448 Mass. 354 | Mass. | 2007
In these cases we revisit the statute providing for commitment of “sexually dangerous persons” (SDPs), G. L.
The statute. We summarize briefly those provisions governing commitment of an SDP that are pertinent to our analysis. Chapter 123A authorizes indefinite commitment to the treatment center (see G. L. c. 123A, § 2) of any person who (1) has been “convicted of ... a sexual offense” or “charged with a sexual offense and . . . determined to be incompetent to stand trial,”
The procedure for commitment of an SDP begins with a report by an “agency with the authority to direct the release of a person presently incarcerated, confined or committed to the department of youth services,” G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 12 (a), which is referred to as the “agency with jurisdiction,” G. L. c. 123A, § 1. Its role is to notify the appropriate prosecutorial officials of the identity of “those prisoners or youths who have a particularly high likelihood of meeting the criteria for a sexually dangerous person.” § 12 (a).
The next step, and the one most important to our analysis, is the filing of the petition:
“When the district attorney or the attorney general determines that the prisoner ... is likely to be a sexually dangerous person as defined in section [one], the [prosecutor] . . . may file a petition alleging that the prisoner . . . is a sexually dangerous person . . . ,”2
G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b). The petition is filed “in the superior
Facts and procedural history. We set forth the relevant background of these cases, which are factually identical in all respects material to our decision. The salient facts are not contested. Richard Gillis was convicted of sexual and nonsexual offenses and was serving a term of incarceration when he was transferred to Bridgewater State Hospital pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 18, which provides for the hospitalization of mentally ill prisoners. After the expiration of his sentence in December, 2001, he continued to be held at Bridgewater State Hospital for successive time periods pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, the statutory provisions for involuntary civil commitment.
Mark Andrews was convicted and served terms of incarceration for various offenses, both sexual and nonsexual in nature. Like Gillis, he was hospitalized at Bridgewater State Hospital during his incarceration pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 18, and was kept there after the expiration of his sentence pursuant to the civil commitment statutory regime, G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. A few weeks after Andrews’s sentence expired, a district attorney petitioned to commit him to the treatment center indefinitely as an SDP pursuant to G. L. c. 123A.
Judges dismissed the Commonwealth’s petitions in each case because the defendants were civil mental health patients at Bridgewater State Hospital who were no longer prisoners serving any term of penal confinement, and thus not subject to the terms of G. L. c. 123A. The Commonwealth appealed, and we then transferred the cases to this court on our own motion.
Discussion. The SDP statute seeks to balance the dual concerns of protecting the public from sexually dangerous persons and preserving individual liberty. See Commonwealth v. Parra, 445 Mass. 262, 264 (2005); Commonwealth v. Knapp,
At issue in the present cases is whether the statute also subjects individuals to SDP commitment who, though having at one time committed an enumerated offense, having already completed a term of incarceration, and facing no pending charges, are civilly committed to Bridgewater State Hospital. To determine whether the language of G. L. c. 123A extends this far, we apply familiar principles of statutory interpretation. However, our interpretation is necessarily informed by the rule that “[l]aws in derogation of the liberty or general rights, of the citizen . . . are to be strictly construed . . . .” Commonwealth v. Beck, 187 Mass. 15, 17 (1904). While the rule is principally applicable to criminal cases, and proceedings under G. L. c. 123A are civil in nature, “the potential deprivation of liberty to those persons subjected to these proceedings,” Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 502 (2000), warrants this more stringent analysis.
On its face, the statute does not provide for SDP commitment of individuals who, at the time of the commitment petition, are held at Bridgewater State Hospital after completing a term of incarceration. To the contrary, the statute contemplates commitment of those who are currently serving a criminal sentence or committed to the Department of Youth Services, or Who face pending charges. General Laws c. 123A, § 12 (b), the provision that authorizes prosecutors to petition for an individual’s commitment as an SDP, repeatedly employs the term “prisoner”:
“When the district attorney or the attorney general determines that the prisoner... is likely to be a sexually dangerous person as defined in section 1, the district attorney or the attorney general at the request of the district attorney may file a petition alleging that the prisoner. . . is a sexually dangerous person and stating sufficient facts to support such allegation in the superior court where the prisoner... is committed or in the superior court of the county where the sexual offense occurred.”
Id. See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12 (a), 13 (a) (also referring to prisoners).
In interpreting provisions of the General Laws, the Legislature has directed that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language . . . .” G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third. “We derive the words’ usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute’s enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 105 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). The word “prisoner,” in its “common and approved usage,” refers to an individual who is
We recognize that G. L. c. 125, § 1 (m), defines a prisoner potentially more broadly as “a committed offender and such other person as is placed in custody in a correctional facility in accordance with law.” That same section states that the definitions provided therein apply “unless the context otherwise requires.” G. L. c. 125, § 1. Here, the context of the SDP statute, which we must constme narrowly, requires a construction of “prisoner” that is no broader than its ordinary usage. We will not assume that mentally ill persons civilly committed to Bridgewater State Hospital are “prisoners” where “the language of G. L. c. 123A does not plainly and unambiguously provide” such a definition. Commonwealth v. McLeod, supra at 294. Because the defendants in these cases, who completed their sentences and faced no charges at the time of the petitions, are not “prisoners” in the ordinary sense of the word, they are not within the class of persons for whom G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), authorizes SDP commitment.
