Having discarded a loaded firearm in October, 1996, the defendant was
1. The conviction pursuant to c. 269, § 10(a), required proof that the gun met the legal definition of a firearm, and the statute specifically indicates that it does not matter whether the firearm is loaded or not.
2. The defendant’s claim, made for the first time on appeal, that the judge’s instructions were in error because they did not “adequately specify that the defendant could be convicted of carrying either a loaded or unloaded firearm” is without merit. Whether the gun is loaded or unloaded is not an element of the offense. In any event, the judge instructed the jury in accordance with the defendant’s requests and told the jury that “a firearm is defined in our laws as a pistol, revolver, or other weapon — loaded or unloaded — from which a shot or bullet can be discharged . . . .” There was no error, let alone a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Freeman,
3. The defendant’s remaining arguments do not merit discussion, except to point out with respect to his argument relating to the chain of custody that the evidence was sufficient to show that the drugs and the gun did not leave
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
General Laws c. 269, § 10(a), as appearing in St. 1990, c. 511, § 2, provides in relevant part: “Whoever, except as provided or exempted by statute, knowingly has in his possession ... a firearm, loaded or unloaded . . . shall be punished . . . .”
At the time of the defendant’s offense, the Legislature specifically provided in § 10(h), as appearing in St. 1996, c. 20: “A violation of this subsection shall not be considered a lesser included offense to a violation of subsection (a) . . . .” Where there is specific authorization for cumulative punishments, there is no prohibition against duplicative convictions. Commonwealth v. Alvarez,
