COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Leroy FEARS, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Nov. 20, 2003.
Reargument Denied Feb. 19, 2004.
836 A.2d 52
Argued March 3, 2003.
Rebecca Denean Spangler, Pittsburgh, Amy Zapp, Harrisburg, for the Com. of PA, Appellee.
Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice CAPPY.
This is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of death following the convictions of Appellant Leroy Fears for
The record, developed at the suppression hearing, guilty plea proceeding and sentencing hearing, reveals that, on June 18, 1994, twelve-year-old Shawn Hagan and thirteen-year-old James Naughton met with other teenagers and Appellant, age thirty-two, at a fishing hole on the Monongahela River. The day before, Appellant had paid Naughton to bring a bottle of his parent‘s vodka from his home. Appellant and the boys spent the day drinking, swimming and fishing. Appellant, Hagan and Naughton eventually separated from the other boys and continued to fish farther down the river. When it began to get dark, Naughton left the area and Hagan continued to swim.
Upon coming to shore, Hagan removed his outer shorts to hang dry. Hagan sat down next to Appellant at which time Hagan‘s arm brushed Appellant. Appellant became aroused, told Hagan to stand, pulled Hagan‘s boxer shorts down, and performed oral sex on him. Appellant then asked Hagan what he was going to do about the incident. Hagan responded that he was going to tell his parents that Appellant had kidnapped him. Appellant then pushed Hagan to the ground, sat on top of him, and choked him for approximately five minutes. When Hagan stopped moving, Appellant removed his hands from Hagan‘s throat. Once Hagan started to revive and cough, Appellant choked him a second time for approximately ten minutes until Appellant was satisfied that Hagan was no longer alive. Appellant then rolled Hagan on to his stomach. Appellant again became aroused and performed anal sex on him. Appellant then placed Hagan‘s body in the river and kept watch for approximately twenty minutes. Appellant
On June 19, 1994, the City of Pittsburgh Police began an investigation into the disappearance of Hagan. They encountered Appellant while searching the area where Hagan had last been seen. Appellant offered to help the police and advised them that he was the last person to have seen Hagan. Appellant also told the officers that he was concerned that neighbors may suspect him in the disappearance because of a prior sexual contact he had with a young boy. After spending several hours with detectives, Appellant voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the Pittsburgh Police Detective Bureau.
In his initial statement, Appellant discussed fishing with Hagan, but did not admit to any criminal activity. As this was occurring, the police learned from another source that Appellant had paid Naughton to provide him with alcohol. Appellant overheard other officers discussing this information, and blurted out that he had given the boy money for vodka, but denied making the boys drink it. The detectives advised Appellant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and presented him with a pre-interrogation warning form. Appellant responded that he was willing to provide the police with a written statement, but that he would no longer speak with the officers. All questioning ceased. The police charged Appellant with corruption of minors and incarcerated him on that charge.
The following day, police discovered a boy‘s body in the Monongahela River, which was later identified as that of Shawn Hagan. The detectives sought to question Appellant and he exhibited a willingness to speak to them. Appellant was then transported from the Allegheny County Jail to the Pittsburgh Police Station and completed a pre-interrogation written waiver form. Appellant was orally advised of his Miranda rights, and executed another pre-interrogation written waiver form. When the detectives advised Appellant that they had discovered Hagan‘s body and could link him to his
Appellant was thereafter charged with criminal homicide, corruption of minors, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) and abuse of a corpse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress his video-taped statement on the ground that it was involuntarily made. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court found that the video confession was given after at least two occasions where Appellant was Mirandized and waived his rights in written form and on tape. Notes of Testimony, Suppression Hearing, December 8, 1994, at 51. It further found that there were no promises made to Appellant and therefore the confession was completely voluntary. Id. at 52.
The court denied suppression and, on December 8, 1994, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder as well as to the remaining charges. He also noted his desire to proceed to sentencing without a jury. Following a colloquy that took place that same day, the trial court accepted Appellant‘s plea. The penalty proceeding was delayed so that a psychological evaluation of Appellant could be conducted.
