*1 Appellant. Commonwealth v. Carter, Argued December 1973. Before Wright, P. Watkins, Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Spaeth, JJ. J., absent). (Spaulding, Sigal, appellant.
Lenard H. for Richman, Attorney, David Assistant District him Ranney, James Attorney, T. Assistant District Richard Sprague, A. Attorney, First Assistant District and Arlen Specter, appellee. Attorney, Commonwealth, District
Opinion 24, 1975: June Curiam, Per This case is court for recon- remanded to the lower appellant’s sideration of that his sentence must claim reduced, light decision Court’s 340 A.2d Santiago, Commonwealth v. (1975). Appellant. v. Dixon,
Submitted 6, J., December 1974. Before Watkins, P. Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Voort, Van der and Spaeth, JJ. Packel, Maltby, DeMasse,
Lewis L. Elaine and John W. Defenders, Defender, Ziccardi, Assistant and Vincent J. appellant. Harry Spaeth, Sendrow, M. Mark and Steven H. Gold- Gafni, blatt, Attorneys, Assistant District Abraham J. Deputy Attorney, District Fitzpatrick, and F. Emmett District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Opinion Per Curiam, June 1975: Judgment of sentence reversed and the record re- manded for a new trial. J., opinion
Hoffman, filed an support in reversal, in which Spaeth, J., joins.
Cercone, J., filed support an of reversal, in which JJ., join. Jacobs Spaeth, der J., dissenting
Van filed Voort, opinion, in which Watkins, J., Price, join. P.
Opinion
Support
Hoffman,
Reversal
J.:
Appellant contends that his conviction should be
granted
reversed and a
light
new trial
of Common
wealth v.
321 A.2d
(1974),
*3
Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456
475,
Pa.
At p.m., 1972, 3, 7:30 on November Philadelphia Department Officer Colella of the Police responded reported to a radio call a in disturbance a Philadelphia. bar located at 9th and Clearfield Streets appellant The wrestling officer observed the floor on with request two to addi- other men. The officer left the bar Appellant concedes also contends and the Commonwealth illegal. appellant’s Appellant received con- sentence was charges year on of assault and current one to four sentences battery resisting battery The maximum and assault and arrest. imprisonment battery under the of for assault and term allowed §4708, Code, 24, 1939, §708, 872, P.S. Penal of June P.L. Act 334, 6, 1972, 1482, §5, repealed by No. the Act of P.L. December penalty 1973, years. 6, for two The maximum June was effective year’s duty obstructing performing im- his one an officer in was specific prisonment the a Under fine $500.00. §4314. and/or 275, Nelson, A. 2d 369 mandate charges as in the instant were involved (1973), in which same the sentencing. merged purposes Because case, for two offenses trial, issue. we do reach this new not we remand for a tional assistance. In the officer, another Edward interim, Mcllvaine, also answered the call. reentered As Colella bar, appellant he saw attack Mcllvaine with a bar stool. another, Appellant then knocked a woman from stool finally appellant attacked The Colella. officers subdued nightsticks. with According their to the officers’ trial testimony, through- appellant carried “like man” a wild out the incident. Stanley appellant handcuffed, officer,
After was a third Pables, transported emergency appellant room to the Turner, Episcopal Hospital. Both Pables and Edward Nursing hospital a a testified as Assistant at who witness, defense were stated that when handcuffs “very emergency room, appellant removed in became just wild” and that “he went berserk.” Appellant charged subsequently indicted and February 22, battery resisting assault and arrest. On appellant 1974, the case was called for trial at which time right heard jury. waived his the court date, On gave witnesses, including appellant all who own not contest account of the did incident. prosecution’s argued account, that he was sane but Appellant at the time of the testified incident. having couple remembered in the bar of drinks being thing that he recalled struck from The next behind. having waking up hospital. in the He admitted hospitalized days Trenton been at seventeen days in Hospital for seven State for observation and Hospital Philadelphia for treatment. General judge hearing appellant’s testimony, stated After *4 “total a adjudication and order that would defer May 1974, appellant psychiatric workup.” Finally, on 15, appel- rejected reappeared court which before the trial guilty bills. insanity on all found lant’s claim of and was years, to four pronounced of to The court sentence one battery charges and concurrently, the of assault run battery resisting assault and arrest.
419
The
held in
Court
Commonwealth v.
supra, that the
has the burden in a first
Commonwealth
degree
proving beyond
doubt
murder case of
a reasonable
specific
the
intent
held
it was
to kill. The Court
prove his
require
reversible error
the
to
accused
preponderance
defense of
of the evi-
intoxication
a
unshifting burden
dence : “.
the
. .
Commonwealth has an
prove beyond
a
doubt all elements
reasonable
is,
degree murder
crime.
of such elements in first
One
389,
course,
specific
of
at
321
intent
to kill.” 457 Pa.
a
supra,
v.
