180 Mass. 374 | Mass. | 1902
The defendant was complained of in the District Court for breaking and entering a building in the night with intent to commit larceny and committing larceny therein. He pleaded not guilty but offered no evidence, and was ordered to recognize for appearance in the Superior Court. At this time
It is argued that the offence was a felony not within the jurisdiction of the District Court to punish, Pub. Sts. c. 203, § 12, c. 210, § 1, St. 1893, c. 396, § 34, that the proceedings in that court were merely to determine whether the defendant should be bound over to answer in the Superior Court, and that not only was any unfavorable conclusion from the defendant’s conduct unwarranted but it is putting a pressure upon a prisoner from which he should be free, if his failure to produce his evidence upon such proceedings can be turned against him. Templeton v. People, 27 Mich. 501.
We certainly should be slow to lay down any general proposition concerning the conclusion to be drawn from silence in the District Court. If due to strategic considerations, which in this case it was less likely to be than if the defendant had had counsel, we should hesitate to say that it tended to show a bad case. Similar conduct in civil causes is familiar. It has been held that a waiver of examination, although it has the same effect as a finding by a magistrate of probable cause to believe the defendant guilty, (State v. Cobb, 71 Maine, 198,) is not such an admission of probable cause as to preclude a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. Schoonover v. Myers, 28 Ill. 308. Hess v. Oregon Baking Co. 31 Oregon, 503. And to this we quite agree. Nevertheless, however uncertain the inference from the conduct of an accused party may be with regard to his innocence or guilt, such conduct generally is admissible in evidence, and what conclusions shall be drawn from it generally is left to the jury to decide.
As to the undue pressure on the prisoner, it does not seem to us a good reason for freeing him from the effect of any legitimate and natural inference against him that he can make a • more effective defence if he has a chance to catch the government by surprise. It is not to be supposed that knowing what he has to meet will lead a prosecuting officer to do more than investigate and try to present the truth. A defendant has no general immunity from comment on his mode of conducting his defence in a criminal case. If new evidence should be produced at a second trial which might have been produced before, there is no doubt that it would be open to the criticism and ar- . gument objected to in this case. So, the failure to produce a witness who had testified at the first trial, Commonwealth v. Haskell, 140 Mass. 128, or to offer evidence in explanation or contradiction of circumstances tending to prove guilt, when such . evidence, if it existed, would be at the prisoner’s command. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 316. Commonwealth v. Clark, 14 Gray, 367, 373. Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1, 27.
The ground on which Templeton v. People, 27 Mich. 501, is . put is that the statute expressly gives the prisoner an election to make or not to make a defence, and therefore, impliedly pro
Exceptions overruled.