Commonwealth v. GagnonCommonwealth v. Gagnon
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Warner
On June 15, 1978, after a jury trial in the Superior Court, Jean Marie Gagnon and two codefendants were convicted on indictments charging armed robbery while masked (
All three defendants appealed. This court reversed their convictions (Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 110 [1983]), but on further appellate review the Supreme Judicial Court found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 391 Mass. 869 (1984).
On December 9, 1992, Gagnon, acting pro se, filed two motions — one seeking, alternatively, a release from unlawful confinement or a new trial, pursuant to
We deal, first, with five issues raised by the defendant’s motion below, second, with his contention that he should be permitted to raise new issues on appeal, and, third, with the propriety of resentencing on the convictions not successfully challenged.
1. Joint venture instructions. Gagnon claims that the jury instructions on joint venture, by repeated use of the terms “determine” and “decide” in reference to the jury’s consideration of that issue in reaching their verdict, unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of persuading the jury that he was not a joint venturer. See Connolly v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527, 535 (1979). Assuming, without deciding, that Gagnon did not waive the point by failing to object at trial and by not raising the burden-shifting argument in his direct appeals, Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 229 (1973), the instructions in this case could not reasonably be read as placing the burden of proof upon the defendant. The charge as a whole sufficiently apprised the jury of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof on joint venture so as not to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the offenses, and every fact necessary to convict, which included the facts necessary to establish a joint venture. Compare Commonwealth v. Shelley, 411 Mass. 692, 694-698 (1992) (“finding” language cured by forceful instructions on the burden of proof).
2.
Attempted murder instructions.
The offenses of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder both require that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s specific intent to kill, in addition to establishing malice aforethought.
Commonwealth
v.
Henson,
394 Mass. 584, 590-592 (1985).
Commonwealth
v.
Maloney,
399 Mass. 785, 788 (1987). See also
Commonwealth
v.
Ennis,
398 Mass. 170, 173-175 (1986)
(Henson
applies retroactively).
Because the issue of specific intent to kill was not actively contested at trial, the erroneous instruction created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 398 Mass. 1, 5 (1986). No one disputed that the bank robbers carried, among them, at least two handguns. Nor was it disputed that the robbers brought those weapons intending that, if necessary, they would be used to shoot persons resisting or pursuing the robbers. Instead, each of the defendants contested the issue of identity, arguing that he had not been one of the robbers. Compare Gabbidon, supra; Commonwealth v. Shea, 398 Mass. 264, 269-270 (1986). Given the undisputed evidence that one of the robbers aimed a handgun at Officer Petrick, at short range, and fired upon him, it is reasonable to expect that a properly instructed jury would have found a specific intent to kill. Compare Shea, supra at 270 (seriousness of wound “inconsistent with any intent other than an intent to kill”). Contrast Commonwealth v. Fernette, 398 Mass. 658, 672 (1986).
As to the “moral certainty” language, Gagnon claims that it requires reversal under the decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court (Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 [1994]) and of the Supreme Judicial Court make it clear, however, that “the use of the words ‘moral certainty,’ as part of or in conjunction with the approved charge from Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320 (1850),” remains sound practice after Cage. Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 562 (1991). Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 571-572 (1994).
The charge given at Gagnon’s trial adequately conveyed the appropriate standard of proof, describing it as proof that creates “an abiding conviction to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty,” and “a clear and settled conviction of
As to the language taken from Madeiros, 255 Mass. at 307, it has been clear at least since Commonwealth v. Williams, 378 Mass. 217, 233-235 (1979), that the use of this charge is disfavored. In Williams, however, the infirmity created by the one-sided warning about the consequences of applying too stringent a standard of proof was cured by adjoining the approved definition of reasonable doubt from Webster. Id. at 235. See also Commonwealth v. Carballo, 381 Mass. 227, 229 (1980); Commonwealth v. Spann, 383 Mass. 142, 150-151 (1981); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 147-148, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982).
