235 Mass. 562 | Mass. | 1920
The defendant was indicted for the murder of Louis Fred Soulia at Billerica on October 31, 1918. Other indictments for the same offence were returned against Joseph Cordio and Luigi Feci. The indictments against Francisco Feci and Cordio were tried together. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree against the defendant Francisco Feci (who will hereafter be referred to as the defendant), and of not guilty against Cordio; Luigi Feci, the third defendant, having absconded and not having been apprehended, was not tried.
The evidence introduced by the Commonwealth tended to show that Soulia, the deceased, lived alone in a small house on a country road in a sparsely settled district, and was employed by the Boston and Maine Railroad in its scrap reclamation department; that near his house there was a path crossing a tract of land covered with scrub trees and undergrowth and leading past a swampy place to the main line tracks of the railroad, after crossing which a person could go to the car shops over land of the railroad corporation; that Soulia frequently used this path in going to and from his work; that Cordio owned a house not far from that of Soulia on the same road; that a path from near Cordio’s house joined the one above described; that for some time before the alleged murder, Cordio and the Fecis (the latter being brothers) had been employed by a contractor in making a culvert on land of the railroad corporation near the reclamation department; that during the time the defendants were working on the culvert there were thefts of brass journal boxes and other junk from the reclamation department; that on the morning of Tuesday, October 29, 1918, between six and seven o’clock, one Perkins, a junk dealer, went with Cordio, the defendant and another man, from Cordio’s house down the path joining the one leading to the railroad tracks, and down that to a side path which led to a hole dug
There was further evidence tending to show that the defendant killed the deceased; also, evidence that there were about twenty incised wounds or cuts on different parts of the body of the deceased of various sizes and depths, and nothing about them taken as a whole was consistent with their having been self-inflicted; that death was the result of all the wounds, — no one of them alone would have been immediately fatal; and that death was caused by loss of blood atid did not instantaneously follow any one wound.
1. The defendant excepted to the admission in evidence of the testimony of Brown (1) that he had a talk at the car shop with Soulia on the morning of October 29; (2) that in consequence of that talk he and Soulia went to the path and saw the defendant, and the brass in the hole, as previously described;- (3) that he (Brown) recognized on the brass castings certain identification marks showing that they were the property of the railroad corporation; and (4) that before that date brass junk had been wrongfully taken from the railroad corporation from time to time.
It was the contention of the Commonwealth that the deceased was murdered either for revenge because of his having revealed the hiding place of the stolen junk and the connection of the defendant and Cordio therewith, or for the purpose of removing a probable witness against them in the event of their being prosecuted for stealing the property or concealing it, or for both such reasons. When this evidence was offered, the district attorney stated in the presence and hearing of the jury that it was offered for the purpose of showing a motive for the crime on the part of the defendant.
Although motive is no part of the offence charged and the Com
The evidence that Brown had a conversation with the deceased, referred to a fact and was clearly competent; the conversation itself was neither asked for nor given, therefore the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence was not violated. Commonwealth v. Moulton, 4 Gray, 39. Sampson v. Sampson, 223 Mass. 451, 459. The evidence that in consequence of the conversation Brown and Soulia went to the path and saw the defendant and observed the brass in the hole, that Brown recognized the property as that of the railroad corporation, and that brass junk had been wrongfully taken therefrom at different times, all was competent and material as having a tendency to show that the brass so secreted was stolen property. A man is not to be convicted of a criminal offence by evidence that he has previously committed other crimes wholly disconnected with that for which he is placed on trial, and such evidence must be excluded; yet if it be shown that the defendant has committed other offences, the commission of which has a tendency to establish the fact in controversy, such evidence is plainly admissible. Commonwealth v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575. Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451, 458. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 199 Mass. 55, 59. Commonwealth v. Dow, 217 Mass. 473, 480. People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 476. Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 57. The defendant contends that there was nothing to show that the brass castings were stolen by him or that he received them knowing them to have been stolen, or that he had any knowledge that he was suspected of either offence. The evidence that the property had been stolen and concealed, that the defendant was seen in the vicinity of the place where it was hidden, of the attempt by him with others to sell it to Perkins, that when Brown and the deceased were in the vicinity where the property was hidden the defendant was seen and ran away when Brown
2. The record recites that the presiding judge instructed the jury fully as to the law upon the main issues presented, to which no exception was taken. The charge contained no reference to the alleged larceny of brass claimed to have been the property of the railroad corporation.
No exception to the charge in this respect.was saved; nor did the defendant at any time either before or after the charge make any request that the evidence referring to the larceny or concealment of the brass should be limited to the question of motive, and no exception is before us because of the omission to give such instruction.
In Commonwealth v. Hassan, 235 Mass. 26, it was said: “It is obviously reasonable that requests for instructions,. if they are to be an aid in the administration of justice in the trial both of criminal and civil cases, ought to be presented before the arguments. . . . The assumption may be indulged that the salient points of the case will be adequately covered by the charge: but if at its close, substantial omissions or errors are observed, the attention of the judge may be drawn to them, and upon refusal or neglect to give correct and adequate instructions upon important factors in the case, the right to exceptions thus adequately protects the rights of parties. Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334.”