The Commonwealth contends that Bridgewater State Hospital has a unique status that renders a person placed there technically a “prisoner.” In support, the Commonwealth relies on the
Nor does Commonwealth v. Geary, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 930 (1991), support the Commonwealth’s interpretation of “prisoner.” There, the Appeals Court held that a defendant serving a life sentence who was transferred to the SDP treatment center at Bridgewater was still a “prisoner” for purposes of an enhanced penalty statute. Id. at 931. In so holding, the Appeals Court relied specifically on the fact that “[h]is life sentence . . . remained in effect and, had he been found at some point to be no longer a sexually dangerous person, he would have been returned [to prison] to continue serving the underlying sentence.” Id. Because the defendants in the present cases were no longer serving any criminal sentence while at Bridgewater
Despite the statute’s repeated references to “prisoners,” the Commonwealth argues that the defendants nonetheless fall under the SDP statute because it mentions persons “incarcerated, confined or committed to the department of youth services” (emphasis added).
The amendments to the SDP statute in response to our decision in Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286 (2002), do not require a different result. In the McLeod case, the defendant had been released after completing his sentence for an enumerated sexual offense, and was subsequently convicted of and imprisoned for a nonsexual offense. Id. at 286-287. During this second term of incarceration, the Commonwealth petitioned to commit the defendant as an SDP. Id. at 287. We affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that the SDP statute as then in effect did not authorize commitment of any and all incarcerated persons merely because, “at some point in the past, they had been convicted of an enumerated sexual offense.” Id. at 294. Subsequently, the Legislature amended the statute to apply to “a person who has ever been convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or a youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense as defined in section 1, regardless of the reason for the
The Commonwealth next argues that interpreting the statute to authorize SDP commitment of the defendants is necessary to further the statute’s purpose of protecting society from sexually dangerous persons at the time of “their actually being reintegrated into the community.” Commonwealth v. Shedlock, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 445, 452 (2003). The Commonwealth contends that it should not be required prematurely to petition for the SDP commitment of persons who, like the defendants, are still segregated from society by some other legal means.
The Commonwealth’s reliance on the Shedlock decision is misplaced. That case, decided after the McLeod case but before the 2004 amendments to the SDP statute, held that a defendant serving a prison sentence for an enumerated sexual offense and a consecutive prison sentence for a nonsexual offense was subject to an SDP petition while serving the latter sentence.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth concedes that the statute does not provide for SDP commitment of a one-time convicted sex offender who, long after release from a term of incarceration, is committed to a mental facility. Rather, the Commonwealth urges that we construe the statute to apply only to those individuals who are subject to a period of continuous confinement beginning with a term of incarceration. In so arguing, however, the Commonwealth asks us to read an element of “continuous confinement” into the statute that simply is not there. Where, as here, the statutory text is clear, “[w]e are not free simply to add language to a statute for the purpose of ‘interpret[ing] [the statute] according to [the Legislature’s] perceived objectives.’ ” Commonwealth v. One 1980 Volvo Auto., 388 Mass. 1014, 1015-1016 (1983), quoting James J. Welch & Co. v. Deputy Comm’r of Capital Planning & Operations, 387 Mass. 662, 666 (1982).
Conclusion. The plain language of G. L. c. 123A does not provide for SDP commitment of individuals who have completed a criminal sentence and have no pending charges, but who are civilly committed to Bridgewater State Hospital under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. Indeed, there is no indication that the Legislature even contemplated this eventuality, and “an event or contingency for which no provision is made does not justify judicial legislation.” Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 92 (2002),
So ordered.
In order for a person charged with a sexual offense but incompetent to stand trial to be committed as an SDP, a judge must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual committed the offense charged. See G. L. c. 123A, § 15.
The statute provides for the filing of an SDP petition against a “prisoner or youth in the custody of the department of youth services.” G. L. c. 123A, § 12(6).
Unlike SDP commitment, which is “for an indeterminate period of a minimum of one day and a maximum of such person’s natural life,” G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d), involuntary civil commitment is limited to an initial period of six months and renewable one-year periods, see G. L. c. 123, § 8 id).
Similarly, the fundamental liberty interest implicated by the SDP statute, that of freedom from physical restraint, requires strict scrutiny in determining whether its provisions satisfy the constitutional dictates of substantive due process. See Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164-165 (2004); Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 292-293 (2002); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 502-503 (2000).
Other aspects of the statute reinforce the conclusion that those placed in mental health facilities are not “prisoners” subject to SDP commitment. For instance, while the statute provides for temporary SDP commitment of a person who is “scheduled to be released from jail, house of correction, prison or a facility of the department of youth services,” G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12 (e), 14 (e), it makes no mention of release from mental health facilities.
Bridgewater State Hospital, which is used for patients in need of strict security, is only one of many institutions to which a person may be civilly committed. See G. L. c. 123, § 7 (authorizing superintendent of any mental health facility to petition for patient’s involuntary commitment).
No party has argued that the phrase “to the department of youth services” modifies the word “confined” as well as the word “committed”; rather, the parties treat “incarcerated,” “confined,” and “committed to the department of youth services” as separate conditions.
Under the current SDP statute, which authorizes commitment of any prisoner who has “ever” been convicted of an enumerated offense, the defendant in Commonwealth v. Shedlock, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 445 (2003), clearly could have been the subject of an SDP petition while serving his sentence for the nonsexual offense.
We are puzzled by the Commonwealth’s concern that our decision today will encourage prisoners purposefully to seek transfer to Bridgewater State Hospital to avoid potential SDP commitment. The defendants concede that, under the current statute, a prisoner serving a criminal sentence who is placed at Bridgewater State Hospital under G. L. c. 123, § 18, is still a “prisoner” subject to SDP commitment until the expiration of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Geary, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 931 (1991) (inmate serving life sentence transferred to SDP treatment center at Bridgewater was still “prisoner”). For purposes of the SDP statute, a prisoner thus has nothing to gain from transfer to Bridgewater State Hospital.