COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph A. DUNCAN, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Argued Oct. 24, 1986. Decided May 20, 1987.
525 A.2d 1177
PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, to-wit, this 23 day of MARCH, 1987, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for reconsideration in light of our decision in Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280 (1986).
Emilio DiMatteo, Jr., Chester, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
PAPADAKOS, Justice.
This is an interlocutory appeal1 by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Appellant) challenging Superior Court‘s Order of July 5, 1985, affirming the pre-trial suppression order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County which granted Appellee‘s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement on grounds the “six hour rule” enunciated in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977),2 had been violated. The suppression court concluded that Appellee was under arrest at the time he “blurted out” the inculpatory statement relating to drugs found in his motel room: “All this stuff is mine, they know nothing about it.” The court further concluded that since Appellee was arrested shortly after 3:00 a.m., and was not arraigned until approximately 11:00 a.m., more than six hours had elapsed; therefore, the Davenport rule was violated and Appellee‘s statement is not admissible at trial. We disagree for the reasons that follow.
Officers Parker and Fife separated and began a search of the motel. Officer Parker observed two men peeking out of a glass doorway. Believing the men were acting in a suspicious manner, he radioed Officer Fife and described his observations. Officer Parker entered the building adjacent to where he had observed the two men and again saw the two individuals peek out of the glass doorway. As Officer Parker approached, the two men exited the building close to where Officer Fife was standing.
Officer Fife stopped the two men and requested some identification, which they provided. The officer then asked if they were guests at the motel. The co-defendant replied in the affirmative. The officer repeated the question to the defendant. Defendant replied that he was a guest in the motel and that they were in the same room. Officer Fife asked to see the room key to confirm their status as guests. The co-defendant stated that his wife was in the room and that she had the key.
The co-defendant went willingly to Room 258 with Officer Fife while Appellee waited with Officer Parker. In response to the co-defendant‘s knock on the door, his wife opened the curtains. At this time, Officer Fife observed through the window a large plastic bag atop a scale. The door was opened and the officer given permission to enter. Upon entering, the officer observed white powder in the plastic bag. Officer Fife called down to Officer Parker, “Jack, you‘d better come up here.” At that time, Officer Parker told Appellee to come with him to the motel room. Appellee entered the room in front of the officer and exclaimed, “All this stuff is mine, they know nothing about
At approximately 3:30 a.m., Investigator Robert Lythgoe arrived on the scene and seized the evidence. Appellee and his co-defendants were then transported to police headquarters and advised of their Miranda rights. Processing of the Appellee was completed at approximately 6:00 to 7:00 a.m. Appellee was preliminarily arraigned at 11:00 a.m., that same morning.
After a preliminary hearing on April 4, 1984, Appellee was held for court on the charges of possession, possession with intent to deliver controlled substances, and conspiracy.
On June 4, 1984, Appellee filed a Motion to Suppress the statement made to the police at the motel. After receiving testimony from Officers Parker and Fife and Investigator Lythgoe on June 11, 1984, the suppression court granted Appellee‘s motion on August 13, 1984. The Commonwealth appealed. Superior Court, in a two-to-one decision, agreed with the findings of the suppression court and affirmed the Order of Suppression on July 5, 1985, 348 Pa.Super. 630, 510 A.2d 290. Judge Wieand dissented on grounds that “there was no causal connection between the delayed preliminary arraignment and the voluntary and unsolicited admission of ownership made by Appellee when controlled substances were found in his room.” The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal which we granted on May 8, 1986, so that we might have the opportunity to review and reconsider the rule adopted in Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra.
In this appeal the Commonwealth raises the following questions for our review: 1) whether the suppression court erred in its conclusion of law that the Appellee was under arrest at the time of his freely volunteered admission; and 2) whether the suppression court improperly employed a per se rule of exclusion of evidence to a violation of the Davenport “six hour rule.”
Appellant first contends that the finding that Appellee was under arrest at the time of his freely volunteered
Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the police had exercised control over his freedom from the moment of the initial stop and that he was not free to go at any time. This Court has utilized the following test for determining whether an arrest has occurred:
We have defined an arrest as any act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.
Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982), citing Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). See also, Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 495 Pa. 612, 435 A.2d 174 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Nelson, 488 Pa. 148, 411 A.2d 740 (1980). An arrest may thus be effectuated without the actual use of force and without a formal statement of arrest. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 455 Pa. 552, 317 A.2d 237 (1974).