The general rule that requests for instructions or for rulings in trials, both in criminal and civil cases, shall be made in writing before the closing arguments is well established, and has long been in force in this Commonwealth independent of any formal rule to that effect. It is equally well settled that to entitle a party to object to an error or omission in the charge of the presiding judge such objection shall be based on an exception for failure to give a request seasonably made, or upon failure to correct such omission or error upon request made at the conclusion of the charge.1 This cardinal rule applies with equal force in civil arid criminal proceedings and is deemed to be the safest method of determining
In Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, at pages 222 and 223, the rule is thus stated: "It is the duty of the judge to give such instructions to the jury in matters of law, as in his judgment may be best calculated to aid and assist them in forming their verdict. But he is not bound to give instructions, upon any particular questions, unless his attention is called to them, and they are particularly requested, in which case, if pertinent, instructions will be given, and if the judge thinks proper, he will reserve the question of their correctness.” Howe v. Ray, 113 Mass. 88.
In Commonwealth v. Wunsch, 129 Mass. 477, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant alleged exceptions, contending that, while certain evidence admitted at the trial was competent for a certain purpose, it was incompetent for other purposes; and it was held that as the evidence was competent for some purposes, the defendant not having asked for instructions limiting its effect, no ground of exception was shown.
In Higlister v. French, 180 Mass. 299, the action was for malicious prosecution and slander. Certain evidence was admitted to show that the complaint on which the plaintiff was prosecuted was instituted by the defendant out of motives of revenge; the latter contended that the evidence should have been limited and that not having been so limited she was prejudiced; and it was held that if the defendant had any fears that the evidence would be so used, she should have requested the court to instruct the jury as to the purpose for which the evidence was competent.
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Rivet, supra, was convicted of murder in the first degree. The Commonwealth offered evidence to show that the motive of the defendant in the commission of the crime was his intention to collect the amount of a policy of insurance on the life of the deceased, pledged to the
In Commonwealth v. Terregno, 234 Mass. 56, the defendant was' convicted of murder in the first degree. He was prosecuted-with one Maria Cammerota, wife of the deceased; she was convicted of manslaughter. Her counsel in Ms closing argument to the jury referred to Terregno in terms wMch might have been found to have been prejudicial to him, and although Ms counsel objected to tMs portion of the argument, he did not save any exception thereto; it was held that as no exception was taken, the question was not presented by the record.
In Commonwealth v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575, the defendant was charged with embezzlement, and evidence of an earlier like offence committed by him was admitted for the purpose of proving a guilty intent in the commission of the previous act. After a verdict of guilty, the presiding judge reported the case to tMs court (Gen. Sts. c. 173, § 8) for the determmation of the question whether the evidence introduced was sufficient to authorize the verdict. The failure to limit the evidence as to its legitimate effect by instructions to the jury was held to be sufficient ground for a new trial. The report so made to this court presented only questions' of law. Commonwealth v. Brynes, 126 Mass. 248. Electric Welding Co. Ltd. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 391, 392. The report showed that no specific instructions were given respecting the purpose for wMch the evidence above referred to was admitted; in these circumstances the question whether such instructions should have been given was properly before the court to the same extent as if it had been raised by exception to the refusal of the trial judge to give the instructions. It is plain that the decision in that case does not support the defendant’s contention. Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra, cited by the defendant, is plainly distinguishable from the case at bar.
While in some jurisdictions it is held to be reversible error for the presiding judge m a criminal case, even if not requested and although no exceptions are taken, to fail fully to instruct the
3. At the close of the charge the defendant excepted to so much of the instructions as allowed the jury to find a verdict of murder in the first degree on the ground that it was committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty. R. L. c. 207, § 1. If, as the jury were warranted in finding upon the direct and circumstantial evidence the defendant either alone or assisted by others killed the deceased by stabbing and wounding him in many parts of his body, and by shooting him, it could not be ruled that the crime was not committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty; manifestly it was a question of fact properly left to the jury upon full and adequate instructions to determine whether the deceased was killed by the defendant, and if they so found, whether the crime was committed with such savagery and brutality as to constitute murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty. Commonwealth v. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1. Commonwealth v. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253.
4. At the close of the charge the defendant’s counsel stated: “I would like to ask the court to suggest to the jury that there is a third person in this case, who had planned this, and that the defendant Feci said that as soon as he heard the shots he ran away; therefore he couldn’t be charged with the crime of murder, and a verdict of guilty in the first degree couldn’t be brought in against him.” If this is to be treated as a request for a ruling of law, it is plain that it could not properly have.been given; there was no evidence as to the person who planned the murder, and while the defendant had said that he ran away as soon as he heard the shots fired, the jury were not obliged to believe this testimony; accordingly they could not properly have been instructed that the defendant could not be found guilty of murder in the first degree. If the request is to be considered as a request to call attention to the evidence referred to, no exception lies, as the judge was not required to refer to fragmentary parts of the evidence; the case was for the jury on all the evidence. Jaquith v. Rogers, 179 Mass. 192, 197. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382, 387.
Exceptions overruled.