A penalty hearing was conducted before the court on February 2, 1995. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstance of a killing committed while in perpetration of a felony,
On January 12, 1996, Appellant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, wherein he alleged the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. On April 16, 1999, the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting certification of the death sentence for appellate review, which the court granted. On April 21, 1999, Appellant filed a reply wherein he requested that his appellate rights be reinstated. The trial court vacated its April 19, 1999 order certifying the case for appellate review and reinstated Appellant‘s appellate rights. Counsel was subsequently appointed. On June 4, 1999, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and thereafter requested an evidentiary hearing on the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings were conducted and the trial court denied relief. A concise statement of matters complained of on appeal was filed on September 12, 2001, and the trial court opinion was issued on June 4, 2002. This appeal follows.
As in all cases where the death penalty has been imposed, we first must conduct an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983), reh‘g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Ockenhouse, 562 Pa. 481, 756 A.2d 1130, 1135 (2000). This standard is applicable in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, as long as the evidence implicates the accused in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.
We now proceed to address the claims raised by Appellant on appeal. Initially, we note that some of Appellant‘s claims allege ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court recently abrogated the procedural rule requiring new counsel to raise claims of previous counsel‘s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity when new counsel was appointed. Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002). In Grant, we announced a new general rule providing that a defendant “should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.” 813 A.2d at 738. Our decision was based on the fact that claims of ineffectiveness were not suited for direct appeal due to the lack of a trial court opinion addressing the issues as well as the lack of an evidentiary record upon which the appellate court could review the claims. We held that the new rule applies retroactively to “any other cases on direct appeal where the issue of ineffectiveness was properly raised and preserved.” Id.
In Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 2003 Pa. Lexis 920 (2003), however, we held that where the concerns that arose in Grant did not exist, i.e., where there was a trial court opinion addressing the claims of ineffective assistance and there was an adequate record devoted to the ineffectiveness claims, our court would proceed to consider the
To prevail on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, the appellant must overcome the presumption of competence by showing that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel‘s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa.186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001). Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused Appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. Allen, 557 Pa. 135, 732 A.2d 582, 587 (1999).
Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his confession on the grounds that it violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as articulated by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). He argues that his right to counsel pursuant to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated at the time the police questioned him following his arrest on the criminal homicide charge. He contends that his right attached the previous day when he was arrested and interrogated on the corruption of minors charge and that it precluded the police from subsequently interrogating him on the criminal homicide charge. Appellant concludes that trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness in this regard rendered his plea to first degree murder unknowing
In Edwards, the defendant was arrested and questioned by police after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).8 Questioning ceased when the defendant stated that he wanted an attorney. The next day, while incarcerated, police officers again informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant ultimately agreed to speak with the officers. He thereafter implicated himself in the murder. The defendant moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court denied suppression and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the use of the defendant‘s confession against him at trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, as declared in Miranda. It held that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Id. at 484. It further held that an accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the police. Id. The Court emphasized that it is inconsistent with Miranda to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.
Appellant then stated, “I don‘t want to say anything out loud anymore, but I am willing to keep writing.” Id. at 42. At no time did Appellant ask for an attorney. Id. To invoke the right to counsel, “at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by police” is required. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 755 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa.Super.2000), quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). Appellant clearly did not convey a desire for counsel, but only declined to continue providing an oral statement. He continued to provide police a written statement. Thus, the interrogation that occurred the following day on June 21, 1994, which concerned the criminal homicide, did not violate Appellant‘s Fifth Amendment rights under Edwards. The confession resulting from the interrogation was therefore not constitutionally infirm and the subsequent guilty plea to first degree murder cannot be found to be invalid on this ground. As the
Appellant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting him to plead guilty to first degree murder, thereby making himself eligible for the death sentence, without requiring the Commonwealth to establish his degree of guilt. He cites several cases which expressly state that an accused may not plead guilty to murder of the first degree. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 547 Pa. 171, 689 A.2d 891, 895 n. 3 (1997); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699, 701 (1966); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317, 319 (1947); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823, 825 (1935); Commonwealth v. Berkenbush, 267 Pa. 455, 110 A. 263, 265 (1920). Appellant argues that the prohibition against pleading guilty to first degree murder is based upon the Due Process Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides, inter alia, that a person cannot be deprived of liberty, “unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”
Contrary to Appellant‘s assertions, the case law upon which he relies does not preclude the acceptance of such a plea on constitutional grounds. Rather, each case cited above discusses the presumptions in the burdens of proof in a murder case and notes that it is the Commonwealth‘s burden to demonstrate that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill required for a conviction of first degree murder. Although the cases state in dicta that one cannot plead guilty to first degree murder, they do not hold that the acceptance of a guilty plea to first degree murder violates due process as guaranteed by
The issue of whether a trial court violates due process by accepting a guilty plea to first degree murder appears to be one of first impression. We have held that the due process inquiry, in its most general form, entails an assessment as to whether the challenged proceeding or conduct offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, and that defines the community‘s sense of fair play and decency. Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36, 764 A.2d 20, 27 (2001).
