Commonwealth v. DiazCommonwealth v. Diaz
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- Before:
- Spalding
On аn appeal from a District Court to the Superior Court the defendant was tried and convicted on a complaint charging a violation of regulations governing the Logan Airport and was sentenced to pay a fine of $25., The regulations involved, which were introduced in evidence, read as follows: “Section II (13). The operator of each taxicab or limousine in the proper line shall, at all times until engaged for hire, remain in the operator’s seat and at the wheel of his vehicle, or outside and within six (6) feet of his vehicle, and shall, at no time while outside his vehicle, obstruct vehicular or pedestrian traffic.” “Section IV (3): Any person who violates the provisions of these rules and regulations, shall be subject to the penalty not exceeding five hundred ($500.00) dоllars for any one offence.” The regulations of which these are a part are entitled, “Rules and regulations for the operation of taxicabs, limousines, motor buses, and charter automobiles at General Edward Lawrence Logan Airport established by the State airport management board, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 637, acts of 1948.”
The case comes here on the defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict. There was evidencе which would warrant a finding that the defendant, an operator of a taxicab, violated the regulations in question. The defendant does not contend otherwise. The ground urged in support of his exception is that the statute from which these regulations stem is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. That statute so far as material reads as follows: “The commissioner shall make such rules
That the Legislature cannot under our Constitution delegate its general power to make laws is so well settled that a citation of authorities is not necessary. That is especially true with respect to its power to define crimes and establish penalties therefor. See
Sheehan, petitioner,
254 Mass. 342, 345. But one of the exceptions to or qualifications of that doctrine is that the Legislature may delegate to a board or an individual officer the working out of the details of a policy adopted by the Legislature.
Commonwealth
v.
Hudson,
315 Mass. 335, 341-342, and cases cited.
Commonwealth
v.
Fox,
218 Mass. 498, 500. “To deny this [power] would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and detеrmination outside the halls of legislation.”
Field
v.
Clark,
143 U. S. 649, 694. It is on this principle that ordinances and by-laws of municipalities and the regulations of various boards have been upheld.
Brodbine
v.
Revere,
182 Mass. 598, 600-602. Of course such ordinances or regulations, to be valid, must be within the ambit of the enabling statute.
Winthrop
v.
New England Chocolate Co.
180 Mass. 464.
Reading St. 1948, c. 637, as a whole, we are of opinion that a sufficiently definite legislative mandate is laid down so that the commissioner and board may constitutionally fill in the details and that the authority delegated was not excessive. The power granted to them to make such rules and regulations “for the use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned airports as he may from time to time deem reasonable and expediеnt” is not essentially different from the power granted by statute to the board of metropolitan park commissioners which was upheld in Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598. There the board was given authority to “make rules and regulations for the government and use of the roadways or boulevards undеr its care, breaches whereof shall be breaches of the peace, punishable as such in any court having jurisdiction of the same” (pages 599-600). Other cases upholding similar delegations of power to local governing bodies are Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, and Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340.
The faсt that the statute empowered the commissioner, subject to the board’s approval, to provide penalties for the violation of the regulations did not render it invalid. This is not a case where the statute authorized the commissioner to fix such pеnalties as he saw fit. Had the statute attempted to do that we have no doubt that it would have been an excessive delegation of power. See
State
v.
Curtis,
230 N. C. 169;
People
v.
Ryan,
267 N. Y. 133. But the statute here
In some instances where a local governing body or board is authorized to make regulations the penalty is fixed by the statute itself. See, for example,
But penalties attaching to the violation of regulations are not always fixed in this manner. Frequently, as here, the local governing body or board is empowered to prescribe the penalties within Emits prescribed by the Legislature. See
It is true that in the instances mentioned above the power to prescribe penalties was within narrower limits than those granted here. It is one thing to give tо a board or municipality power to fix penalties not in excess of $20 or even $100 and quite another to empower it to fix them up to $500. The authority which may be granted to a local governing body to fix penalties, even when a maximum limit is prescribed, is not unrestricted. Such bodies cannot be granted a roving commission to establish within broad limits such penalties as they see fit. That is essentially a legislative power which cannot be delegated. The question is one of degree. The “use, operation, and maintеnance of state-owned airports” could conceivably necessitate rules and regulations relating to much more hazardous activities than those arising from the operation of taxicabs and limousines. The power to determine penalties granted to the commissioner here goes to the very verge of what is permissible, but we are not prepared to say that it crosses the fine. .
While the statute is not invalid, for the reasons discussed above, we are disposed to hold otherwise with respect to the regulation here involved, or at least so much of it as ” prescribes the penalty. Where authority is granted to a local governing body to work out the details of a legislative policy — even the broad authority given here: to make such rules and regulations “as . . . [The commissioner] may from time to time deem reasonable and expedient” — the power must not be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the rules and regulations must be reasonable. See Winthrop v. New England Chocolate Co. 180 Mass. 464; Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241; Commonwealth v. Badger, 243 Mass; 137; Druzik v. Board of Health of Haverhill, 324 Mass. 129; Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519.
We recognize that the defendant here was fined $25 rather than the maximum of $500, but that does not validate the conviction. The reasonableness of the regulation is to be tested by what can happen under it rather than by what actually did happen. See Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247, 251. The fortuitous circumstance that a reasonablе penalty was imposed by the court did not render the regulation valid and deprive the defendant of his right to challenge it. We also recognize that the ground on which we have held the regulation invalid is not the ground urged by the defendant, but that is immaterial. In substance he has challenged the law under which he was convicted and he is entitled not to be sentenced on a law that is invalid.
It follows that the defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict must be sustained.
So ordered.
Notes
The Supreme Court of California, however, in Harbor Commissioners of Eureka v. Excelsior Redwood Co. 88 Cal. 491, held that the Legislature could • not delegate to a board the power to prescribe penalties not in excess of $500 for violation of its regulations.