COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Carol DILLON, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Oct. 31, 1991.
598 A.2d 963 | 528 Pa. 417
Argued Jan. 14, 1991.
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County is reinstated.
LARSEN and ZAPPALA, JJ., concur in the result.
David Rudovsky, for amicus-Nat. Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.
Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div., Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., Maxine J. Stotland, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
Appellant, Carol Dillon, was found guilty of murder in the third degree and possession of an instrument of crime following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The trial court denied her post-trial motions and sentenced her to a prison term of not less than three years and no more than six years. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed 386 Pa.Super. 236, 562 A.2d 885. We granted allocatur. We now reverse on the basis of the trial court‘s exclusion of evidence presented by appellant as herein set forth.
Appellant was accused of stabbing and killing her husband, James Dillon, in their home on Saturday, June 7, 1986. Appellant admits to the fatal stabbing but asserts that she did so in self-defense after the decedent, who was drunk at the time, attacked her. At trial, appellant testified that the decedent had become violent when drinking and beaten her on numerous occasions (T.T., 11/4/87, pp. 7-8).
In a trial for homicide, where self-defense is asserted, the defendant may introduce evidence of the turbulent or dangerous character of the decedent. Commonwealth v. Tiffany, 121 Pa. 165, 15 A. 462 (1888). This type of character evidence is admissible on either of two grounds: 1) to corroborate the defendant‘s alleged knowledge of the victim‘s violent character in an effort to show that the defendant reasonably believed that her life was in danger; and/or 2) to prove the allegedly violent propensities of the victim to show that the victim was in fact the aggressor. Commonwealth v. Clemmons, 505 Pa. 356, 479 A.2d 955 (1984); Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297, 284 A.2d 748 (1971). In the instant case, Weinert‘s testimony is admissible on both of these grounds.
Where this character evidence is proffered to corroborate the defendant‘s state of mind, the defendant must demonstrate knowledge of the decedent‘s character or reputation in order to establish a proper foundation for her claim that such knowledge put her in fear. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 180 n. 2, 394 A.2d 968, 970 n. 2 (1978); II Wigmore, Evidence § 246. As noted previously, appellant herein testified as to the numerous episodes of violence inflicted upon her by the decedent when he had
Having established her knowledge of the decedent‘s violent character, appellant was entitled to buttress her claim with evidence of the decedent‘s violent character. Appellant sought to introduce Weinert‘s testimony to explain the decedent‘s general character and reputation when drinking. At the very least, Weinert‘s testimony would have shown that the decedent was “mean and vicious” when drunk. Since there was evidence to show that the decedent had been drinking prior to the stabbing,1 Weinert‘s testimony would be relevant to corroborate appellant‘s state of fear, and therefore, the testimony should have been admitted.
In addition, Weinert‘s testimony should have been admitted on the issue of who was the aggressor. This Court, as far back as 1884, has permitted the introduction of character evidence to prove the decedent‘s violent propensities, where self-defense is asserted and where there is an issue as to who was the aggressor. Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1, 9 (1884). “When the issue of self-defense is made in a trial for homicide, and thus a controversy arises whether the deceased was the aggressor, one‘s persuasion will be more or less affected by the character of the deceased; it may throw much light on the probabilities of the deceased‘s action.” I Wigmore, Evidence § 63 at 467.2 In the instant case, appellant testified that the decedent was the aggressor and that he grabbed her by the arm, pushed her, punched her and told her he was going to kill her just prior to her stabbing him (T.T.,
Weinert‘s testimony was both relevant and competent evidence of the decedent‘s character for violence when drinking and of his being the aggressor. The trial court erred in excluding such evidence.3 Appellant is entitled to a new trial.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ., join this majority opinion.
NIX, C.J., filed a concurring opinion joined by FLAHERTY and McDERMOTT, JJ.
FLAHERTY, J., filed a concurring opinion joined by NIX, C.J., and McDERMOTT, J.
CAPPY, J., filed a concurring opinion joined by LARSEN and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
NIX, Chief Justice, concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority today, I write separately to state my belief that evidence regarding the cumulative effects of wife-beating and general spousal abuse must be admissible to bear upon the “reasonableness” of the conduct by a party who claims self-defense to a charge of spousal homicide.
With respect to battered women in particular, society has condoned wife abuse, ignored or denied its existence, or blamed the wife. The legal system has reinforced this by not providing effective assistance and only selectively enforcing applicable laws. [T]hese “social misconceptions of battered women often blind the [jury] [sic] to the reasonableness of a battered woman‘s use of defensive force.” 8 Harv. Women‘s L.J. at 130 (footnotes omitted).