We hold that the community‘s sense of fair play and decency is not offended by the trial court‘s acceptance of a guilty plea to first degree murder as long as it is determined that the plea is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. Safeguards exist to protect against an arbitrary imposition of the death sentence. For example, our Court conducts an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence in every capital case. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982). This review is in conjunction with our statutory obligation under
Moreover, although the present issue was not raised, this Court has affirmed the judgment of sentence in cases where guilty pleas to first degree murder were entered and accepted by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Fiebiger, 570 Pa. 583, 810 A.2d 1233, 1239 (2002) (“As Appellant‘s guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, with Appellant acknowledging that he committed each element of first degree murder, we do not find that the conviction was the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor [under
Permitting a defendant to plead guilty to first degree murder is also consistent with our death penalty statute, which contemplates the acceptance of a guilty plea to that specific offense.
Procedure in nonjury trials and guilty pleas.—If the defendant has waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the Commonwealth, in which case the trial judge shall hear the evidence and determine the penalty in the
same manner as would a jury as provided in subsection (a) [Procedure in jury trials.].
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure do not preclude the acceptance of a guilty plea to first degree murder. Chapter 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is entitled, “Special Rules for Cases In Which Death Sentence is Authorized.” Rule 802 states:
Rule 802. Guilty Plea Procedure
(A) When a defendant charged with murder enters a plea of guilty to a charge of murder generally, the judge before whom the plea is entered shall alone determine the degree of guilt.
(B) If the crime is determined to be murder of the first degree the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted as provided by law.
In a related claim, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty to first degree murder because such plea is prohibited. As we reject Appellant‘s argument that one may not plead guilty to first degree murder, we likewise reject the ineffectiveness claim arising from this issue.
Appellant, however, raises a separate ground of ineffectiveness arising from counsel‘s failure to advise Appellant of the option of proceeding to a degree of guilt hearing. Appellant asserts that trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was unaware of the possibility of proceeding to a degree of guilt hearing and therefore counsel could not have advised him of that alternative. He contends that such
Having determined that Appellant‘s plea to first degree murder was not per se invalid, we proceed to examine whether it was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. This determination is intertwined with the resolution of Appellant‘s next claim, which challenges the guilty plea colloquy as deficient on several grounds. Appellant reiterates that the colloquy failed to inform him of his right to a degree of guilt hearing, the elements of first degree murder, and an adequate definition of malice as is required under Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974). He further contends that the standard guilty plea form was used and completed without counsel present and that no effort was made to alter that form to explain the unique aspects of a capital case. Specifically, he asserts that he was not informed that he could be tried at the guilt phase by a jury and then proceed to the sentencing phase before a judge, that he could life-qualify the jury, that he had the right to individual voir dire, and that a capital defendant has twenty preemptory challenges.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant‘s plea, we hold that the record supports the trial court‘s finding of a sufficient colloquy and a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea to first degree murder. The record reflects that at the colloquy, Appellant indicated his desire to plead guilty to the specific offense of first degree murder. Suppression/Guilty Plea Transcript at 57. Trial counsel informed the court that he had discussed with Appellant how the Commonwealth‘s evidence was sufficient to justify a verdict of murder of the first degree, i.e., that Appellant‘s audio-taped confession stating that he choked the victim a second time until he was certain that the boy was dead was sufficient for a jury to find that he had acted with the specific intent to kill the victim. Suppression/Guilty Plea Transcript at 58. The court advised Appellant that by pleading guilty to first degree murder, he was pleading guilty to “the intentional, premeditated killing with malice aforethought to the victim in this case, Shawn Hagan.” Suppression/Guilty Plea Transcript at 57.12 The court specifically inquired as to whether Appellant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties on the related charges and Appellant responded in