As in
Tavares, supra,
the judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged. He defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt as proof which creates “an abiding conviction” ór “a clear and settled conviction” of the defendant’s guilt, and contrasted reasonable doubt with a “whimsical or fanciful doubt” and with the doubt “of a juror who is earnestly seeking for a doubt or excuse to acquit.” Compare
Commonwealth
v.
Seay,
376
4.
Duplicative convictions.
A defendant may not be convicted of two criminal offenses based on the same act or acts unless each crime requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.
Morey
v.
Commonwealth,
108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).
Commonwealth
v.
Jones,
382 Mass. 387, 393, 395 (1981). Gagnon was convicted, among other things, on indictments charging armed assault with intent to murder (no. 77-2669) and attempted murder (no. 77-2670). He was sentenced to fifteen to twenty years for the armed assault and to four and one-half to five years for attempted murder, those sentences to run concurrently. He correctly argues that these two crimes constitute the “same offense” under the
Morey
test, since attempted murder requires proof of no fact beyond those necessary to show an armed assault with intent to murder. See
Commonwealth
v.
Peaslee, 177
Mass. 267, 271 (1901) (Holmes, C.J.) (armed assault is a sufficient overt act to support conviction for attempted murder);
Commonwealth
v.
Henson,
394 Mass. at 590-591 (assault with
Gagnon did not object to the duplicative convictions at the time of his trial or sentencing. At that time, the law provided no remedy for duplicative convictions unless multiple punishments were imposed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tabor, 376 Mass. 811, 825 (1978). The Supreme Judicial Court subsequently decided in Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. at 396-397, that a defendant is harmed by convictions themselves, apart from the punishment imposed, and held that multiple convictions for crimes that are the same in the Morey sense are invalid regardless of the sentences imposed. This court has applied Jones retroactively. E.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 752-753 (1981).
Gagnon’s failure to object at the time of sentencing, or to press this claim on direct review, does not preclude relief through his motion for a new trial. A defendant convicted twice for the same crime is entitled to relief despite failing to preserve his appellate rights, and even if he does not raise the issue on appeal.
Commonwealth
v.
Stewart,
375 Mass. 380, 393 (1978).
Commonwealth
v.
Sanchez,
405 Mass. 369, 382 (1989).
Commonwealth
v.
DiMatteo,
12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 555 (1981).
Commonwealth
v.
Hamm,
19 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 80-81 (1984). See also
Commonwealth
v.
Grasso,
375 Mass. 138, 140 (1978). The Commonwealth, indeed, does not contend that this issue is waived but argues that, because Gagnon has already served more than the maximum five years of his attempted murder sentence, his challenge is not permitted by
5.
Erroneous sentencing on assault with intent to murder.
Although indictment 77-2669 charged Gagnon with
armed
assault with intent to murder, in violation of
As the Commonwealth concedes, the facts of this case closely parallel those in
Commonwealth
v.
Harris,
23 Mass. App. Ct. 687 (1987), which reaffirmed the rule that “[t]he only verdict which can be received and regarded, as a complete and valid verdict of a jury, upon which a judgment can be rendered, is an open and public verdict, given in and assented to, in open court, as the unanimous act of the jury.”
Id.
at 692, quoting from
Lawrence
v.
Stearns,
11 Pick. 501, 502 (1831). Contrast
Commonwealth
v.
Andino,
34 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 427 (1993). It follows that the offense of
6.
Issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Gagnon argues that the motion judge wrongly denied his motion for appointment of counsel and that as a remedy for that error this court should entertain on appeal certain arguments not raised below. In the ordinary course, those issues would now be waived because of Gagnon’s unexcused failure to present them in his first new trial motion.
The motion judge has considerable discretion in deciding whether appointed counsel is needed to assist a defendant who has moved for postconviction relief.
Commonwealth
v.
Conceicao,
388 Mass. 255, 262 (1983). Although the motion judge here was not the judge who presided at trial, the substantive grounds raised by the motion all related either to the trial judge’s charge or to the court’s sentencing jurisdiction, and therefore involved no factual issues.
