After a jury-waived trial, the defendant was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), and of committing this offense within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed with respect to
1. Facts. Immediately before trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute cocaine under indictments stemming from events on December 5, 1997, and January 2, 1998. These cases were originally scheduled to be joined with the case at trial.
On December 5, 1997, at an apartment in Pittsfield, the defendant sold one-eighth of an ounce of crack cocaine, or an “eight ball,” valued at $140, to аn undercover State trooper. The defendant was aided in this sale by a female accomplice. On January 2, 1998, at another apartment in Pittsfield, the defendant sold two bags of crack cocaine to another undercover State trooper, one bag weighing at least one-half gram, in exchange for a stereo system. The defendant was again aided by a female accomplice in the sale. The defendant also pleaded guilty to conspirаcy to distribute crack cocaine between November 1, 1997, and February 6, 1998. During the plea hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that a witness would have
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the following evidence. On February 17, 1998, just before 10 p.m., two police officers were patrolling a commercial district of Pittsfield when they spotted the defendant sitting in a car. The defendant was known to the officers аnd they were aware of an outstanding warrant for his arrest for dealing crack cocaine. A female passenger was sitting in the back seat of the defendant’s vehicle at the time of his arrest.
The police conducted a routine search of the defendant at the police station and found a large piece of crack cocaine in the defendant’s right sock. This crack cocaine was later found to weigh 2.71 grams. He had no “smoking apparatus” but did carry an operational pager.
Officer Glenn Civello, one of the arresting officers and a narcotics investigator for the city of Pittsfield, testified at trial. He stated that the amount of crack cocaine found on the defendant could be split into twenty-seven pieces and sold for a total street value of $540. He also testified that the average amount of cocaine sold for personal use was 0.1 grams. Furthermore, he stated that while the true weight of an “еight ball” is 3.5 grams, he had known “eight balls” to be sold at 2.2 grams as well. Officer Civello opined that based on the evidence and circumstances of the case, the amount of crack cocaine found on the defendant was not consistent with рersonal use and was consistent with an intent to distribute.
2. Discussion, a. Admission of prior drug distribution evidence. As a general rule, “the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Helfant,
The defendant’s state of mind or intent was particularly relevant and material to the Commonwealth’s proof of the crimes charged in the indictments, and evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts was admissible as evidence of his intent at the time of the crimes charged. See Commonwealth v. Helfant, supra at 227, citing Commonwealth v. King,
The evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sales was sufficiently related in time to be logically probative. In general, there is no specific time limit on when a priоr bad act can no longer be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Jackson,
The determination that prior bad act evidence pertains to a defendant’s intent, has similarities with thе crime charged to be meaningfully distinctive, shares proximity of time and place with the crime charged, and that the probative value of the prior bad acts evidence does not outweigh its prejudicial effect is left within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned absent palpable error. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, supra at 786, and cases cited. We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts.
b. Opinion testimony of arresting officer. The Commonwealth argues that it was not error for the judge to allow Officer Civ-ello to testify that the drugs possessed by the defendant were not consistent with personal use. We agree. “The use of narcotics investigators to testify in this manner as experts in drug cases has bеen consistently upheld.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,
The judge appropriately constrained the witness’s testimony to his opinion of whether the circumstances were consistent with personal use or intention to distribute. The defendant was not prejudiced by Officer Civello’s testimony before an experienced trial judge in a jury-waived trial.
The evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the judge in admitting evidenсe of the defendant’s prior misconduct and the opinion testimony of Officer Civello. There was sufficient evidence for the judge to find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged.
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
By way of a stipulation, evidence of the prior bad acts wаs admitted through a recitation of the facts made at the defendant’s plea hearing coupled with the defendant’s acknowledgment that he had committed the acts described. The defendant does not argue that the method of reсeiving this evidence was erroneous; therefore, we need not address it.
We recognize that many people carry paging devices. The defendant, at the time of his arrest, not only possessed a pager, but also possessеd 2.71 grams of crack cocaine in circumstances similar to those when he sold cocaine to the undercover State troopers. The pager, therefore, supports the inference that the defendant intended to distribute thе crack cocaine in his possession. Commonwealth v. Savageau,
Moreover, the conspiracy charge to which the defendant pleaded guilty covered the time period from November 1, 1997, through February 6, 1998, the later date being less than two weeks prior to the February 17, 1998, incident.