The trial court also incorporated the ten-page standard guilty plea form into the oral colloquy. The written waiver form explained, inter alia, the constitutional right to a jury trial, the concept of peremptory and “for cause” challenges to jurors, the fact that the Commonwealth was required to prove each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the definition of reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, the rights foregone by pleading guilty, and appellant‘s post-trial and appellate rights. The written form was completed, initialed on each page, and signed by Appellant. Trial counsel explained that, although he was not present when Appellant completed the form, he had previously advised Appellant of what the form entailed and asked him to read it and answer the questions. Suppression/Guilty Plea Transcript at 70. Trial counsel further stated that he was available to Appellant and Appellant did not indicate that he had any questions about the form. Suppression/Guilty Plea Transcript at 70. Thus, the colloquy demonstrated that Appellant was aware of the factual basis for the plea and that he understood the nature of the charges to which he was pleading.13
Appellant next contends that it was error for the trial court to accept Appellant‘s guilty plea to the first count of IDSI, which was based upon the oral sodomy that preceded the strangulation of the victim.14 He asserts three separate grounds upon which to find the plea invalid. Appellant first argues that there was no factual basis for the plea because there was no evidence of forcible compulsion. See
This claim fails because the element of forcible compulsion was clearly established. In Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986), a twenty-year-old defendant lured an eight-year-old girl into an abandoned building and instructed her to lie down, whereupon he performed sexual acts upon her. The Superior Court reversed the defendant‘s rape conviction under
There is an element of forcible compulsion, or the threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution, inherent in the situation in which an adult who is with a child who is younger, smaller, less psychologically and emotionally mature, and less sophisticated than the adult, instructs the child to submit to the performance of sexual acts. This is especially so where the child knows and trusts the adult. In such cases, forcible compulsion or the threat of forcible compulsion derives from the respective capacities of the child and the adult sufficient to induce the child to submit to the wishes of the adult (“prevent resistance“), without the use of physical force or violence or the explicit threat of physical force or violence.
The same is true in the instant case. Here Appellant, age thirty-two, stated in his confession that he told the twelve-year-old victim “to stand up and [Appellant] pulled down his underwear and started to have oral sex with him.” Suppression Hearing/Guilty Plea Transcript at 78-79. When this occurred, it was dusk and Appellant and the victim were in a
Appellant‘s next ground for invalidating the plea to the first count of IDSI is based upon the corpus delicti rule. Under the corpus delicti rule, extrajudicial statements of the accused may not be admitted into evidence unless corroborated by independent evidence that the crime actually occurred. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 545 Pa. 361, 681 A.2d 717, 720 (1996). The purpose of the rule is to prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession where no crime has in fact been committed. Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940). Appellant argues that there is no independent physical, eyewitness, or other evidence to establish the sodomy and therefore the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea to IDSI.
Although we agree that there is no independent evidence of the oral sodomy, we find that the confession could have been used to establish those offenses under the exception to the corpus delicti rule, commonly referred to as the closely related crime exception. This Court adopted the closely related crime exception in McMullen, supra. We stated that
where a defendant‘s confession relates to two separate crimes with which he is charged, and where independent evidence establishes the corpus delicti of only one of those crimes, the confession may be admissible as evidence of the commission of the other crime. This will be the case only where the relationship between the two crimes is sufficiently close to ensure that the policies underlying the corpus delicti rule are not violated.
Id. at 723 (citations omitted).
The facts of the instant case fall under the closely related crime exception to the corpus delicti rule. Appellant committed the sexual assault and the murder of the child within minutes and the purpose of the murder was to conceal the sexual assault. Therefore the relationship between the
Our conclusion is consistent with the approach taken in Commonwealth v. Bardo, 551 Pa. 140, 709 A.2d 871 (1998). In Bardo, the defendant confessed that he strangled his three-year-old niece to death while he was sexually molesting her. He was charged with first degree murder and aggravated indecent assault. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the body of the victim was found in a plastic bag in a creek and that the victim died from unnatural causes. The Commonwealth did not present independent evidence of aggravated indecent assault before introducing the defendant‘s confession. We held that the confession was admissible as to both crimes because “the relationship between the two crimes is close and the policy underlying the corpus delicti rule has not been violated.” Id. at 874.16
Appellant‘s final ground for invalidating his plea to the first count of IDSI is on the basis that the guilty plea colloquy was inadequate because it did not sufficiently define the nature and elements of the offense. He contends that the trial court failed to give understandable definitions of “forcible compulsion,” “per os” and “deviate sexual intercourse.” He concludes that he therefore did not enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea to that offense. Appellant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the inadequate colloquy.
