21 Pa. Super. 286 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1902
Opinion by
Whether the corporate officers of a city, of the third class have authority to appropriate a portion of the city funds for the purpose of defraying the expenses — such as for hall rent, heating and lighting the same and janitor’s services — necessarily incident to the holding therein of a convention, composed of delegates from all cities of the third class, and called for the purpose of advancing the various interests of such cities, promoting remedial legislation therefor, and for the discussion of, and interchange of views upon, any and all topics relating to the welfare and conduct of the same, — which appears, to be the
Wé are not disposed to enter into a discussion of the question as to the power of a city, as a city, to become a member of an association or league formed for the purpose, amongst other things, of promoting remedial legislation. For, we think it self-evident that it cannot, by assuming the obligations of membership in such league or association, acquire the power, or enlarge the powers before possessed, to expend the city’s money for purely social or hospitable purposes. Nor can it be maintained that such power is inherent in every municipal corporation, or in every city. If not conferred by express words, it must be shown that it is necessarily or fairly implied in, or in
The powers here granted are very broad, but if the grant is to be construed so as to authorize such expenditures as were shown by the bills which the controller was asked to approve, it would be difficult to point out the limits beyond which the corporate officers cannot go in the expenditure of money for social pleasures. The expenditures have no relation to any of the objects expressly mentioned in the section unless it be the welfare of the city, but we fail to see how that is promoted, or how it profits the great body of citizens, that a few persons should éat and drink at their cost. The case of Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, 183 Pa. 202, is plainly distinguishable from the case at bar, and in the case of Tatham v. Philadelphia, 2 W. N. C. 564, a principle in the construction of statutes was relied on which cannot be invoked here. The general rule established by the great weight of authority is that a public corporation cannot make a contract to provide an entertainment for its citizens or guests: 1 Dillon’s Municipal Corporations (4th ed.), sec. 149; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency of Law (1st ed.), p. 1051, and cases there cited; Bergner v. Harrisburg, 1 Pearson, 291. See also, as bearing indirectly upon the question as it is presented here, Cumberland County v. Poor Directors, 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 614, and McKean County v. Young et al., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 481. Speaking of the rule laid down by Judge Dillon, Judge
Judgment affirmed.