, the the defendant’s assertion of his delay, McQuaid, to the defendant”. v. prejudice Commonwealth 499, (1975). 518, 465, A.2d alleviate the 464 Pa. 347 475 To fundamen- backlog effectively protect and to more the accused, Rule rights adopted of an we tal constitutional 217, 214, 364 v. 469 Pa. Mayfield, 1100. Commonwealth 1345, (1976). promulgated this Rule Through A.2d 1347 we to the protect standard accused’s objective an Thus, trial. Rule 1100 states: Prompt Trial “Rule 1100. complaint
(a)(1) in a court case in which written Trial 30, after 1973 but filed the defendant June against is two shall no later than 1974 commence July before from date on which seventy days hundred complaint is filed.” an rule, however, permit is not that we immutable it, knowingly such waiver provided to
accused waive
Pa.
v.
Manley,
executed. Commonwealth
intelligently
(1980);
Myrick,
v.
Even without Coleman the Commonwealth must still scope establish the voluntariness waiver. The rule is clear that a trial commence within 270 arrest, if of the such arrest prior occurred to July (d) provides safeguard Subsection to the Common- wealth delay when the in commencing the trial is attributa- ble to the If defendant. fails to com- mence trial mandatory within the it has the burden to prove delay that the has not been caused lack of by its due diligence.
Reviewing record, it is clear that did not waive his indefinitely trial. In rather lengthy colloquy, the trial court discussed with the Appellant’s trial counsel the basis for the Appellant’s waiv- er. Trial counsel indicated the Appellant wanted to complete a homicide trial before engaging in the robbery trial. The burglary judge then inquired when the homicide trial completed. would be Being advised that the homicide trial was scheduled sometime after Labor Day, the court set the new trial date for September 23rd. At no time did the indicate that he was indefinite- ly waiving his Rule 1100 rights. Consequently, should prior commenced to September 23. Excluding any subsequent continuances attributable to the Appellant, trial was commenced more than beyond that which is permissible Thus, under Rule 1100. the Appellant’s right to trial, a speedy guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the United Constitution, States has been violated.
The Appellant’s conviction and robbery must be reversed.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.