11 Pa. Super. 620 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1899
Opinion by
The defendant was convicted of having violated the provisions of the Act of May 18, 1893, P. L. 94, in that he practised medicine and surgery without a license. His appeal raises the question of the constitutionality of the act. He contends that the said act is unconstitutional for two reasons, first, because it violates that part of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declares that “ no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any state deprive any person, of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
So far as the provisions of this section are supposed to conflict with that part of the fourteenth amendment forbidding the states to “ abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” it is too clear for discussion that this clause has no application. It was intended to protect the privileges ■and immunities of citizens of the United States that is, such privileges and immunities as belong to them as citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those that belong to them as citizens of a state. It was not intended as a protection to the citizens of a state against the legislative power of their own ■state over their privileges and immunities which belong to them as citizens of a state. The right to engage in the business of the practice of law, or of selling liquor, are not rights which belong to a man because he is a citizen of the United States: Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. 130; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657. So also the right to practice medicine and surgery is not a right which belongs to him as a citizen of the United States, but as a citizen of a state.
The next question is whether any part of section 15 of the act conflicts with that part of the fourteenth amendment which prohibits a state from denying “ to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is strenuously argued that because section 15 excludes from the operation of the act medical officers in the service of the army or navy, or of the marine hospital, or medical examiners of relief departments of railroad companies while so employed, or persons actually serving as members of the resident medical staff of a legally incorporated hospital, or any lawfully qualified physicians and surgeons residing in other states or countries, meeting registered physicians of this state in consultation, or physicians or surgeons residing on the border of a neighboring state and duly authorized under the laws thereof to practice medicine and surgery therein, whose practice extends into the limits of this state, provided that they shall not open an office, or appoint a place 'to meet patients or receive calls within the limits of this state, it denies the defendant the equal protection of the laws. But this is a misconception of what is meant by the phrase “equal protection of the laws.” Under the authorities it is clear that
The exemption of commissioned medical officers, serving in the army or navy of the United States, or in the marine hospital, from the provisions of the act does not deprive the defendant of the equal protection of the laws as defined by these last two, and many other decisions. Whilst their burdens may not be the same as those of the defendant, neither are their privileges the same. The plain meaning of the language applying to them is that they need not pass an examination by the state’s board to secure a license in order to practice their profession within the comparatively narrow limits of their service. There is no language anywhere hi the act that authorizes them to enter upon the public practice of medicine, — on the contrary it is very plain that it was intended that they should not. The same limited privileges are given to medical examiners of relief departments of railroad companies and members of the resident staff of legally incorporated hospitals. They can exercise them only while employed or actually serving in their narrow sphere. There is nothing to indicate that they are allowed to practice in a way that competes with the defendant. He may have the public of the entire commonwealth as the sphere of his professional activity, whilst these excepted classes are confined to a much narrower, or more contracted field. So also are very limited privileges given to legally qualified physicians and sur
We are also well satisfied that this act does not conflict with that clause of section 7 of article 3 of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which forbids the passage of a law “ granting to any corporation or association, or individual, any special or exclusive privilege or immunity.” It does not grant privileges or immunities to any one. As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Lord, in State of Oregon v. Randolph, 23 Oregon, 74; 17 L. R. A. 470, “it only establishes a rule of evidence by which qualification to practice medicine and surgery is to be determined.” It operates alike upon all citizens of this state, and they are all permitted to comply with its provisions. So long as the qualifications are such as are described in the former part
Judgment affirmed.