Commonwealth v. Dutton, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
July 2, 1973
reargument refused August 9, 1973.
453 Pa. 547 | 307 A.2d 238
Reversed and a new trial is ordered.
Argued April 28, 1972. Before JONES, C. J., EAGEN, O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, with him James J. Wilson, Assistant District Attorney, James D. Crawford, Deputy Distriсt Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE MANDERINO, July 2, 1973:
Appellant, Joseph Dutton, was convicted of murder in the first degree, burglary and aggravated robbery on January 28, 1970, following a jury trial. Post-trial motions were denied. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on December 1, 1971, and this appeal followed.
Prior tо trial, appellant requested the suppression of an inculpatory statement allegedly given by the appellant even though he refused to sign the statement. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. In his post-trial motions, appellant again claimed that the statement was involuntary and was a product of un
Appellant was arrested without a warrant at аpproximately 10:05 a.m., at his home on January 28, 1969. Approximately seven hours earlier, a night watchman had been killed at a laundry company. Appellant was taken to police hеadquarters and a first round of interrogation began at 10:32 a.m. He was given advice concerning his constitutional rights and denied any involvement in the crime. The questioning of the appellant continued throughout the day and did not end until approximately 10:18 p.m., at which time the appellant refused to sign a formal statement. Appellant was not taken before a magistrate until the following day. The exact time is not clear from the record, but it was apparently at 12:41 p.m., approximately twenty-six hours after his arrest.
During the first eight hours after appellant‘s arrest, he was subjected to six different interrogation periods. The shortest period was approximately a half-hour and the longest period was approximately two hours. After the first three interrogation periods, a new officer began his participation in the interrogation process. After the first five interrogation sessions, another officer, who had not participated in the first fivе interrogation sessions, began his participation in the interrogation process. At one point, the appellant was given a polygraph test. During the first five interrogation sessions, aрpellant continually denied any involvement in the crime. After the sixth interrogation session, involving three officers, had been in progress continually for approximately an hour and a half, аppellant, for the first time, made oral statements admitting involvement in the crime. This was approximately eight hours after his arrest and following six separate interrogation sessions throughout the day during which confrontation took place between the appellant and at least six differ
The appellant claims that his statеments were the product of an unnecessary delay between his arrest and his preliminary arraignment and violated Rule 116(a) of the
In Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A. 2d 810 (1965), we specifically called attention to the requirement of taking the person arrested without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority for a preliminary arraignment. We there said that unnecessary delay is “. . . regrettable and to be discouraged. . . .” In Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A. 2d 417 (1972), we held that a violation of the Rules requires that the trial court “. . . exclude all evidence obtained during ‘unnecessary delay’ except that which . . . has nо reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever.” See also Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A. 2d 701 (1973). In this case the delay which occurred between arrest and arraignment was clearly related to the statements obtained. The appellant for approximately eight hours denied any involvement. It was only after six interrogation sessions involving various officers that the appellant madе any inculpatory statement. See Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 148-156, 239 A. 2d 426, 429-434 (1968). The delay in this case was not necessary for any administrative processing; neither was the delay caused by the unavailability of a magistrate. The
Judgment of sentence reversed and case remanded for a new trial.
DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE POMEROY:
In Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A. 2d 417 (1972), this Court adopted “the federal approach” to evidence obtained during an unnecessary delay prior to arraignment, and announced a procedural rule excluding all evidence so obtained from admission at trial.1 Earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A. 2d 473 (1973), we carefully considered the applicability of the Futch decision to a confession obtained during a period of unnecessary delay following an arrest in 1969 and, refusing implicitly to hold such a cоnfession without more inadmissible, we instead applied the “totality of the circumstances” approach of our pre-Futch law.2 Today, however, the Court ignores Riggins and removes all restrictions on the retroactive aрplication of Futch, at least as far back
Like its federal prototypes, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957), our decision in Futch was not based on constitutional considerations. The exclusionary rule we promulgated was grounded on the Court‘s supervisory powers over the administration of justice in the courts of this Commonwealth. We have heretofore consistently denied retrоspective effect to our supervisory rulings, even as to matters as closely related to the fairness of trial proceedings as jury instructions, see Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A. 2d 299 (1971); Commonwealth v. O‘Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A. 2d 497 (1970); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A. 2d 215 (1960).
The effective date of a nеw rule of evidence designed to control police conduct should be determined, in my view, by the same considerations which would govern a novel ruling of constitutional law. See Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 21 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1968). As these hаve been formulated by the United States Supreme Court, they include: (1) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the оld standards, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. Where on balance these considerations do not
The Futch exclusionary rule contributes nothing to the certainty of the judicial fact-finding process. As Mr. Justice EAGEN pointed out in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A. 2d 701 (1973), the rule is directed entirely to police conduct prior to trial and operates irrespective of the reliability or prоbative value of the evidence excluded. One may hope that the threat of exclusion will help to deter dilatory or illegal police conduct, but it can hardly be supposеd that application of the exclusionary rule to events long past will add anything to the rule‘s deterrent force for the future. On the other hand, the Court‘s opinion may have grave repеrcussions on the administration of justice. No one knows how many prosecutions have been instituted since January 1, 1965 in reliance on our pre-Futch rules of admissibility, but there must have been a great mаny. Now, it appears, any defendant convicted on the basis of evidence which under Futch should be excluded is entitled to a new trial, regardless of the fairness of his original trial. I see nothing to bе gained from saddling our judicial system with this potentially staggering burden.4
Mr. Chief Justice JONES and Mr. Justice EAGEN join in this dissenting opinion.