195 Pa. 504 | Pa. | 1900
Opinion by
It is conceded that the respondents were duly elected school controllers in accordance with the Act of May 23, 1874, P. L. 254, sec. 41, and that they are properly qualified and entitled to hold the office, if the act is valid. But it is said that the act being one for the classification and regulation of cities of the third class, section 41 and those parts of the act which relate to school districts are void as local or special legislation on a subject prohibited by section 7 of article 3 of the constitution. The learned court below so held.
Section 41 which is in question provides that “ each of said cities of the third class shall constitute one school district.” There is nothing new or peculiar in this, so far as it makes the district coterminous in territory with the city, for the legislature has always constituted school districts of territory embraced in some of the municipal- or political divisions of the state. Thus the Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 617, sec. 1, which is the foundation of the existing statute law on the general subject, provides that “ every township, borough and city .... shall constitute a school district.” Section 41 then provides that “ all the property therein shall be the common property of said districtand the members of the board of school controllers for the time being shall have power to levy and collect taxes and the same rights and powers in relation to real and personal property as is now by law conferred upon the school directors of the several districts of this commonwealth, and they shall govern and manage the public schools in the manner now provided by law for the maintenance of a system of education by common schools ; ” but further proceeds to fix the number of school controllers according to the number of wards in the city, and their separate election by the electors of the several wards. These latter provisions apply in terms only to cities of the third class, and herein lies the substance of the objection made. . -
The most cursory examination of this act discloses, that it is
It is said that classification is only sustained on the ground of necessity. But the necessity spoken of by this court in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, was the necessity of escape from the intolerable inconvenience of uniformity of regulations under circumstances and needs essentially different. And in general with reference to public matters and legisla
The classification of school districts intended by the act of 1874 is upon lines of distinction as genuine and as fundamental as its classification of cities themselves. Both cities and school districts exercise functions which are governmental in character, and they necessarily run closely together. The legislature may recognize this fact, and provide for the regulation of the two.powers concurrently in the same territory so far as they relate to the same or similar matters, so that the same governmental functions, as for instance the supreme power of arbitrarily taking the citizen’s property by taxation, shall be exercised harmoniously over the inhabitants of the same district. An illustration of this principle may be found in the act of 1854, which has worked so well in practice that for nearly half a century it has been the basis of all the statute law on the subject. Section 1 of that act, as already quoted, provides that “ every township borough and city .... shall constitute and be a school district, subject to the provisions of this act, but any borough which is or may be connected with a township in the assessment of county rates and levies shall with the said township form one district.”
How far classification' in connection with cities might be applied to functions of the school boards strictly educational in character, such as the qualifications of pupils or teachers, the grading of schools, the course of study, etc., we need not now consider. This act does not interfere with any such matters
Objection is also made to the act on the ground that its title gives no indication of its contents in regard to school districts. The case was argued and treated both in the court below and here, as resting on the act of 1874, and for convenience has been so considered up to this point. But with reference to this second objection it is important to remember that the act upon which the case rests is the Act of June 16, 1891, P. L. 306. It is true that it is as it purports to be, an amendment of section 41 of the act of 1874, but it is a substantial re-enactment with some changes, and is a complete, independent and self-sustaining statute, and its title, An Act to amend the 41st section, etc. “in respect to the representation in boards of school controllers,” etc., gives explicit notice of the subject intended to be legislated upon.
In deference to the importance of the question and the elaborate opinion of the court below, the writer has carefully reread and compared all of the numerous decisions of this court on the restrictions contained in article 3 of the constitution. Our present views are not in conflict with anything that was decided in any of them, though occasional expressions are to be met with that indicate some uncertainty and perhaps even some variation in the views of the writers of the opinions. This was to be expected. The constitution of 1873 was a new departure in the history of the law. Instead of being confined, in accordance with the traditions of American institutions, to the framework of the government as composed of general and fundamental principles, it was converted into a binding code of particulars and details which had previously been left to the province of ordinary legislation. And the ruling motive with which we are now specially concerned was profound distrust of the legislature. As pointed out by our Brother Dean in Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554, article 3 contains sixty specific prohibitions of legislation besides other restrictions and regulations not absolutely prohibitory. Through these the pathway for honest and desirable and necessary laws even yet is not always clear, and it was inevitable that there should be some uncertainty and even divergence in the views of judges thus forced to enter on an untrodden and difficult field. But as already said there is no conflict between what we now hold and anything we have heretofore decided. And the only case which is in apparent opposition is Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246. That case was rightly decided on its facts, as was shown in In re Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 357, but much of what our late Brother Williams said in the opinion was by way of historical review of the public school system, rather than of discussion of constitutional powers, and the authority of the case must be strictly limited to what it decided. So limited it is in line with all our cases on the subject including the present.
Undoubtedly many acts have been passed whose framers intended to evade the constitutional prohibitions. These the-courts have always unhesitatingly struck down, and may safely be relied on to continue to do so. But where the legislative intent is not to evade the restrictions the courts are not required to be astute in extending them over cases not really within the' evil prohibited though the form may have the appearance of
It may, therefore, be taken as settled law that in cases of this character the courts will look beyond the mere form of the act, and examine its true intent and effect, in the light of the purpose of the constitutional restrictions.
Judgment reversed and judgment entered for defendants (appellants) with costs.