Commonwealth v. FallonCommonwealth v. Fallon
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Armstrong
The defendant appealed from an order entered February 22, 1999, revoking his probation on a previously suspended six-month sentence to a house of correction. The sentence had been imposed following his guilty pleas to charges of operating while under the influence of liquor (OUI), second offense, operating when his license to drive was under suspension, and failing to stop for the police. The sentence was imposed on the OUI conviction (the other charges were filed) on Octobеr 22, 1998; but it was suspended, and the defendant put on probation, until October 28, 2000.
During that рrobationary period, on February 10, 1999, the defendant was arraigned on two new offenses, assault and bat
The defendant questions in three respects the procedurаl regularity of the revocation proceedings.1 We shall not reach those contentions because we are in accord with the Commоnwealth’s view that the appeal is now moot. The six-month sentence, rеimposed upon revocation, see Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224, 228 (1995), was not stayed, either in the Distriсt Court or here. As a result, the sentence was served and the defendant wаs discharged well before the appeal was briefed.
In. several suсh cases in recent years — that is, cases in which the defendant’s probation was revoked and his appeal from the revocation order was not heard before completion of the sentence — we have determined that we should consider the appeal, citing the pоssible collateral consequences that might later stem from the revоcation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 614-615 (1987); Commonwealth v. Smith, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 324, 325 n.1 (1995); Commonwealth v. Christian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479-480, S.C., 428 Mass. 1022 (1999); Commonwealth v. Streeter, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 128, 130-131 (2000). Those decisions were based on a recognition that the “revocation in itself implies a failure of the [defendant] to satisfy the obligations of conditional liberty,”
In this case, however, we take judicial notice, see Hotchkiss v. State Racing Commn., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 684, 686 n.1 (1998), of the fаct that the defendant was convicted of the new charges on which the revocation order was based. The convictions establish, as mattеr of record, based on the higher, beyond a reasonable doubt standаrd of proof, see Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass, at 225-227, that the defendant, while on probation, viоlated the conditions of his freedom by committing new criminal offenses. That fаct submerges any residual negative consequences of the probation revocation, so that questions concerning the validity of the revocation are now purely academic. See Gross v. Bishop, 377 F.2d 492, 494 (8th Cir. 1967).
The appeal is therefore dismissed, not on the merits, but because it has become moot.
So ordered.
Notes
The contentions are (1) that permitting an assistant district attorney to conduct the hearing for the probation department impermissibly violates separation of powers principles, see Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 22-23 (1998), and Commonwealth v. Tate, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 447-448 (1993); (2) that the judge employed an incorrect probable cause standard of proоf, see Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224, 226 (1995) (requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence); and (3) that the judge failed to make findings of fact or otherwise state reasons for revocation, see Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 113 (1990).