Opinion by
Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen goods. The sole issue he raises is the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the goods he received were in fact stolеn or feloniously taken. He does not question the proof of the other elements of thе crime, namely that he received the goods and knew or should have known them to be stolеn.
The evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and the Commonwеalth must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in considering a motion in arrest of judgment following a guilty verdict.
Commonwealth v. Simpson,
Appellant was indicted for larceny and receiving stolen goods. After trial without а jury Judge John E. Walsh, Jr., sustained a demurrer to the larceny charge, but found the appellant guilty of rеceiving stolen goods and sentenced him.
Since the evidence that the card was originally stolen or feloniously taken is entirely circumstantial, the appellant urges that to find him guilty the evidence must be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but guilt. Howevеr, that is no longer the law of Pennsylvania. Now, ££[t]he test of the sufficiency of the evidence, irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, is whether accepting as true all оf the evidence upon which, if believed, the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is suffiсient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. . . .”
Commonwealth v. Whiting,
The evidence when considered in its entirety was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the credit card was stolen or feloniously taken. No problem оf ownership or title to the credit card existed. That was clearly vested in Samuel Russell as anyone reading the credit card could ascertain. The card was sealed in an envelope and placed in the hands of the postal authorities. The owner never received it. No *318 one into whose hands this credit card fell, other than the owner, could have tаken it under a claim of right.
The appellant suggests that the card may have come into Rudd’s рossession other than by being stolen or feloniously taken. Specifically, he points to thе possibility that the card may have been lost or strayed. However, we find very little evidencе to support this possibility, but even if it were lost we fail to see how the appellant would be aided. The card, even if “lost”, was still in the constructive possession of the owner whose nаme was imprinted on the card along with the name of the issuing company. Whoever opened the envelope took the card from the owner’s constructive possession. His failure to return the card to either the owner or the issuer, coupled with the act of giving the сard to someone other than the owner, shows the requisite intent for a stealing or felonious taking. Parenthetically, we note that had the card been abandoned it could not havе been subsequently stolen or feloniously taken. However, there is no possibility that it was abandoned since it was in a sealed envelope and would not expire until almost two years аfter it came into appellant’s hands.
We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that someone stole or feloniously took the credit card and that the appellant subsequently received it.
Judgment affirmed.
