*1 123 enjoining particular griev- lieve an order arbitration granted may ance should not be unless it be said with positive assurance that the arbitration is clause involved susceptible interpretation not to an that covers the as- dispute. serted v. Cf. United America Steelworkers Navigation supra. Warrior & Company, areWe Gulf presented with this factual situation herein.11 The decree of the trial court far it refused so as enjoin dispute arbitration of the Fuste is af- tenure firmed, enjoined and the decree in so as it arbitra- far dispute tion of the librarian status is reversed. proceedings is remanded for further con- record
sistent herewith. pay
Each side to own costs. NIX, J., part no took the consideration or decision of this case. A.2d 875 Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH of v. GEE,
Gregory Appellant. L. Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued 20, Jan. 1975. April
Decided that, although 11. We note the chancellor the librarian determined arbitration, dispute ripe status this contention was University complaint seeking injunc- not advanced tive relief or in in its Moreover, appeal its Court. such deter- proper provide enjoining mination does not an basis for arbitra- question tion as the of the timeliness a demand for arbitration interpretation agreement “is not of and not one of the ex- scope provision; istence or of the arbitration it is thus outside and its bounds our review resolution must be left to arbi- Muhlenberg Township Authority tration.” Pennsylvania School District Co., Fortunato Construction 460 Pa. 333 A.2d *6 Binns, Philadelphia, appellant. James J. for Fitzpatrick, F. Emmett Atty., Dist. Steven H. Gold- blatt, Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Deborah Glass, Philadelphia, appellee. EAGEN, O’BRIEN,
Before ROBERTS, POMEROY, MANDERINO, NIX and JJ.
OPINION
EAGEN, Justice. appellant,
The Gregory Gee, jury was convicted of degree. murder in the Following second denial post-trial motions, prison sentence of to fifteen five years imposed. was appeal This direct followed. prosecution
The emanated stabbing from the fatal Glenn Cook, years seventeen of age, Overbrook outside High Philadelphia atmosphere hostility School in an youth between two gangs, Gang, rival Moon most whose Overbrook, members attended and the June Street Gang, University High most of whose members attended Cook, School. Overbrook, a former student at was on his accompanied lunch hour sixteen-year-old and had his cousin, Tyrone Cook, Overbrook, a student to the at school.
Shortly stabbing, Gee, after the a member of and an Gang, police in the officer June taken into Street was custody during questioning admit- followed However, explained ted he stabbed Cook. he that when day he day visited his off from Overbrook was—it “something work —he heard from had friends said, point, kicked with the Moon.” At his Gee about Gang forty school, members of the Moon came out of Cook, and Glenn he knew to be a member of the whom Moon, swung at him times with three a cane missed but time, each and in defense he stabbed Cook once with a knife then He ran.1 further indicated he carried the self-protection knife for because he himself had once been stabbed. Evidence Gee’s custodial statements was admitted into evidence at trial. eyewitness only to the occurrence who testified at Lambert,
trial for was one Commonwealth Steven a student at He fifteen then Overbrook. stated alone, standing away feet from Cook and that Cook was leaning against the front the school unarmed and wall of *7 building he He ran attacked Gee when was Gee. said building, onto steps his coat the front of the threw down the June upon which other members of an automobile approached Cook, Gang sitting, shouted Street “Yeah, Gang” him in the Moon stabbed You from then near the heart. Lambert said Cook chest run, him grabbed chest to followed his and tried and Gee swinging his knife.2 still appeal is on statements of this based
Much
ap
eyewitnesses to the incident which
made
various
precluded from mak
improperly
pellant contends he was
he describes
which
ing
use of at his trial and
adequate
Maryland,
Brady
broadly
“exculpatory.” He cites
v.
as
1196-97,
215
1194,
87,
10 L.Ed.2d
83,
S.Ct.
U.S.
83
373
by the
suppression
proposition that “the
(1963)
for
upon re
an accused
prosecution
to
of evidence favorable
is material
process
the evidence
due
where
quest violates
denied, but this
pretrial
suppress
evidence
motion
1. A
to
rulihg
challenged.
is
two stab
sustained
pathologist
testified that Cook
2. A medical
pierced
wounds,
his
his chest wall and
had entered
one
which
right
heart;
from the
entered the
flank
had
the other
which
groin. The
major
blood vessel
partially severed
rear and
itself,
wound,
to cause
was sufficient
either
witness stated
death.