To support the battered woman‘s argument in a proper case, expert testimony can be introduced to show how a battering relationship generates different perspectives of danger, imminence, and necessary force. Id. at 132. Expert testimony can also explain why the defendant stayed in the relationship, why she never called the police, or why she feared increased violence. The behavioral patterns that emerge in a study of battered women are collectively referred to as “learned helplessness.” 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 432. This learned helplessness and its resulting feeling of inability to control the beatings lead to a process of victimization, rendering the woman psychologically paralyzed and unable to perceive the existence of any available options.
Clearly, society‘s historic refusal to acknowledge or interfere with instances of domestic violence has forced the victims into an impossible situation. As a result of traditionally being unable to obtain help, these victims, all too frequently, resort to killing their abuser, perceiving this to
Section 505(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states:
Use of force justifiable for protection of the person: The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
Section 501 of the Code defines “belief” as meaning “reasonable belief” and this standard has been observed in the decisions of this Court. Commonwealth v. White, 492 Pa. 489, 424 A.2d 1296 (1981); Commonwealth v. Webster, 490 Pa. 322, 416 A.2d 491 (1980); Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 376 A.2d 627 (1977); Commonwealth v. Nau; 473 Pa. 1, 373 A.2d 449 (1977); Commonwealth v. Light; 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d 288 (1974); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 451 Pa. 163, 301 A.2d 841 (1973). Thus, while section 505(a) of the Crimes Code, in conjunction with section 501, sets forth an objective standard for determining whether the use of force was justified, i.e., reasonableness, this Court must necessarily examine the surrounding circumstances, as they impact upon the assailant, in order to make that determination. That is, we must ascertain whether the “reaction” was reasonable considering the circumstances known to the defendant.
In Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981), this Court held that where
there has been physical abuse over a long period of time, the circumstances which assist the court in determining the reasonableness of a defendant‘s fear of death or serious injury at the time of the killing include the defendant‘s familiarity with the victim‘s behavior in the past.
494 Pa. at 472, 431 A.2d at 952.
Further, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 394 A.2d 968 (1978), this Court allowed the introduction of evidence of those factors existing prior to the homicide which bore on the defendant‘s emotional state of mind at the time of the homicide.
Our function as interpreters of the statutory expression of legislative will requires constraint on our part, but not to the point of closing our eyes to relevant evidence which in this case concerns a debilitating phenomenon, the effects of which have long been known but have only recently received a name and the appropriate recognition. It is significant to distinguish between instances when the Court exercises its interpretive judgment and those where the Court examines the propriety of legislatively expressed will. While this Court may not embark upon a process of judicial legislation, we are free to interpret that legislation upon
I am not suggesting that once a defendant has established that she was a victim of the deceased‘s habitual emotional and/or physical abuse, the matter is resolved. I only recommend this as one factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant‘s belief at the time of the homicide that deadly force was necessary.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.
FLAHERTY and McDERMOTT, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.
FLAHERTY, Justice, concurring.
I join the concurring opinion authored by Mr. Chief Justice Nix as I too see no reason to establish what the chief justice terms a “... separate and distinct defense to homicide.” The law surrounding self-defense has developed adequately to accommodate the effect of long-term physical abuse (Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 472, 431 A.2d 949, 952 (1981)) and to go further gives me pause.
NIX, C.J., and McDERMOTT, J., join in this concurring opinion.
CAPPY, Justice, concurring.
I join the majority but write separately because the majority failed to address an issue which I believe is properly before us and should be resolved. The issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony relating to the so-called “battered woman syndrome.”1 More specifically, the issue is whether we should permit expert testimony about the battered woman‘s syndrome in a self-
Mrs. Dillon testified at trial that her husband had physically assaulted her approximately eighteen to twenty times during their eighteen month marriage. She also testified that Mr. Dillon had repeatedly struck her in the twenty-four hour period prior to the killing. Mrs. Dillon stated that on the night before the killing, her husband had hit her head on the night table, causing her head to bleed.
On the evening of the killing, Mrs. Dillon testified that she had broken free from her husband while they were in the car and went into the house. As she was cleaning up in the kitchen, Mr. Dillon grabbed her by the arm and pushed her over by the counter. She was pinned by the refrigerator and was unable to break away from her husband. He
Ms. Zerbe, a cousin of Mrs. Dillon, testified that she was present in May of 1985 when Mr. Dillon started “hollering and screaming” and began “throwing punches” at Mrs. Dillon. Ms. Zerbe, in an attempt to protect her cousin, jumped in between the Dillons and was the recipient of the blows intended for Mrs. Dillon.
Mrs. Dillon‘s youngest son testified that on the night before the killing, his mother‘s head was bleeding from a gash which she received after an argument she had with the deceased. The son testified that he asked the deceased whether he had hit his mother, but the deceased merely told him to get some aspirin for her, never answering the question.