The test is an objective one, i.e., viewed in the light of the reasonable impression conveyed to the person subjected to the seizure rather than the strictly subjective view of the officers or the persons being seized. Commonwealth v. Haggerty, supra, 495 Pa. at 615, 435 A.2d at 175, citing Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 327 A.2d 63 (1974). We have also held that a police officer‘s subjective view that a defendant was not free to leave is of no moment absent an act indicating an intention to take the person into custody. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 482 Pa. 97, 393 A.2d 397 (1978).
In reviewing the rulings of a suppression court our initial task is to determine whether the factual findings are sup
In the instant case, the Appellee offered no testimony at the suppression hearing. The suppression court‘s determination that Appellee was under arrest when he accompanied Officer Parker to Room 258 was based on the testimony of the Commonwealth‘s witnesses. The suppression court found that this testimony established that: (a) Appellee had stated that he was a resident of Room 258; (b) following the discovery of the drugs, the officers had probable cause to arrest Appellee, (c) both officers assumed that Officer Parker was to bring Appellee to Room 258, following Officer Fife‘s call, (d) Officer Parker believed that Officer Fife had found the stolen television set or other evidence of crime; (e) Officer Parker testified that at that point Appellee was not free to leave, and (f) under Commonwealth v. Lovette, supra, the act of transporting Appellee to Room 258 without his consent constituted an arrest.
In Lovette the issue was whether placing the defendant in a police vehicle after a “pat down” search and transporting him to the scene of a burglary for identification by the victim constituted an arrest. We held:
Under all of the circumstances, it is clear that the placing of appellant and his companions in the police vehicle for the purpose of transporting them to the scene of the offense, without their consent, constituted an arrest as that term has been defined under our cases. Id. 498 Pa. at 672, 450 A.2d at 978.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Lovette from the instant case in that the police actions there went well-beyond what occurred here, and that the officers there had other options available to them. Here, Appellant argues, when Officer Fife called for Officer Parker to come upstairs a split
Since we conclude that there was an arrest, we now address Appellant‘s second contention that the suppression court improperly employed a per se rule of exclusion of evidence applied technically to a violation of the Davenport rule of prompt arraignment. The Appellant argues that the exclusion of Appellee‘s statement was an inappropriate and unnecessary sanction, as the statement was voluntary and not obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The Davenport rule, briefly stated, provides that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any declaration obtained after arrest but before arraignment is not admissible at trial. Id. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an individual who is arrested be brought before a judicial officer for preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay.
Rule 140 provides that the court shall inform the accused of the charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to bail and his right to a preliminary hearing. Thus, the requirement of a prompt arraignment serves to protect the accused‘s right to know “the nature and cause of the accusation against him,”
We first addressed the problem in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972), wherein we held
While the Futch formula was not designed to terminate police interrogation, it was intended to interrupt it after a reasonable period of time to allow the suspect to be advised of his custodial rights by an impartial judicial officer, as opposed to police officials, and in appropriate cases to establish the conditions of his release pending trial. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 148, 454 A.2d 1004, 1006 (1982).
The Futch rule was deliberately made flexible to provide the opportunity for a court to exclude only that evidence which was clearly tainted by the coercive atmosphere of the custodial interrogation. While this flexibili
Our adoption of the more rigid standard of Davenport was an attempt to assure more certain and even-handed application of the prompt arraignment requirement, and provide greater guidance to trial courts and law enforcement authorities. It was thought that a rule based on the length of delay between arrest and arraignment would simplify the task of determining the admissibility of statements taken before arraignment and thereby further judicial economy. Moreover, the rule would better serve to deter violations of the prompt arraignment requirement and ensure the accused of the protections it affords. Id. 471 Pa. at 287, 370 A.2d 306. While we recognized that it is difficult to fix any particular time limit, we concluded that the six hour rule provided a workable rule which could be readily complied with absent exigent circumstances. Id., 471 Pa. at 286, n. 7, 370 A.2d 306 n. 7. Our experience with the per se application of the rule has proven to the contrary. The rule has been applied on a mechanical basis to violations which bear no relationship to the statement obtained and has shielded the guilty for no reason relevant to the
This Court never intended that the rule of Davenport be rigidly applied in all situations without regard to the purpose of the rule and the evils sought to be avoided by its application. “At no time did we wish to cut off freely volunteered confessions of guilt, nor did we wish to impede legitimate law enforcement efforts. The primary purpose sought to be obtained was to discourage the obtaining of incriminatory information through coercive means,” Jenkins, supra, 500 Pa. at 150, 454 A.2d at 1007, and it was felt that the mere passage of time while under arrest could have a coercive effect upon a defendant.