irrespective
good
guilt
punishment,
or
to
either
proposition
prosecution.” faith or bad faith
correct,
record
though
that
undoubtedly
we note
is
than
specific request
such evidence other
no
for
reveals
polygraph
relating
examination.
his
materials
specific
Nevertheless,
that,
such
think
absent
we
even
duty
make
request,
prosecutor
available
has
truly exculpatory,
rather
is
the defense evidence that
Brady
evi-
merely
suggests that such
than
favorable.3
punish-
guilt or to
dence
be “material either to
would
as
Exculpatory
been defined
evidence has also
ment.”
defend-
extrinsieally
which
tends to establish
“evidence
charged,
as differentiated
ant’s innocence of
crimes
although favorable, merely collateral
from
is
that which
impeaching.” People
Bottom,
v.
76 Misc.2d
People
Fraiser,
N.Y.S.2d
334-35
Cf.
piece
(1973). A
of evi-
Misc.2d
Gee a detective exculpatory suppression hearing and later at trial support which would his claim existed self-defense, reading careful of the record discloses but a statements, only there were indicated *8 accusatory. exculpatory, but these statements were not suggest indi of statements The record does the existence gang hostility members cating at scene of other that appellant’s gang with drawn were observed of own it—on may had blood of which even have knives —one view of own had a But in Gee’s and that someone cane. independently repeated, uncontroverted, corrobo and Cook, the he Glenn had stabbed rated admission pathologist sustained finding the either wound of Justice, Project for Criminal Standards ABA on Standards See Function, § Relating Defense to the Prosecution Function and the Draft, 1971). 3.11(a) (Approved fatal, been the of in itself would have and absence Cook any placing other statement than Gee’s own a cahe any weapon decedent, other in the hands of the these supported to seem neither have Gee’s statements would provoca- suggested to claim of self-defense nor have manslaughter. tion needed to murder to reduce arrest, day given poly On the of his Gee graph examination, argues that, apart and he now from question admissibility polygraph of the results subsequently, themselves which will be discussed Commonwealth’s failure turn over defense counsel “every test, every result, every sheet that was interview polygraph taken in connection with test” was a vio duty exculpatory lation of over its turn evidence. exculpatory in it cer This evidence was the sense tainly exculpatory by appellant, but contained any precluded him from not in the sense that its denial evidence; “extrinsically” tend to es did not additional mitigate guilt. record of or to innocence tablish hearing suppression makes it clear that the results of inconclusive, that in the course and examination appellant merely gave same version this examination statement stabbing gave informal he in his Both these subsequent statement. formal his any addi evidence, into statements were admitted firm he remained probative of evidence that value tional at an intermediate of events in his version consistent consistency light of the clearly in be minimal would time outweigh the allowed already not be should shown and arising references from danger improper inferences v. John Commonwealth Cf. polygraph examination. A.2d Pa. son, 441 general, discovery the law pre-trial
forAs defend that, “proof Pennsylvania absent is clear and com exceptional circumstances hearing, ant, after only inspect “to permitted may be pelling reasons”
133 any and copy written photograph and or confessions him, is not en made and that he statements” written inspection discovery “pretrial to titled written possession of the Com in the statements of witnesses also Common See monwealth.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 104, A.2d Specter Shiomos, 457 320 wealth ex rel. v. Pa. 252, (1974); Stafford, Pa. v. 450 299 134 Commonwealth 943, (1973), denied, S.Ct. A.2d 412 93 590 cert. U.S. Turra, 2775, (1973); 404 37 L.Ed.2d Commonwealth v. appellant (1971). 442 96 Here Pa. 275 A.2d made pretrial “exceptional showing no circumstances pretrial dis compelling entitle him to reasons” would statements, covery beyond nor was his own that of re rule, him to notice-of-alibi which have entitled would ciprocal against discovery, him. Cf. Common enforced (1974). The Jackson, wealth v. 457 Pa. 319 A.2d during presentation Commonwealth did make available pos in its its relevant statements own case-in-chief all ultimately it merely not those of witnesses session and ap support stand, does not the record called pellant’s effective access that he was claim denied Kon Commonwealth during statements the trial. Cf. tos, Pa. 276 A.2d only one
At
the Commonwealth called
trial
Lambert,
killing,
eyewitness
indicated
to the
Steven
going
call
it
not
a number
to the defense that was
police
given
to the
because
others who had
they
changed aspects
and were not
of their
had
stories
however,
changes,
thought
witnesses.
to be reliable
appeared
exculpatory
rather
in nature and
guilt. Appellant nevertheless
strengthen the evidence of
calling
the Com
argues
these witnesses
in not
now
testi
obligation
to withhold
in its
monwealth failed
theory
accused, apparently on the
mony
favorable
cross-examining
precluded
from
thereby
him
their
with
inconsistencies
these
about
witnesses
clear, however,
Com-
The law is
statements.