A.2d at
884.
Commonwealth
may prove a
prosecution
upheld
Court
the rule that
testimony
lay
sanity by
witnesses. See
of
defendant’s
469
Zlatovich,
388, 269 A.2d
v.
Commonwealth
principle
(1970).
however, underscore
did,
rely upon
longer
can no
of
that “the Commonwealth
law
offer evidence
presumption
sanity, but instead must
321
483,
sane.” 456
to show that
Pa.
[the accused]
sanity
is at issue
question
A.2d at 632. “When
sanity
disappeared
presumption
has
finding
support
must be sufficient to
A.2d at
a reasonable
issue
is
terms of state
law.”
386,
compelled
at
457 Pa.
A.2d at
are
to
We
321
882-83.
by
hold that Rose
Demmitt
are retroactive
a recent
decision
Supreme
of the
The
filed the follow
Court.
Court
ing per
now,
opinion:
day
curiam
“And
this 11th
February,
petition
1975,
granted,
for allocatur is
affirming
order of
Superior
judgment of
Court
sentence is reversed and a new trial
is awarded. See
Demmitt,
Commonwealth
475,
456 Pa.
ability
right
question
specific
to
intent,
form a
of the
but also the
appellant
jury
psychiatric
to
have
deliberate
evidence
degree
to lessen the
of offense due
the actor’s
“diminished
capacity.” “[Appellant]
. . .
that since he introduced
contends
tending
a lack
to show
as
the criminal acts
intent
charged, he is entitled to an
on the
instruction
doctrine
responsibility.
addition, appellant
diminished
maintains
support
plea
guilty
since this
evidence was
of his
of not
insanity,
reason of
the Commonwealth
bear the burden
should
proving sanity beyond
Superior Ct.
doubt.” 228
reasonable
Pa.
87-88,
A. 2d at
324
3. Because our Court decided
without the benefit of
Simms
Supreme
decisions,
Court’s
Justice
voted to remand
ROBERTS
apparent
Superior
Simms to our Court: “It
decided this
without the benefit of
case
our decisions
Common-
380,
(1974),
wealth
Pa.
Spaeth,
joins in
opinion.
this
Opinion
Support op
J.:
Reversal
Cercone,
I reluctantly support
simply
reversal
this case
because,
principles
whenever no substantial
would
compromised by
vigor
this court should
accommodation,
ously strive
equal
to avoid affirmance based on
division.
In
regard,
Judge
I have concluded that
Hoffman’s.
employed by
estimation of the
the
standards
lower court
in evaluating appellant’s insanity
likely
defense are more
As
below,
correct.
indicated
the courts of this Common
uniformly rejected
wealth had
principle
the current
provided by
Commonwealth v.
report prepared. receiving analyzing to be After May report, 22, 1974, judge entered the sentences complained of herein. sum, report found, indicated, judge as the trial very person
that Dixon “is a or hostile who is unable to impulses.” report conclude, refuses to control his did however, competent that Dixon was to stand trial. On this basis the court determined that “the defendant was able to have requisite mens rea at the time of any incident.” Nowhere in the there court’s is failing insanity by.the mention of Dixon’s to show his preponderance of the or even his failure evidence, presump- oifer credible evidence sufficient to overcome sanity. tion of Furthermore, sentencing hearing at the clearly insanity the court stated that it considered Dixon’s going defense as to his state of mind at the time offenses were committed: person totally
“If a then, of it out mentally, *7 course, he could not he have have mens rea. If does merely understanding doing some of he what and is person a hostile unable to or refuses to control who is impulses, very . . well would have mens rea. . “However, reports, he reading I that do feel after just argument your fails to control course, Of himself. himself, ability is he control doesn’t have the to psychiatrists does, whereas the feel that he to some degree, enough degree him or to make at least to of a competent.
“The then the conclusion Court would come to necessary there the act was mens rea to commit circumstances, charged. which he is those Under going guilty Bills of Indict- Court is to find him on all . . ment. authority does not of
One need an extensive recitation and, to know that the crime element mens rea of a is an beyond proved by therefore, must be the Commonwealth a reasonable See, e.g., C.J.S., doubt. Criminal Law §29 (1961). weighing the evidence in the instant case the lower court expressly stated that the Commonwealth proved beyond its case a Therefore, reasonable doubt. it would be not unreasonable to infer from the court’s beyond and the that it found, record doubt, that Dixon was sane the time the were offenses committed.