6
Compare
ibid.;
7. Resentencing. Gagnon was sentenced to thirty-nine to fifty-four years for the armed robbery, fifteen to twenty years for armed assault with intent to murder, four and one-half to five years for attempted murder, and seven and one-half to nine years for assault with a dangerous weapon, all to run concurrently. The conviction for assault and battery on a police officer was placed on file with Gagnon’s consent. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court subsequently reduced Gagnon’s sentence on the armed robbery conviction to a term of twenty-five to thirty-five years.
Arguing that the trial judge incorporated punishment for the attempted murder and armed assault convictions into the long sentence that he imposed for armed robbery, Gagnon asks that we order resentencing on all of the remaining, legal convictions. He bases his inference that the punishments were so “incorporated” solely on the length of the armed robbery sentence (thirty-nine to fifty-four years, as it was originally imposed) and the fact that the other sentences were made to run concurrently with it.
“Although ‘it is not a function of this court to review an otherwise lawful sentence which is within the limits of the applicable statutory provisions,’ . . . sentences based upon erroneous or impermissible considerations have been vacated” (citation omitted).
Commonwealth
v.
Repoza,
28 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 330 (1990). However, in only one reported case have we vacated an otherwise valid sentence on the ground that it ran concurrently with the sentence on an
The judge imposed different terms of years on each of the convictions. His comments at sentencing reveal that his consideration was directed to the underlying facts of the offenses rather than the technical alignment of the indictments. Re-sentencing is not required solely on the basis that the sentences were concurrent. See Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 700 & n.10 (1982).
8.
Conclusion.
The sentences imposed on indictments 77-2669 (armed assault with intent to murder) and 77-2670 (attempted murder) are vacated, and the judgment of conviction on number 77-2670 is reversed. The case is remanded to the Superior Court, where indictment 77-2670 is to be dismissed as duplicative, and the docket entries for indictment 77-2669 are to be revised to reflect the verdict of guilty of simple assault with intent to murder,
So ordered.
Notes
The crimes were committed in the course of a bank robbery; Gagnon was indicted and convicted as a joint venturer, primarily on evidence that he drove the getaway car. The facts are recited in greater detail in Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 110 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 391 Mass. 869 (1984).
The “clairvoyance exception,” see Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 588 (1978), does not apply because Henson did not announce a new rule of constitutional significance but only clarified the meaning of a criminal statute. Contrast Commonwealth v. DeJoinville, 381 Mass. 246, 248, 251 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123, 126 (1984); Commonwealth v. Limone, 410 Mass. 364, 365-366 (1991).
Gagnon also argues for the first time on appeal that certain language following on the heels of the reasonable doubt instructions implied that he had the burden to come forward with evidence in his defense. The language urged the jury to “bear in mind that the sole number of witnesses called by one side or the other doesn’t enter into this matter at all. It’s the weight and value and strength of the testimony of the witnesses in inducing belief that is important.” In the context of the charge as a whole, the challenged language explained to the jury precisely the correct rule — that their job, rather than tallying up the quantity of evidence produced by either side, was to examine what they believed after hearing all the evidence, and, in particular, whether they retained any reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
Gagnon also asserts — also for the first time on appeal — that the general attempt statute,
The Clerk: “On Indictment No. 77-2[6]69, charging Jean Marie Gagnon with assault with intent to murder, is he guilty or not guilty?” The Foreman: “Guilty as charged, sir.”
The Clerk: “Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You say that Jean Marie Gagnon is guilty of assault with intent to murder. So say you, Mr. Foreman; so say you all, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)
The motion also asserted that Gagnon’s trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective, but, with the following exception, the claimed ineffectiveness related only to the waiver of the five substantive issues. By way of a footnote, Gagnon suggests that his trial counsel’s decision to comment, in closing argument, on Gagnon’s decision not to testify constituted ineffective assistance. This strategic judgment that explanation would improve the defendant’s position was not “manifestly unreasonable” in the circumstances, and so was not ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 273 (1991).