*10
required
is not
to
to
monwealth
call
the stand all availa-
witnesses, particularly
regards
ble
if it
them unrelia-
as
ble,
long
as
as
their
it makes
names and whereabouts
Jones,
to
available
the
See Commonwealth v.
defense.
(1973);
v.
Pa.
Because continued to what prior statements, the defense evidence these witnesses’ ap- to its Since determined call them on own behalf. peared might involved these been witnesses have gang hostility that ac- one or the other in the with side judge’s killing, companied hearing held in the was right potential of his each witness chambers advise himself, and right to incriminate his not and counsel testify ex- and were eventually chose not to of them some they were indicated that this Others for reason. cused apparent that at least willing testify, but it became Gee, testify but eager to not of them were some repeatedly this, judge against Because of him. might be such witnesses counsel that defense warned his wit- them client, he that if made to his harmful claim adversely, not could they nesses and testified prior statements. their surprise impeach with them testify in expected them he still indicated that Counsel police, to the statements consistent with their manner these When helpful his client. this would be and that testify stand, they as did were called to witnesses impeach- at contradition hoped, all efforts counsel objected to were by ment means of precluded by the Commonwealth and Gee court. argues error. origins ordinarily par the rule
ty impeach testimony himself cannot a witness he gen obscurity. is called is in historical It has shrouded erally thought primitive time when to be a relic of the parties supported by witnesses modern word, “oath-helpers” sense of the function but whose purely partisan one of was not to attest to facts but Wigmore, swearing party calling for the See 3A them. *11 (Chadbourn 1970). these oath- Evidence 896 rev. Since § helpers party ordinarily from by the were chosen among relatives, friends, his coun own adherents and side, by oath-helpers representing tered similar other the thought appropriate party regard it was as each vouching credibility for the of his own and witnesses by recog long they bound what Courts have affirmed. nized, however, application the an that a of strict juris cient voucher rule the conditions of under modern prudence injustice, they lead to and so have articu can rule, exceptions developed lated and of to the a number usually re questioning whether the itself rule without exception mains a one.4 valid One such well-established permits party, surprised by a adverse who an has been by called, made cross-ex statement has witness prior him on the state amine basis of his inconsistent general regard, however, is that ments. rule Evidence, recently But see Federal en- Rule 607 the Rules law, totally abrogates the and acted into provides which law rule common credibility may by that “The aof witness be attacked any party, including party calling of the him.” The Notes Advisory promulgated justify Committee it in this which Rule against manner: “The impeaching wit- traditional own rule one’s premises. party ness is as based on A abandoned false does belief, worthy hold out his rarely as witnesses since he has selecting free choice in right par- Denial of them. leaves the ty mercy at the adversary.” of the and the witness While this us, binding rule and its upon they high- new are not rationale are ly persuasive prevalent indications of the trend toward liberaliza- tion in this area. 136 hearsay
prior and inconsistent statements are admissible substantive of the truth as evidence statements, impeach credibility merely but present ones.5 that defense here contends
The Commonwealth
these witnesses
counsel was
cross-examine
not entitled to
to the
surprise
talked
on
he had not
the basis of
because
fully
calling
he was
them,
witnesses before
and because
untrustworthy
prosecutor
they
warned
testify
might
judge
they
appeared
and
against
language in
his client.
It cites
Commonwealth
(1957),
Selden
Turner,
and
239, 253,
389 Pa.
A.2d 784
this Court
with
*12
Pennsylvania.
5.
firmly
This distinction has been
adhered to in
See,
Tucker,
584,
g.,
e.
Commonwealth
137 Smith, 544, 548, in 424 227 A.2d Commonwealth v. Pa. 653, (1967), appropriate to fol- is a more standard 655 low:
“
general
party
a
as a
a
who calls witness
‘While
rule
represents
being worthy
him as
of belief and cannot
impeach him,
considerably
this rule has been
relaxed
is
prevent
injustice
tendency
and the
the courts
permit parties
re-
strict
show the truth without
”
gard
(Emphasis
original.)
technicalities.’
permitted
Pennsylvania
frequently
parties to
have
courts
a
impeach
contradict or
them without
witnesses called
requirement
surprise
strict
when the interests
truth
justice
require
See,
g.,
seem to
e.
