Commonwealth v. FailorCommonwealth v. Failor
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- Before:
- Nigro
We granted allowance of appeal in these consolidated cases to consider whether the Superior Court erred in finding that Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
The undisputed facts and procedural history of the instant cases are as follows: On October 30, 1997, a state trooper stopped Appellant Scott Alan Failor on Pennsylvania State Route 174 and issued him a speeding citation. The speeding citation was filed in District Justice Susan Day’s office. On December 1, 1997, the trooper received a certified copy of Failor’s driving record from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”). After seeing a notation on Failor’s driving record that Failor’s license had been under suspension on October 30, 1997, the trooper issued Failor a DUS citation. The DUS citation was filed in District Justice Day’s office on December 3, 1997. On December 12, 1997, Failor appeared before District Justice Day and pled guilty to speeding. Failor subsequently appeared before District Justice Day a second time and pled guilty to DUS.
On November 9, 1997, a state trooper stopped Appellant Keith A. Blosser for speeding on Pennsylvania State Route 34. As a result of a routine radio check with PennDOT to verify Blosser’s driving status, the trooper learned that Blosser’s license was suspended. The trooper immediately issued Blosser a speeding citation and a separate DUS citation. Both citations were filed in District Justice Day’s office. On December 2,1997, Blosser pled guilty to speeding. After accepting Blosser’s guilty plea, District Justice Day appointed an attorney to represent Blosser for the DUS charge. On January 28, 1998, following a trial before District Justice Day, Blosser was convicted of the DUS charge.
Both Appellants Failor and Blosser appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County and moved to dismiss their DUS charges, alleging that the Commonwealth’s prosecution of them for DUS following their speeding convictions violated federal and state constitutional double jeopardy provisions as well as
Under
In both of the instant cases, all four prongs of
Furthermore, contrary to the lower courts, we do not find that by pleading guilty to their speeding charges, Appellants waived their statutory right to have both their speeding and DUS charges brought in a single prosecution. In addressing the waiver issue below, the Superior Court stated that “if a defendant knowingly acquiesces in what appears to be an advantageous separation of charges, he cannot later raise an objection claiming the statutory protection from multiple trials.” Commonwealth v. Failor, 1999 PA Super 128, 734 A.2d 400, 403 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Carelli, 291 Pa.Super. 502, 507, 436 A.2d 228, 231 (1981)). In Carelli, the court found that a defendant waives his right to contest multiple prosecutions where the defendant’s silence misleads the court and the Commonwealth into believing that the defendant has consented to multiple prosecutions for charges arising out of one incident. 291 PaSuper at 508, 436 A.2d at 230.
This Court, however, has rendered a number of decisions that countenance against waiver unless the defendant has taken some sort of affirmative action to separate the prosecutions pending against him.
See Commonwealth v. Stewart,
493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Muffley,
493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Holmes,
480 Pa. 536, 391 A.2d 1015 (1978). These cases strongly suggest that the burden to protect a defendant from vexatious litigation and to conserve judicial resources rests squarely on the shoulders of the Commonwealth, and thus, it is the Commonwealth’s burden, rather than the defendant’s, to move for consolidated trials.
See Stewart,
493 Pa. at 30-32, 425 A.2d at 349-50;
Muffley,
493 Pa. at 34-35, 425 A.2d at 352;
Holmes,
480 Pa. at 541-12, 391 A.2d at 1018. In
Stewart,
the Commonwealth argued that the defendant should have the burden of moving for consolidated trials where multiple charges arise from a single criminal episode. This Court, however, made it clear that based upon the sound policies behind
Yet to place this burden on the defendant would be to ignore the duty of the Commonwealth to advance the societal interests underlyingsection 110 . “Compulsory joinder of all offenses arising from a single ‘transaction’ avoids piecemeal litigation and thus conserves precious judicial and professional manpower was well as the time of jurors, witnesses, and the use of public resources.” Commonwealth v. Campana (I), 452 Pa. at 252, 304 A.2d at 441.
(1) Both the need for protection of the accused from governmental harassment and the need for judicial economy-mandate prosecutorial consolidations of the charges in appellant’s case.
Stewart, 493 Pa. at 29, 425 A.2d at 349 (emphasis added).
Additionally, in
Stewart,
this Court indicated that a defendant should be said to have waived his right to a single trial only when he affirmatively acts to separate the prosecution of charges pending against him. As an example, we noted that if a defendant opposes the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate charges, the defendant
While Stewart arose in the context of an initial information being filed, a subsequent guilty plea, and a second information being filed, the language utilized by the Stewart Court clearly transcends the specific facts of that case. The Court spoke to the broader principles of placing the burden of joinder on the Commonwealth and finding waiver only in those instances where the defendant affirmatively acts to separate the prosecutions pending against him. 493 Pa. at 30 31, 425 A.2d at 349-50.
In the instant cases, Appellants did not take any affirmative actions to either separate their trials or to oppose consolidation. Rather, the Commonwealth brought the successive prosecutions against Appellants. In light of the policy reasons underlying
Accordingly, we reverse the orders of the Superior Court and vacate Appellants’ convictions for driving with a suspended license.
CASTILLE, Justice and NEWMAN, Justice, dissent.
Notes
.
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charges of such offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
.
.
. The trial court conducts a
de novo
review of appeals from convictions for summary offenses.
. The trial court found that because speeding and DUS are separate offenses, each requiring proof of an element not contained in the other, Appellants were not subject to double jeopardy as a result of their separate prosecutions for each charge. In light of our disposition of Appellants’