Detective Miller testified that he observed bruises on Mrs. Dillon‘s arms and legs on the day of the killing as well as red finger marks on her legs, “as if somebody had grabbed her by the leg and squeezed it.” He also testified that on the night of the killing, he saw an injury on her scalp with visible dried blood.
A neighbor of the Dillons testified that shortly before the killing, the deceased grabbed Mrs. Dillon by the arm in the car, restraining her from leaving the vehicle. He testified that Mrs. Dillon broke free and ran up the stairs to the house.
At the trial of this matter, counsel for Mrs. Dillon requested that he be permitted to call Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, a clinical psychiatrist, to testify about the battered woman syndrome and its applicability to the facts of the case. The trial court refused to admit such testimony, relying on the Superior Court‘s ruling in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 358 Pa.Super. 270, 517 A.2d 540 (1986), which held that “[t]he ‘battered woman syndrome’ has not been recognized in this Commonwealth as a viable defense in case [sic] of homicide.” 358 Pa.Super. 270, 278, 517 A.2d 540, 544 (1986).
Following the trial of the case sub judice, this Court reversed the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989). In Stonehouse, we stated, in a plurality decision,3 that:
[W]e believe that expert testimony regarding battered women is admissible as the basis for proving justification in the use of deadly force where the defendant has been shown to be a victim of psychological and physical abuse.
Id., 521 Pa. at 61, 555 A.2d at 783.
As was discussed in Stonehouse, the myths concerning battered women are firmly entrenched in the minds of our culture. For example, many people believe that battered women are masochistic, weak and uneducated, that they can easily escape victimization by leaving their tormentors, and that the police would protect such women if only they would
Evidence concerning battered women generally arises in two distinct types of murder cases. The first scenario is the “non-confrontational” type case in which an abused woman kills her husband during a period of time when he is not attacking her. Often, the killings occur while the husband is sleeping or otherwise incapacitated. See, Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa.Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, 373 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810 (1987). That type of case is not before us here.
The battered woman issue also arises in “confrontational” killings, where the woman uses deadly force in response to an actual physical attack. Several jurisdictions have permitted testimony about the battered woman syndrome in cases involving a confrontational, self-defense posture. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.1989); State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d. 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) and State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981), appeal after remand, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me.1983).5
As stated, the question before this Court is whether we should permit expert testimony about the battered woman
First, it is clear that many jurors believe the myths about battered women and will often be unable to understand either why a woman failed to leave her husband or why she did not contact the police for assistance. These stereotypic beliefs underscore the importance of expert testimony to explain why women remain silent about and in denial of the abuse they have suffered. Without expert testimony, many jurors-who have little knowledge or understanding of the dynamics of batterers and their victims-find the tales of abuse and the reactions of those abused simply beyond their ken. One commentator thoughtfully notes:
Testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome is of particular value to a defendant whose emotional patterns and social history conform to the syndrome because it effectively rebuts common jury misconceptions, such as the notion that she might have been able to extricate herself from the abusive relationship by some means short of killing her batterer.6
Thus, expert testimony is proper to educate the jury about the phenomenon of batterers and their spouses. As Justice Flaherty wrote for the majority in Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986):
It has long been established that expert opinion testimony is proper only where formation of an opinion on a subject requires knowledge, information, or skill beyond what is possessed by the ordinary juror. As stated in Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 334, 227 A.2d 900, 903 (1967) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 443, 123 A.2d 435, 438 (1956)), “Expert testimony is admissible in all cases, civil and criminal alike, when it
involves explanations and inferences not within the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and experience.‘”
Id., 512 Pa. at 442, 517 A.2d at 921.
The danger of not presenting expert testimony in these cases is that the jury may well be predisposed to judge the actions and reactions of a woman in a position that they cannot hope to comprehend. In my view, many jurors who know nothing about battered women simply find the tales of abuse too incredible to believe and thus, refuse to keep an open mind about the rest of the evidence, being convinced that “no one would have put up with such abuse therefore it must not be true.” The testimony of the expert is intended to refute some of the common prejudices against battered women, thus permitting the jury to have a better ability to judge the evidence rationally, rather than judge it on the basis of an erroneous prejudice.7 Once the jury is educated by an expert about the battered woman syndrome, they are in a much better position to assess the facts before them.8
This Court has consistently held that in self-defense cases, the jury must decide whether the acts of the defen-
What may seem to be “reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm” to a person who is not the subject of abuse may not correspond with the reasonable fear of someone who has been living with an abusive husband.9 As the Washington Supreme Court aptly noted in State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984),
We find that expert testimony explaining why a person suffering from the battered woman syndrome would not
The second reason I believe that expert testimony should be admissible is that it may be shown to be relevant to the defendant‘s state of mind. Admitting such testimony in self-defense cases is wholly consistent with our case law allowing evidence tending to show whether the defendant believed his life was in danger.