Commonwealth
it.
7,
Smith, supra;
Deitrick,
v.
Commonwealth
Pa.
v.
221
(1908);
70
Staino,
A. 275
Commonwealth
Pa.Su
v.
204
per. 319,
(1964);
In
States
United
ap
has
Court
strict
held that
some circumstances the
plication
prevent
of a
defendant
state’s voucher rule to
cross-examining
contradicting
from
him
witness
self
right
process
called can be a denial of his
to due
has
Mississippi,
law. Chambers v.
410 U.S.
S.Ct.
trenchantly . .in in observed Chambers: their rarely to select trials, able criminal defendants are they them." they where find must take them witnesses: Although at at U.S. S.Ct. —unlike al- Evidence, unequivocally which new Federal Rules any credibility any to be attacked low the witness discretion party Pennsylvania measure of invests a law — judge party may cross-exam- in the trial as to whether a called, abuse it would be an ine witness he himself has deny judge cross-examination of discretion for the to surprise strictly if so would lack of to do on basis of In injustice the defendant. be to cause substantial in his case, however, judge the trial has indicated re- his opinion denying trial that motion for a new Gee’s the witnesses’ cross-examination about fusal allow only prior the absence was based not on prior incon- surprise collateralness of the but also on the by the be determined sistencies to the issues of fact to jury. accuracy trial, in
Since Gee a statement trial, he not contest at ad- voluntariness of which did only signifi- Cook, mitted that he had stabbed Glenn disputed jury cant resolve was issue of fact for the whether or him not the first attacked with decedent cane, guilt. absolving mitigating his He thus him of or also the de- declared his statement that he had stabbed only cedent retreated, once then while the Common- witness, that, Lambert, wealth’s still testified Steven swinging knife, his of the re- in the direction followed treating jury However, Glenn Cook. even if the accept subsequent events, Gee’s version of the uncontro- undisputed opinion expert pathologist verted and fatal; was that either been wound alone have would thus, responsible Gee would been have Cook’s Glenn subsequently death even if another him. had stabbed Therefore, although hampered by the we are absence given by record of the statements these witnesses to *14 police regarded by by exculpatory, the and and asGee regarded specify clearly why failure them as Gee’s to he prove such and what he the have had would been able consistently prior witnesses testified with their state- ments, reading suggests a his careful of the record that exculpatory misplaced. reliance their on nature was only witnesses, The record indicates that one of these Leroy Malachi, stabbing testified at trial the itself. about witness, Waters, apparently Another told Charles had police prior boys the that he trial had seen several cane, with repeated knives and one he on with a the witness stand. cross-examination the Com- On monwealth, however, boy he that stated the cane with Leatherbury, not the decedent but Michael a member Gang. original of the June Street Since the statement apparently say not cane, did that had the Glenn Cook only somebody did, that there was no contradiction of statement, only amplification earlier an it. Defense obviously hoped counsel testimony that a cane was that present support would lend story, signifi- but Gee’s cantly he did cane, not ask the witness who had the obviously any previous so rely did on statement that possession inwas of the decedent. When Com- brought damag- monwealth on out cross-examination the ing testimony gang it was a member of own Gee’s swinging cane, casting who was only thus not doubt on jury Gee’s version suggesting events but might where gotten he story, have for his de- idea only fense counsel surprise, had no basis for but provide impeach- no contradiction a basis Similarly, witness, Leroy ment. Malachi, appar- had ently police knife, Leatherbury stated to the had a cane; cross, on while direct he stated that he had a on however, apparent he resolved the contradiction testi- fying Leatherbury cane, had both a knife and a regularly crippled that he carried the cane a because of leg. through concerning a
Gee, cross-examination state- given attempted ment police, to the to show that another Mouse, Gang, White of the June known as member Street bloody potential had with knife. But one been seen testify police witness told this to declined to who had grounds, Mouse him- on Fifth Amendment as did White he stand, self. saw Waters, who did take the denied hand; Mouse his statement White with knife his apparently had Mouse did have said that White *15 it knife, though there no he said had was indication he had blood on it. In admission view Gee’s decedent, inconsistency to whether the stabbed as an knife, even one Mouse with a witness had seen White might particularly he it, had on since did have blood clearly a mat- testify knives, seen others with was he had had not decedent ter collateral to the issue of or whether appellant v. Commonwealth attacked with a cane. Cf. (1974); Common- Lynch, 213, 455 274 Pa. 314 A.2d Fisher, 262 wealth 290 A.2d v. 447 Pa. clearly were defense more collateral and irrelevant Even bring apparent as to out inconsistencies counsel’s efforts a member of Moon to whether not Glenn Cook was Miller, witness, Gang, particularly another Kevin since Certainly it estab- he even if were did state that was. beyond that the decedent was member lished all doubt support to gang, itself, lend no this, of the rival would him with claim that Glenn Cook had attacked Gee’s cane. in this case the therefore conclude that
