Following a jury trial completed on September 14, 1977, appellant was found guilty of burglary. 1 Post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied, and he was subsequently sentenced to a tеrm of imprisonment of from three to six years. Because we now determine appellant’s allegations of error by the trial court to be without merit, we affirm that judgment of sentence.
Viewеd in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the facts adduced at trial are as follows. At approximately 2:35 a. m. on July 13, 1977, the owners of a garage located in Bangor, Northampton County, heard noises emanating from the garage and notified the police. Two officers responded to the call and arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. Officer Hughes exited the patrol car and approached the front door of the garage. Through the glass door he observed appellant come from behind the cash registеr to just in front of the door. While attempting to open the door, appellant failed to respond to Officer Hughes’ *281 order to halt. Finally, in response to the officer’s slight step backward from the door, appellant looked upward. Officer Hughes again ordered him to halt and placed the barrel of his shotgun to the window, at which time appellant ran and exited the building through a broken window. He was immediately pursued by Officer Hughes, but the chase was futile and ultimately abandoned. Examination of the garage then revealed that $8.79 had been taken from the cash rеgister.
Officer Hughes relayed his identification of the burglar, who he recognized as appellant, to the department, and appellant was apprehended at his home at 5:00 a. m. The arresting officers confiscated $8.72 in change and a one dollar bill from appellant’s bureau. Also removed from a pile of clothing were articles of apparel matсhing those that had been worn by the burglar.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The test for determining whether the evidence in a criminal case is sufficient is, accepting as true all the Commonwealth’s evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Holmes,
Appellant would еmphasize the fact that his fingerprints were not found at the scene (Officer Hughes testified that
*282
the burglar did not wear gloves) and that the two investigating officers disagreed on whether the intruder wore snеakers or leather shoes. While the absence of appellant’s fingerprints and the minor discrepancy in the clothing description are of course probative, they do not vitiate the positive identification offered by Officer Hughes. The credibility and weight to be accorded a witness’s testimony is for the finder of fact, who may believe all, part, or none of the proffered testimony.
Commonwealth v. Whack,
Appellant nеxt contends that the court erred in refusing to continue the trial until a subpoenaed defense witness could be found. The facts are these. Appellant desired to call one Diane Biеchy for the purpose of establishing an alibi defense. Ms. Biechy had not appeared at the time trial commenced at 1:30 p. m. on September 13, 1977, and no continuance was sought аt that time. The witness was still absent when the Commonwealth rested its case and the court adjourned later that afternoon. The following morning, the court granted a delay of one and one-half hours pending the arrival of Ms. Biechy. At the end of that period, appellant’s counsel requested a bench warrant be issued for compelling her attendance, and summarized the prоposed testimony as follows:
“The substance of the testimony that Miss Biechy would give is that the defendant, Mr. Franks, had been drinking excessively all night, since beer was ten cents a drink that night. He had consumed аn inordinate amount and was quite drunk. He was in the company of Miss Beichy [sic] until twelve or 12:30 and he was with two young men until 2:30 a. m. Since there would be a geographical distance between Bangor, thе site of the crime, and Wind Gap, the site of the Beer Stein, I, therefore, think that this *283 is a valuable defense to the defendant, and, in addition, I think that the defense of intoxication is also valuable for the defendant, since it encompasses an idea of intent.” (N.T. 68-69).
The court then ordered the trial to proceed without the witness, although it did issue a bench warrant and order her to be held рending a contempt hearing. Appellant did not subsequently take the stand.
In
Commonwealth
v.
Kishbach,
“It is blackletter law that an appellate court may not reverse a trial court’s denial of a continuance without a palpable and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Warner,209 Pa.Super. 215 ,225 A.2d 98 (1966), cert. den.389 U.S. 986 ,88 S.Ct. 477 ,19 L.Ed.2d 479 . See generally 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1865, p. 710, n. 78. And, the rule has been applied with equal force when a witness is absent. Id. at p. 712.”
See also Commonwealth v. Scott,
Presently, the trial court focused on the substance of the witness’s testimony in denying the continuance. Appellant wished Ms. Biechy to testify so as to corroborate in part his alibi defense, a defense based on his alleged excessive drinking in a Wind Gap tavern during the time of the burglary. Commenting on the proposed testimony in this light, the trial court noted:
“This evidence fails entirely to establish an alibi defense, since the crime was committed at approximately 2:30 A.M. in Wind Gap, [sic, Bangor?] Pennsylvania, a town not fаr *284 from the situs of the bar. This witness could not have testified to the Defendant’s whereabouts from 12:30 onward, since she had no personal knowledge of these facts. Her testimony as to the Defendаnt’s state of intoxication is equally inefficacious to the defense, since this witness could not have testified to the Defendant’s state of intoxication at the time of the crime, which oсcurred some two hours after the Defendant left the witness’s presence.” (Opinion at 4).
Although it does appear that appellant exhibited some vigor in attempting to procure thе witness, we agree that the substance of the testimony was not so critical as to warrant a further delay in trial. We consequently cannot hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in ordering the triаl to proceed.
Finally, appellant reasons that the trial judge confused the jury by delivering contradictory instructions. In its final charge, the court instructed the jury that it must render a verdict “without sympаthy . . . without passion and without feeling or thought of favor . . . .” (N.T. 76-A). Subsequently, the court read to the jury the following point for charge requested by appellant:
“ ‘Verdicts which are not logically consistеnt may be returned by a jury if there is sufficient evidence supporting the conviction the jury returns. A jury, in subtle ways, may temper the rigidity of the Criminal Code in the application of the letter of the law to рarticular cases and may perhaps thereby mitigate the rigors of the law.’ ” (N.T. 100). 2
In reviewing a jury instruction for prejudicial error, the charge must be read and considered as a whole.
Commonwealth v. Woodward,
The judgment of sentence is consequently affirmed.
Notes
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.
. The request was evidently prompted by the multiple charges brought against appellant, viz. burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property. The trial court charged the jury that in the event appellant were found guilty of burglary, he could not be convicted of the latter two charges.