As noted, to determine a defendant‘s actual knowledge of the implications and rights associated with a guilty
You are also charged at CC Number 9409095 with two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and abuse of corpse. It‘s alleged that on June 18th of 1994 in Allegheny County at Count 1, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, that you did engage in deviate sexual intercourse per os or per anus with Shawn Hagan, age 12, who was not your spouse, by forcible compulsion or by threat of forcible compulsion.
You‘re charged at Count 2 with engaging in deviate sexual intercourse per os or per anus with Shawn Hagan, age 12, not your spouse, by forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion.
You are charged at Count 3, abuse of corpse. That is that you, without authorization of law, treated the corpse of Shawn Hagan, age 12, in a way that said actor knew would outrage ordinary family sensibilities. As to the penalties, the deviate sexual intercourse, that is per mouth or per anus as charged at counts 1 and 2, they‘re felonies of the first degree. They are punishable each separately by a maximum penalty of 10 to 20 years in jail and/or a $25,000 time [sic]. I emphasize both separately, and the third count, abuse of corpse, is punishable in that it is a misdemeanor of the second degree, is punishable by up to two years in jail, one to two years in jail and/or a $5,000 fine.
Sir, do you understand the nature of the charges and the possible penalties on these related charges?
APPELLANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
Suppression Hearing/Guilty Plea Transcript at 60-62.
Following the colloquy, the prosecutor gave a detailed summary of the facts which included those supporting the first count of IDSI, i.e., that while at a secluded area on the
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea to the second count of IDSI, based upon the anal sodomy that occurred after the strangulation. He argues that, at the time of the offense, one could not engage in deviate sexual intercourse with a corpse. See Commonwealth v. Sudler, 496 Pa. 295, 436 A.2d 1376 (1981) (penetration after a victim‘s death is not within the definition of the “forcible compulsion” subsection of the rape statute; the proper offense under such circumstances is abuse of corpse); see also Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833, 847 (1985) (crimes of rape and indecent assault can only arise against living persons).17 He also contends that the conviction fatally infected the penalty phase where the only aggravating circumstance was that the killing was committed while in the perpetration of a felony. Appellant maintains that the evidence was therefore insufficient to sustain the only aggravating circumstance and that therefore counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant to enter the plea.
We agree. Because the plea to the first count of IDSI was properly accepted by the trial court and was supported by sufficient evidence, any error in accepting the plea to the second count of IDSI, for which no sentence was imposed, did not cause prejudice to Appellant. Had the invalid plea supported a separate aggravating circumstance, the process of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been offset. That is not the case here. The invalidation of the guilty plea to the second count of IDSI did not invalidate the only aggravating circumstance found, i.e., the commission of the killing during the perpetration of a felony. As Appellant was not prejudiced by the entrance of his plea, his related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advising him to plead guilty to the second count of IDSI also fails.
Having concluded that there are no reversible errors relating to the guilt phase, we now proceed to address Appellant‘s remaining penalty phase issues. Appellant first contends that
Under Pennsylvania law, a capital defendant tried without a jury in the guilt phase retains the right to a jury in the penalty phase of the trial unless he specifically waives that right without objection by the Commonwealth.
Before a voluntary waiver may be accepted as knowing and intelligent, the on-record colloquy must show that the defendant fully comprehended the significance of the right being waived and must indicate that, at a minimum, the defendant knew the essential protections inherent in a jury trial as well as the consequences attendant upon a relinquishment of those safeguards.
Commonwealth v. O‘Donnell, 740 A.2d at 212.
While we did not provide a mechanical listing of what must be included in a colloquy regarding a capital defendant‘s waiver to a penalty-phase jury, we held in O‘Donnell that it was clear that the colloquy must be an on-record dialogue, which is calculated to insure the defendant comprehends the nature and significance of the right being waived. Id. at 213. At the very least, we held that the defendant should be asked if he understands that he has the right to be sentenced by a penalty-phase jury, whether any waiver to that right has been based on promises or coercion and if he understands that under Pennsylvania law a penalty-phase jury must render a unanimous verdict. Id.