We preventing judge de trial not his discretion did abuse cross-examining the witnesses from fense counsel Although might be denial himself it well had called. im from process a defendant due for a court forbid of lack strictly on the basis peaching his witness own exculpatory prior surprise made a the witness had where considera provided statement "under circumstances v. Mis- reliability,” as in Chambers ble assurance of [its] pro- sissippi, supra, due U.S. at at S.Ct. require cess counsel, does not who calls a defense prior witnesses on the basis of unreliable8 exculpatory merely that are to the collateral and are impeach permitted matter witnesses issue, at those be reason, Nor, means of these statements. the same subsequently was it judge an abuse for the discretion impeach refuse to these wit- allow defense counsel indirectly nesses through police took officers who opinion down their that such statements. areWe judicial delay important discretion is as a check on and confusion testimo- can collateral which be caused ny, defendant, and that the burden remain must awith strictly seeking surprised by testimony adverse called, to cross-examine an he himself has adverse witness of showing that the denial such cross-examination would injustice be an himto because the statement depended upon sufficiently exculpatory indica- tive of reliability upon reasonable. make reliance compare See Bowers, supra. Commonwealth *16 argues
Gee
further
that was error
exclude
polygraph
results
his
of
This
examination.
Court
has repeatedly
consistently
of a
and
held that the results
polygraph
purpose
any
examination are
for
inadmissible
Pennsylvania
reliability
in
the scientific
of such
because
tests
See,
g.,
sufficiently
has not
e.
been
established.
Brooks,
Commonwealth v.
Civil jur- however, number points out, that a Gee admissible, held results be isdictions have now such so has accuracy tests of such the scientific reconsid- improved years should in that we recent Certainly in- it is regard position to them. er our with developments this field upon cumbent us to be alert to ex- passed beyond the that, have so if indeed lie detectors comparable to stage perimental to a trustworthiness immeas- have results that of other tests whose scientific truth, dowe urably in their search aided our courts might provide. they enlightenment deny ourselves the admitted polygraph been results have We also note that court in which jurisdictions conditions other under admis- probative value, that such is satisfied of their See, e. persuasive judicial advocates. sibility has found (E.D.Mich. F.Supp. 90 Ridling, g., United States present case 1972).9 think, however, that the We do estab- our appropriate is in which to reconsider an one tests, reliability since of such lished view about given to Gee test of the record indicates that the results were inconclusive. argues fair trial because also that he was denied a
Gee the conduct inconsistency rulings and of trial judge during After a careful of the trial. course argument to be record, examination of the we find without merit.
Judgment affirmed. NIX, JJ., in the result.
POMEROY and concur *17 Oklahoma, however, also, jurisdiction, which 9. We note that one judge previously of the trial held it to be within the discretion stipu- parties polygraph or when all whether not admit results admission, holdings recently prior late to their overruled the circumstances, any because held such results inadmissible under potential unreliability polygraph “of examinations at this State, 1975). (Okl.Crim.App., Fulton 541 P.2d time.” opinion dissenting which ROBERTS, J., filed a J., joined. MANDERINO, consideration participate in the
JONES, J., did C. of this case. decision ROBERTS, (dissenting). Justice (1) example good a provides case I believe that doctrine that why abandon ancient we should for his truthfulness party producing witness vouches a inconsistent (2) why admit should we concerning mat- statements as evidence of witnesses ters statement. contained approxi police took statements from
In this case killing. eyewitnesses to the mately a dozen half dece stated that Apparently1 of these witnesses several re which gang, that the clash dent was a member of someone, fight, gang sulted in his death was a pre fight during which possibly decedent, cane had a to corrobo killing. These statements tended ceded with a him appellant’s attacked rate that decedent claim protect from cane and he killed himself serious bodily harm.2 however, given,
Sometime after these statements were testimony. changed their all but one of witnesses these testi- the one witness Commonwealth called whose no mony change. he saw cane did He testified members of and that neither nor were decedent wit- the other to call The Commonwealth refused gang. having unreliable, they because felt to be nesses changed their stories. therefore, record, we must in the None of these statements are they rely partisan descriptions to on determine contain. what only mat- majority addressed
2. The these asserts that to the believe I that a inquiry. ters central cannot collateral supporting are such claim of self-defense and claim evidence prosecution. to a murder collateral *18 to tended ver- which the statements to use In effort an two appellant’s called counsel version, ify appellant’s minds and asked changed their had who the witnesses in accord- they testified the When them about incident. plead appellant’s counsel changed stories, their ance with the impeach on surprise he be allowed and asked that The trial prior statements. the inconsistent basis of Although trial the him to do so. not allow court did the before counsel explaned appellant and his court any claim not allow it would witnesses were called probably sustain- though ruling surprise, and ruling which the able, should reverse I believe that we the from freely given kept statements and these relevent jury. statements important the earlier
It is to realize kill- shortly the given police after by the the witnesses to the than ing or more reliable probably reliable as testimony. corresponding in-court more is cases, statement many “In the inconsistent testimony at the witness likely the to be true than in time the trial it was made nearer because likely influ- to be it relates and is less matter which litiga- gave rise to controversy that enced tion.”