In establishing the six hour rule of Davenport, we did not abandon the requirement that the incriminating evidence sought to be suppressed be reasonably related to the unnecessary delay, as evidenced by the exigent circumstances exception to the rule. See, Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, 104 S.Ct. 3547, 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461, 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, supra. Moreover, implicit in our holding was a determination that a delay of six hours between arrest and arraignment is an acceptable period of time to accommodate conflicting interests without creating such a coercive effect so as to violate the rights of an accused. Therefore, the focus should be upon when the statement was obtained, i.e., within or beyond the six hour period. If the statement is obtained within the six hour period, absent coercion or other illegality, it is not obtained in violation of the rights of an accused and should be admissible. In keeping with the underlying objectives of the rule, only statements obtained after the six hour period has run should be suppressed on the basis of Davenport.
In the instant case, as Judge Wieand noted in his dissenting opinion, there is absolutely no causal connection between the voluntary statement made by Appellee minutes after his arrest and the subsequent delay in his arraignment by some one and one-half to two hours beyond the six hour Davenport rule. Moreover, the statement was not the product of interrogation, much less coercion. The subsequent illegality of Appellee‘s detention after the voluntary statement does not retroactively change the circumstances under which he made the disclosure. And, Appellee has made no claim that the statement was elicited through illegality. The sole basis of Appellee‘s suppression claim is that of technicality. He was not arraigned within six hours
Accordingly, the Order of Superior Court affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County granting Appellee‘s Motion to Suppress is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County for trial.
FLAHERTY and MCDERMOTT, JJ., file concurring opinions.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion, joined by ZAPPALA, J.
HUTCHINSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.
FLAHERTY, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result as it is clear that appellee‘s statement was voluntary and not the product of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment. Further, I join in that portion of the opinion authored by Mr. Justice Papadakos announcing that statements given within six hours of arrest should not be suppressed merely because arraignment occurs more than six hours after arrest, as those statements ought not be presumed to be the product of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment.
While I am in complete agreement that our rule which requires that persons accused of crimes be afforded a prompt preliminary arraignment, Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977), is a good one, I
MCDERMOTT, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result for the reasons stated in my Concurring Opinion in Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 151, 454 A.2d 1004, 1007 (1982).
NIX, Chief Justice, dissenting.
In Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977), this Court explained that the purpose of its already-existent rule excluding evidence obtained during unnecessary prearraignment delay was “not simply to guard against the coercive influence of custodial interrogation, but to ensure that the rights to which an accused is entitled at preliminary arraignment are afforded without unnecessary delay.” Id., 471 Pa. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added). The “six-hour” rule promulgated in Davenport was designed to effectuate those underlying purposes in a way that was both certain and workable. Although the majority opinion in the instant case recognizes the dual purposes of the rule excluding evidence obtained during unnecessary delay, the majority proposes a drastic abridgment of the Davenport rule that will severely undermine the second of those essential purposes. If, as the majority opinion proposes, only statements obtained after the lapse of the six-hour period should be subject to exclusion, then once the police obtain a statement prior to the end of that period, there will no longer be a compulsion on their part to have the accused arraigned in a timely manner. The sanction for unnecessary delay will be gone. If an
The “six-hour” rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Davenport has had a salutary effect on the administration of criminal justice in this state, in that the rule, while being sensitive to essential rights of an accused, also provides law enforcement officials and the court‘s with a clear and manageable guideline.
I, therefore, dissent.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
HUTCHINSON, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The Commonwealth enjoys a right to appeal an adverse suppression order only upon a good faith certification by the Commonwealth that the suppression order terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution. Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985). See also Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963). My review of the record in this case reveals that the Commonwealth failed to make any certification as to the impact of the suppression order upon its case. Accordingly, I would quash this appeal and would not reach the Davenport issue. The failure to heed the certification requirement of Dugger will only add to Superior Court‘s already congested docket unwarranted Commonwealth appeals of suppression orders. Moreover, I do not believe that the Commonwealth, in good faith, could possibly certify that the exclusion of appellee‘s inculpatory statement alone either terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution in light of the wealth of physical evidence available to the Commonwealth. On the record before us this is a