On the
hand,
other
the court
did
have the benefit
of Commonwealth Demmitt,
(1974),
v.
which
“It is next that the trial court erred its jury proof instructions to the as to the burden of insanity. charge, issue In the course stated, court burden part, the accused had the proving insanity by preponderance the evi- dence have to and that the Commonwealth did not affirmatively prove sanity. argues it Appellant however, jury; this was erroneous to so instruct rejected by majority of this same contention (1970)] Pa. 1 Vogel, [440 nothing gained by further discussion would here.” Id. at 393. unanimously agreed that:
However, in Demmitt the Court from repeat that there must be sufficient “We finding any support source whatsoever *8 beyond reasonable doubt.” Pa. 482. a 456 there case, there can no doubt In the instant be conclude, the court to evidence for sufficient only doubt, appellant was that the sane. reasonable employ question did, fact, court in is whether 424 any In the of
standard. absence indications to the con- trary in the and, indeed, record some indications that the “reasonable doubt standard” employed, I would prefer postponing remanding our decision in this case and so that the might clarify court the basis of its decision.1 The division highlights of this appropriateness court of that course. Unfortunately, compels that same division me to reach a decision on the basis of the state current of the record; and, only on slightly that basis amI more persuaded than necessary. not that a trial new Spaeth, JJ.,
Jacobs and join opinion. in this Dissenting by Opinion Voort, Van der J.: I respectfully must dissent.
While I challenge do not findings my Brethren voting support regarding the reversal, retroactive application of Rose, Commonwealth v. 321 A.2d (1974) and Commonwealth v. Pa. 475, 321 A.2d (1974), challenge and I also do not fact that incorrect, support sentences are I feel those ing reversal seriously holdings have misconstrued and, those cases appellant herein, I further believe the on the record, basis is not entitled to take advant age the holdings in those cases. supra, Commonwealth v.
stated: emphasize upon
“We
insistence
our
Com-
prove beyond
monwealth’s burden to
doubt all
require
elements of the crime
it to
does not
disprove
negative. Thus,
to enable a defendant
negate specific
seek to
intent
reliance on the fact
intoxication,
there
must be evidence in the case
concerning
place
sufficient
in issue
de-
that fact
Indeed,
request
Ms brief the
does not
that he
basis,
only
granted a new
trial
this
but
that we remand
asks
by the court
case for reconsideration
below.
*9
fendant’s mental condition. Such
may
adduced
part
the defendant
case,
as
of his
or, con-
ceivably, may be found in the
own
Commonwealth’s
case in chief or be
through
elicited
cross-examination.
Once a defendant has come forward with such evi-
dence, or it is in the case
the Common-
otherwise,
wealth, as we have indicated
may
above,
introduce
testimony
it,
to refute
duty
but is under no
to do so.”
389-90,
In Commonwealth supra, in- where discussed, defense specifically was it was held that: Pennsylvania in law
“[t]he
is that
in. order to
insanity,
establish
a defendant must still meet at
part
two-pronged
least one
M’Naghten
test.
There must be evidence in the case from whatever
source
he
quality
did not
know
nature and
wrong.”
of his
or
act
that he
it
did not know that was
Pa. at
The evidence indicated disorderly unruly. testimony There was no to the as psychiatric nature of hospitaliza- treatment either majority upon vague tion. holds that this equivocal testimony regarding instability the some mental *10 put proving Commonwealth is to the Herculean task of appellant disorderly. that sane at he the time became holdings This the extends in Rose and It ex- Demmitt. pands upon the demands unwise the Commonwealth to an extent. Super- Willis, Dr. Bernard Assistant J. Hospital appel-
intendent of Farview State that testified severely “seriously, lant time. Demmitt was insane at the I he quality think did not of his know the nature act. I do not think he he could was in a state where any exercise control over I think he was his behavior. my completely absolutely disassociated, insane ... right did not know the difference between corroborating wrong.” psychiatrists other offered Three testify testimony They to that of could Dr. Willis. testify insanity they the time of the offense but did appellant before that Demmitt been under treatment had killing schizophrenia. Our the for a serious condition testimony substantial held that with this insanity placed in question issue, and that the Com- presumption was overcome doubt. prove sanity monwealth must why majority in illustrates instant case accused presumption Demmitt retained testimony the Common- the flimsiest sane. Otherwise proving the burden of improperly put would be wealth sanity beyond reasonable doubt. together the testi- testimony,
Appellant’s own provide do not Commonwealth, mony adduced two-pronged part either supportive M’Naghten produced The evidence test. fails to establish quality did not know nature and of his wrong. act nor that he did not know his acts were compelled For these am to dissent from reasons I decision to reverse.
I would remand the cases affirm convictions and re-sentencing. J., J., join dissenting Watkins, Price, in this P. opinion. Specialty Appellant, Com G I
Commonwealth, v. pany. Appellant, Urban.
Commonwealth, K Amusement Appellant, v. &S Commonwealth, Company. Watkins,
Argued P. Before March Voort, Price, der Jacobs, Cercone, Van Hoffman, *11 Spaeth, JJ. Attorney General, Richard W. Assistant Hollstein, Deputy At- Moschzisker, him Michael District Von