Moreover, contrary to his assertions, Appellant was informed of the Mills protections. Trial counsel stated at the colloquy, “[t]hat any single juror who might not agree with the majority would cause that—cause the Court to have to impose a sentence of life.” Sentencing Hearing at 9. Trial counsel further expressly testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had discussed with Appellant the function of a jury in a penalty proceeding and the fact that the jury need not be unanimous in finding a mitigating factor. Evidentiary Hearing at 147-148. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting Appellant to waive his right to a sentencing jury and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a sufficient colloquy.
Appellant next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an independent investigation into mitigation evidence, for failing to present a defense psychiatric expert and instead relying on a pre-sentence report prepared by a county probation officer that contained information prejudicial to Appellant.19
In evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a sufficient investigation into mitigation evidence, the applicable standard is as follows:
Counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations or to make reasonable decisions that render particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Where counsel has made a strategic decision after a thorough investigation of the law and facts, it is virtually
unchallengeable; strategic choices made following a less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supports the limitation of the investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. As noted, an evaluation of counsel‘s performance is highly deferential, and the reasonableness of counsel‘s decisions cannot be based upon the distorting effects of hindsight. See id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Furthermore, reasonableness in this context depends, in critical part, upon the information supplied by the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 319, 513 A.2d 373, 383 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987). Thus, assuming a reasonable investigation, where there is no notice to counsel of particular mitigating evidence, he cannot be held ineffective for failing to pursue it. See Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 276, 719 A.2d 233, 238 (1998).
Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (2000).
Before considering the alleged deficiencies in trial counsel‘s investigation and introduction of mitigation evidence, we review the investigation he conducted and the mitigating evidence trial counsel presented. Initially, we note that trial counsel spoke with Appellant numerous times over the six-month period between arrest and trial and decided that entering guilty pleas to the offenses charged would establish mitigation by showing remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Evidentiary Hearing at 157. Trial counsel also obtained a letter from a former roommate of Appellant‘s who lived in Japan. Appellant was required to contact the friend through the United States Consulate and have the letter notarized by a consular officer. The letter addressed the nature of his six-year relationship with Appellant and the assistance Appellant provided the friend in obtaining his graduate degree. Trial counsel also sought to provide mitigation evidence from the pre-sentence report.
Appellant contends that such investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence was insufficient. According to Appellant, an adequate investigation would have revealed that: Appellant was prematurely born to a twelve-year old girl and suffered from cardiac arrest within one hour of his birth, causing severe lack of oxygen to his brain; Appellant was
As this claim appears to be of arguable merit, we must examine whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his performance. We reiterate that reasonableness in this context depends, in critical part, upon the information supplied by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d at 735. As noted, trial counsel testified that Appellant displayed no overt psychotic behavior between the time of the arrest and trial.22 Appellant also did not inform trial counsel of any
Appellant‘s final claim is that he was constructively denied counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution based upon the cumulative errors of trial
Finally, pursuant to
Accordingly, we affirm the verdict and sentence of death.24
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion.
Justice SAYLOR concurring.
I have no objection to the Court moving toward sanctioning a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty to the offense of first-degree murder, as a number of other jurisdictions permit. I also agree with the majority that the procedural irregularity involved in the common pleas courts acceptance of Appellants first-degree-murder plea, despite this Courts then-prevailing proscription against such pleas, does
I also disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for relying on the pre-sentence report prepared by the Allegheny County probation office and the associated evaluation of Dr. Christine Martone, the chief psychiatrist of the Allegheny County Behavior Clinic, in lieu of an independent investigation into mitigation evidence. See Commonwealth v. Meadows, 567 Pa. 344, 368, 787 A.2d 312, 326 (2001) (Saylor, J., concurring) (collecting cases and observ-
Ultimately, however, I agree with the majority that Appellant failed to establish the requisite prejudice, as the trial judge (who was himself the factfinder at the penalty hearing by virtue of Appellants jury waiver) considered Appellants mental health evidence at the post-sentence hearing and concluded that, had it been offered into evidence in the penalty proceeding, it nonetheless would not have affected the outcome.
I also join the majority in the balance of its reasoning and decision.