Comment, California Evidence Code §
Moreover, are the statements the witnesses who made concerning the earlier for cross-examination available they were which and conditions under given.3 may as The trier of fact the witness observe self-contradictions, however, follow, prior 3. “It does not having testi- when admitted are to be treated as no affirmative value, strictly any monial to be denied such credit is doing only ground for them in the mind of the tribunal. The theory hearsay hearsay be But so would rule. extrajudicial rejected it was is that an because rule made out examination statement is subject person an absent to cross- court Here, however, by hypothesis the .... subject present is There is cross-examination. witness ample opportunity him as to to test the basis for his former Noth statement.4 explains giving the earlier denies jury in which ing procedure normal is lost to the credibility accorded weight to be evaluates admitting a wit practice testimony.5 witness’ evidence substantive as ness’ inconsistent statement Fed.R. jurisdictions. accepted many See has been ad (prior statement *19 607, 801(d)(1) inconsistent Evid. any par request upon missible as substantive evidence 609 230, 163 N.W.2d ty); State, 41 Wis.2d Gelhaar v. L. 26 929, 90 S.Ct. (1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. admissi (prior statement (1970) inconsistent Ed.2d 796 writing declar ble as evidence when substantive examination); § is Cal.Evid.Code ant available for cross substan as (prior statement admissible 1235 inconsistent for cross-examina tive evidence declarant available when (a) (prior tion) statement ; 60-460 Kansas Stat.Anno. § wit a if is evidence declarant admissible as substantive consistency statement); New regard ness, without (prior ad Jersey 63(1) inconsistent statement R.Evid. impeach when used missible as substantive evidence (prior state witness); 63(1) Utah R.Evid. inconsistent impeach regard to use for ment without admissible (similar Fed.R. 801(d)(1) ment); R.Evid. Uniform prior is ad 801(d)(1) inconsistent statement Evid. evidence). missible as substantive in evidence
Allowing to be admitted such statements just require the matters stated would for truth of presently exists changes as two in the law evidence purpose hearsay has The whole rule statement. been already satisfied.” 1970) (em- (Chadbourn § rev. Wigmore, 3A Evidence at phasis original). witness, “If, they jury that the conclude from all see 4. before, truth, they says said is but what he what he now not they of that deciding see and hear are from what none the less person and in court.” States, (Learned (2d 1925) Cir. v. United 6 F.2d Di Carlo Hand, J.). McCormick, § Evidence 251 See in Pennsylvania. any party First, be allowed to should impeach any allowed, only witness. If not party prior who did call the witness in- could use virtually consistent statement. This would be same present as Second, law. inconsistent statement only impeach witness, would be but admissible changes would be substantive evidence. These are not acceptance drastic, jurisdic- as evidenced their in the tions listed above.6 majority’s only keep relevant result serves jury. evidence from the serves no
reliable Its result greater principle judicial than I inertia. believe is, trial fundamentally, objective search an account upon charges of the events which the are based. criminal evidentiary An ignore rule which forces the searcher to reliability relevant clues whose can be tested cross-ex- purpose. I, amination serves dissent from therefore, no majority’s result. *20 MANDERINO, J., joins opinion. dissenting in this 354 A.2d Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH
v. Appellant. JOHNSON, Arthur Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued April 7, 1975. April 7, 1976. Decided Reargument Denied June 1976. required by would Chambers appear This result also be Mississippi, 410 U.S. S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d