In Commonwealth v. Michael Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975), we held that state of mind evidence is relevant to show that the defendant acted not out of malice, but out of fear. See also, Commonwealth v. Scott, 480 Pa. 50, 389 A.2d 79 (1978), in which we held it was error not to permit appellant‘s wife to testify about prior racial incidents in which they were victimized to show the jury that appellant was in a state of fear at the time of the shooting and that he acted in self defense, or at the very least, not out of malice. “Clearly appellant‘s state of mind was relevant in the instant case. The evidence he sought to present to the jury tended to establish that his actions were motivated by fear rather than the intent required to convict for murder.” Id.; 480 Pa. at 56, 389 A.2d at 82. Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981) we stated “there is no reason why a finding of self-defense should not consider the mental state of a reasonable person who has suffered repeated previous beatings at the hands of the victim.” 494 Pa. at 472-73, 431 A.2d at 952 (quoting Comment, 6 Pepperdine L. Rev. 213, 223 (1978)).
In self-defense cases, we have long permitted testimony about the defendant‘s knowledge of the victim‘s prior violent acts, Commonwealth v. David Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 394 A.2d 968 (1978), as well as evidence of the history of abuse suffered at the hands of the victim, Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981). In Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa.Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, 373
Pennsylvania courts recognized that battered wives, viewing the facts through a filter of fear caused by past beatings, might reasonably perceive the approach of their threatening but unarmed husbands in the same way that another person would view the approach of a stranger with an upraised knife.
Id., 363 Pa.Superior Ct. at 336, 526 A.2d at 373 (emphasis in original).10
The Superior Court in Grove refers to Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981), in which we stated that:
In a case such as this, in which there has been physical abuse over a long period of time, the circumstances which assist the court in determining the reasonableness of a defendant‘s fear of death or serious injury at the time of a killing include the defendant‘s familiarity with the victim‘s behavior in the past.... ‘[T]here is no reason why a finding of self-defense should not consider the mental state of a reasonable person who has suffered repeated previous beatings at the hands of the victim.’ [cites omitted]
Id., 494 Pa. at 472-73, 431 A.2d at 949 (emphasis supplied).
The reason testimony about the deceased victim‘s prior behavior is admissible is that it is relevant to the state of mind of the defendant at the time the killing occurred. Psychiatric testimony may also be relevant to the defendant‘s state of mind at the time of the killing.
In prior cases, this Court and the Superior Court have permitted expert psychiatric testimony to be introduced in murder cases when such testimony is relevant to certain
Applying the established principles of relevancy to a murder prosecution where a defendant asserts that he acted in the heat of passion, it seems clear [that] any evidence-lay or psychiatric pertinent to that defense should be admissible.
The same rationale is applicable in a self-defense case. In Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 50, 376 A.2d 627, 629 (1977), then Justice, now Chief Justice Nix, writing for the majority, stated that “we agree that the proffered evidence [psychiatric testimony] would have been relevant to a claim of self-defense....” In Black, however, the facts did not support the self-defense claim and thus, we found that the exclusion of the proffered testimony did not require reversal.11
In the plurality decision of Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d 288 (1974), Justice Pomeroy (joined by Justice Jones, with Justices Eagen and O‘Brien concurring in result) writing in favor of affirmance, stated that there were two elements to self-defense:
First, the defendant in fact must have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger. Second, the belief must be reasonable in light of the facts as they appeared to him. [cite omitted] The first element is entirely subjective; the second, clearly objective.
As the cases cited herein demonstrate, permitting expert testimony in a case such a this is in complete accord with our existing case law. I do not believe we would be creating a new “battered woman‘s defense” by permitting expert testimony in the case sub judice, nor would I suggest that we attempt to do so here. The defense asserted is self-defense. The testimony of the expert is relevant to the defendant‘s state of mind concerning self-defense and is helpful to the jury in evaluating the testimony.
In a self-defense case in which the defendant alleges that she was battered by the victim and proffers competent expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome, I believe that an expert may testify about the
I asked him, “Please stop; don‘t hit me anymore.” That just didn‘t do anything. And he kept repeating, “I am going to kill you.” At this point I was scared. I thought he was going to kill me, because I have never seen him react like this.
Although we need not decide whether, as a general rule, expert testimony is relevant to the reasonableness of a defendant‘s state of mind, in the case of self-defense involving the battered woman‘s syndrome, it clearly is relevant.14
I believe it is furthermore apparent that if psychiatric testimony is relevant to the issue of self defense, it is
Reviewing the testimony of the witnesses as a whole in the case sub judice, I believe that the appellant introduced evidence establishing a “pattern of battering,” Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 66, 555 A.2d at 785, sufficient to enable her to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome as initially recognized in Stonehouse.15
For the reasons recited, I believe that in addition to the remand as ordered by the majority, this case also should be remanded with the instruction that the trial court permit the appellant to introduce expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome.
LARSEN and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.